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The AMERICAN JOURNAL *of* ECONOMICS *and* SOCIOLOGY

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VOL. 9 JULY, 1950 NO. 4

What is "Equality of Opportunity"?

By FRANCIS NEILSON

The Importance of Definitions

SOCRATES WAS A STICKLER for clear definitions. Who can read "The Republic" and fail to enjoy his method of making his friends explain the meaning of the words they used that day they were gathered at the Piraeus, when they began their search for justice? The quest would have been fruitless if, at each step taken in the discussion, he had not insisted on clarifying the meaning of leading terms. Cicero, too, was strict about the necessity of defining economic and political ideas in a way so simple that his hearers understood what was meant. His declaration on natural law is an example of the care he took to make his meaning clear.

Marcus Aurelius was another who asked for precise definition. His advice is worth quoting:

> Make for thyself a definition or description of the thing which is presented to thee, so as to see distinctly what kind of a thing it is, in its substance, in its nudity, in its complete entirety, and tell thyself its proper name, and the names of the things of which it has been compounded, and into which it will be received. . . .

These are precepts to be followed if we would know the exact meanings of terms. From the men who laid them down so long ago we gather that conversation was no less difficult then than it is now. Indeed, Plato's work, "The Republic," will forever remain the outstanding example of the confusion in men's thought and how hard it is to make them understand that words and phrases must have particular meanings, if the time given to controversy is not to be misspent.

A few years ago, at a dinner party, held at the house of a physicist—a Nobel prize winner—one of the leading sociologists of the country asked, "What is to take the place of the capitalistic system?" The question was addressed to an economist, but before he could reply, the physicist put in, "What *is* the capitalistic system?"

The rest of the evening was taken up with an argument about the meaning of the phrase "capitalistic system," and so different were the ideas of the people at the table about it that the time passed without the original question being answered.

Socrates was perhaps the only philosopher who succeeded in making his disputants realize that they would get nowhere in their controversy about justice unless they agreed upon clear definitions of words. All through the centuries, down to our own day, we have had countless illustrations of the futility of attempting to determine what men mean by their leading terms unless, at the outset of the discussion, they agree upon precise definitions of the principal concepts.

Roger Bacon, the great Franciscan mathematician of the thirteenth century, said: "The mixture of those things by speech which are by nature divided is the mother of all error."

How strange it is that so little is done in the institutions of learning to enlighten the students about this necessary study. It is fundamental to a proper understanding of discourse. Yet, some of our modern philosophers, politicians, and economists reveal in their writings that they have not given due consideration to these matters. They are often as guilty of defects in expression as men were at any time.

One has only to think of the term laissez faire, as it has been used since the days of Archdeacon Cunningham, to know that this is so. The industrial system, often called the capitalistic system, is frequently described as one of laissez faire. However, when it is pointed out that there has never been, in any political civilization, a period of no restriction, thinking men realize that the term is misapplied. A free industrial system in a complex civilization has never been known, and since the days of the so-called Industrial Revolution, neither Great Britain nor any European country has been without restrictive laws which interfere with production and commerce. The confusion in the minds of students, caused by the misuse of this term, is responsible for much of the misunderstanding so widespread among Fabians and many sociologists.

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The Physiocrats and Laissez faire

THE PHYSIOCRATS, who advocated an economic system of laissez faire, were a clear-thinking body of men. Henry Dunning Macleod, in his book, "Elements of Economics" (1881), described their doctrine and the industrial goal they had in view. It would serve a useful purpose if our mentors would prescribe a course in economic fundamentals that would include the study of the system advocated by the Physiocrats.

In his very interesting work, "The Growth of English Industry and Commerce in Modern Times" (2 vols., Cambridge University Press, 1903), Dr. Cunningham repeatedly uses the term laissez faire, but nowhere does he explain what it really means. François Quesnay announced the doctrine in his work, "*Le Droit Naturel*" (1768), an inquiry into natural rights. It goes to the basis of man's urge to satisfy his desires and needs with the least exertion. It is a demand for freedom to produce the commodities that are necessary for his well-being. One of the clearest statements to be found upon the idea of the Physiocrats is that of Henry George, in "The Science of Political Economy" (N. Y., Robt. Schalkenbach Foundation, 1938), Book II, Chapter IV, in which he translates and defines the motto of Quesnay: "*Laissez faire, laissez aller,*" as "A fair field and no favor."

It was not until long after the enclosure acts had depopulated the countrysides of England and driven men into the towns that the term laissez faire was applied to industry. But at no time since the discovery of coal and steam has there been such a condition as "a fair field and no favor." Restrictive industrial laws and the taxation of wealth had been in vogue since the days of the Stuarts. However, the so-called capitalistic system could not have raised its grimy edifices so speedily (when the machine driven by steam superseded the old village system of handicraft), had not enclosures supplied the labor market with an abundance of men who had no alternative. Indeed, it was a denial of laissez faire which produced a capitalism that throve on low-paid labor.

Quesnay and his colleagues did not envisage industrial conditions such as those that sprang into being after the discovery of coal and steam. He died in 1774, and the inventions of Watt, Hargreaves, and Arkwright were then in their infancy. It was not easy for those born fifty or sixty years later to find a perspective that would enable them to view the sequence of events that led to the Hungry Forties and the destitution rife in the manufacturing towns. Moreover, Quesnay could not know that an economic revolution was progressing covertly in England, with the object of despoiling the free laborers of the common fields and turning them adrift to crowd into urban districts in search of work.

According to Frederick Clifford's "A History of Private Bill Legislation" (2 vols., London, 1885), 3,511,814 acres of land were enclosed by private bills in the eighteenth century. But this figure is only the extent of the areas declared in the bills. As for enclosures and depopulation by force, such means for territorial aggrandizement had been taken ever since the days of John of Gaunt.

Quesnay's economic theory of dealing with the first factor in production, land—the passive factor, the created one—was philosophically sound, and in it lay the attribute of freedom to produce, equality of opportunity.

This period—the century and a half from 1700 to 1850—deserves a new, thorough treatment, now that we have so much fresh material, much of it discovered by John Hammond. But it will serve no educative purpose to survey it from our present-day vantage point. The recorder might begin with James E. Thorold Rogers' book, "Six Centuries of Work and Wages," and trace the thread of this most terrible of all revolutions, stretching from the end of the thirteenth century, when a serf held twelve acres of arable, down to our own day, when the great mass are landless wage slaves.

In a review of Henry Steele Commager's book, "The American Mind" (Yale University Press, 1950), Joseph Wood Krutch quotes from it:

> What populism and progressivism, the new freedom and the New Deal, meant in terms of political philosophy was the final repudiation of laissez-faire and the explicit recognition of government as a social welfare agency.

Here in America an industrial system of laissez faire has not existed since the birth of trade unionism. Protective tariffs, factory laws, social legislation, and trade union demands for higher nominal wage and fewer working hours are contrary to all the ideas that were held by the Physiocrats. It is not a question of whether these expedients were necessary to ameliorate the economic distress. The consequence of such legislation shows clearly that as more of these measures are put upon the statute book, more are required to bolster them. Nothing has been done to provide man with an alternative to entering the labor market, and we have seen the dollar he earns (when he gets a chance to work) shrink in purchasing power. Moreover, all the labor-saving aids produced by science and invention tend to make life harder for him.

The Meaning of "Radical"

ANOTHER WORD EMPLOYED loosely by politicians and editors is "radical." If the members of the famous Radical Club of Boston could know how it is used today, they would be amazed. Every member of that unique

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society was an individualist, whether he were a Whig, a Democrat, or a Republican. How this term has been twisted to cover the nostrums of Socialists and Communists no one pretends to say. In England and in this country it was in use long before the days of Marx and Engels.

The Oxford Dictionary gives a satisfactory definition of it, and there is no excuse whatever for its being misapplied. It means "root," and an English Radical of the eighteenth century was a man who desired the restoration of the constitution; the abolition of landlordism; and the re-establishment and reaffirmation of "the law and custom of the land."

This claim appears occasionally in philosophical and political tracts since the days of Edward the Confessor, though it is scarcely noticed by the Radicals of the school of Grote, Mill, and Molesworth. Thomas Paine was a Radical, and so was Thomas Jefferson. Only one who is not particular about his definitions could use it to designate political and social nostrums that are as superficial as those in vogue today.

Equality of Opportunity—Economic, Political, or Social

How often we notice now in the speeches of politicians and in the essays of men directing the fortunes of our institutions of learning the phrase "equality of opportunity." A former President of this country frequently inserted it in his fireside chats, but it was left to the discretion of the listeners as to what he meant by it. Whether he referred to it in a social sense or a political or economic one, none could gather from the context in which it was embedded.

What is implied by it would certainly make a great difference to the understanding of those whose opportunity to earn a decent living is thwarted by restrictive laws. For so many people it seems to be somewhat like the blessed word Mesopotamia—high sounding and of merely decorative purpose; a literary boss or a bit of chiselled foliage for a capital.

Many years ago a popular archbishop delivered a sermon in which he called for a system of equality of opportunity. Afterwards, some of his parishioners wanted to know what he meant by the phrase. He explained that he used it in an economic sense, a desire for the people to have access to land, which is the basis of their existence.

The controversy that arose from this explanation impressed the archbishop with the fact that those in his see who, in their domains, held sway over natural resources were not inclined to part with their acres. Needless to say, the archbishop dropped the subject and returned to sermons which in no way disturbed the economic notions of his well-to-do parishioners.

A newspaper commenting upon the controversy said that it was better for church dignitaries to stick to sin, schism, and squalor. Within the church there could be very little controversy about these daily problems.

In an interview published in *The New York Times Magazine*, March 5, 1950, Dr. A. W. Griswold, the new president of Yale University, said:

> By democracy I mean a political society in which the greatest possible measure of justice implicit in the phrase *equal opportunity* is combined with the greatest possible measure of freedom and encouragement for the individual to develop his own talent, initiative and moral responsibility. . . .

Here we find it in a context which gives us the impression that the speaker has a definite idea of what the phrase signifies, and perhaps he took it for granted that there would be no doubt in the mind of the reader as to its application. He may have thought no one would so misunderstand the use to which he put it as to imagine it had a political or social significance.

In a democracy where adult suffrage is established, we are supposed to be on a basis of equality of opportunity, so far as voting goes. Here there is no such privilege as that which was enjoyed by the plural voter in Great Britain up until a few years ago. One adult, one vote, is the basis of the franchise in this country. But after the voting is over and the candidates have been elected to the legislatures, the equality of opportunity of the elector ceases to be a determining factor, and through lack of further interest the legislators are left to themselves to conduct the affairs of the nation. The daily papers are full of instances of privilege, nepotism, and graft, and the investigating committees organized to deal with abuse are so many that it is difficult to sustain interest in their proceedings. Therefore, it might be said that the electors' equality of opportunity in political affairs comes to an end when the poll closes on election day.

Now in social affairs there cannot be equality of opportunity for all in a democracy. In the first place, it is not in the nature of man—nor, indeed, in that of woman—to desire it. The first difficulty would be in determining from which stratum the move should be made—from below, up, or from up, down. It is only necessary to walk through the neighborhoods of a medium-sized town and notice the places where the various sections of the community live to be convinced that social equality of opportunity is impossible under this system. There are supposed to be no class distinctions in the land of the free. That may be so in theory, but it is certainly not so in practice.

Some time ago a critic of the system remarked that only at baseball games, race meetings, and prize fights does one see the classes mix on a

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democratic basis. In the main, this is true, and to a certain extent it is true of such sporting events in Europe. Yet, we have our special enclosures and sections in grandstands for those who can afford to pay high prices for their seats. Money talks, and though we despise such social divisions as upper classes, middle classes, and lower classes, we realize that the purse has much the same significance everywhere; the amount of income only too often denotes the social line of demarcation between one section of the community and another.

The Meaning of Justice

PRESIDENT GRISWOLD TELLS US he is in favor of "the greatest possible measure of justice implicit in the phrase *equal opportunity.*" What makes his declaration somewhat unique is that he associates the term justice with "freedom and encouragement for the individual to develop his own talent, initiative and moral responsibility."

There have been notions just as confused about the meaning of the term "justice" as there have been about the phrase "equality of opportunity." I presume Socrates would say, if he were at Yale, that equality of opportunity was synonymous with justice. But who is prepared to create a State such as Socrates had in mind? Some years ago I made a composite definition of justice as it is described in "The Republic":

> Justice is the institution of a natural order in which a man can produce food, buildings, and clothing for himself, removing not a neighbour's landmark, practising one thing only, the thing to which his nature is best adapted, doing his own business, not being a busybody, not taking what is another's nor being deprived of what is his own, having what is his own, and belongs to him, interfering not with another, so that he may set in order his own inner life, and be his own master, his own law, and at peace with himself. ("The Eleventh Commandment," N. Y., The Viking Press, 1933, p. 82)

These ideas may be gained from the debates that took place on the occasion of the festival of Bendis, the Thracian Artemis. The event—almost forgotten now—was one of the most important recorded in history, and it would be well for those who are interested in a bureaucratic State to return to "The Republic" and learn once more about the ideas held by wise men centuries before the beginning of the Christian Era. It would take a book of many pages to follow the lines of thought inspired by Socrates.

Think of the work of the jurisconsults of Rome! In the "Institutes of Justinian" it is laid down that "he is just who gives to each what belongs

to him." The Fathers of the Church saw to the heart of this idea and clearly differentiated between land and property. Down through the Dark Ages, into the Middle Ages, and as near our time as Richard Hooker and Joseph Butler, thinkers have expressed themselves in the terms set forth by Socrates.

However, we live in a workaday world, and we seem not to be interested in philosophical abstractions. We are practical people, and much of our thought is given to the making of the hydrogen bomb and the question of who will drop it first. Science has taken possession of the field of ideas, and now the physicists together with the laymen are victims of the political system in which we live, for the present.

It is to be hoped that President Griswold will have a fair field and no favor, and we shall watch with deep interest his pilgrimage of peace in a society that is in sad need of his assistance.

Natural Law

PHILOSOPHERS AND JURISTS, since the days of Plato and Cicero, have interpreted natural law in an economic sense, and their commentators—at least from the time of Aquinas to John Locke—have promulgated the idea that man has a right to use the earth, which is necessary for his subsistence. Equality of opportunity, therefore, means nothing less than equal rights to use land because man is a land animal and cannot live or work without it.

There should be no doubt of this in the mind of a cultivated American because when this Republic was founded, many men expressed themselves clearly upon this matter. St. George Tucker and John Taylor followed the Lockian tradition closely and expressed their notions of natural right in the same downright manner as Coke and Blackstone. Tucker says: "All men being by nature equal, in respect to their rights, no man nor set of men, can have any natural, or inherent right, to rule over the rest."

It would be well for some of our latter-day exponents of economic and political affairs to return to the writings of the men of the Revolutionary era. An excellent work for students is "American Interpretations of Natural Law," by Benjamin Fletcher Wright, Jr. (Cambridge, Mass., 1931). Though it may be late in the day to do anything of a practical nature to restore economic rights, it would do no harm if educators of influence in our institutions of learning renewed acquaintance with the thought of men who laid the philosophical basis for the structure of this Republic.

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Accretions and Confusion

A FASCINATING STUDY for a man who thinks and writes is to notice the accretions of definitions given to simple terms since Johnson compiled his dictionary. It is difficult to keep pace with the various shades and meanings that creep upon a word like ivy on a wall. The more we learn, the more need for a lexicon.

Some years ago I received from the great-nephew of Archbishop Trench a very unusual present—a copy of the twenty-seventh edition of "On The Study of Words" (1st ed., 1851). The Archbishop wrote it just about one hundred years ago, and when I was a boy, scholars in the higher forms were reminded of it frequently in the courses in English literature.

Alas, it is out of date, and only philologists would derive pleasure from a study of it. We live in an age when great masses of people so little understand the metrical beauty of the King James Version of the New Testament that it has to be rewritten. It is a sad commentary on the schooling now given to the people, for it should be remembered that for several generations the poor spelled out the sentences and memorized many of them. What was understood then by the poor who, in a great measure, had to educate themselves, cannot be read now with understanding by those who have had the benefits of higher education.

The interview of President Griswold in *The New York Times* gives hope of a better day. He certainly expresses himself freely. As the head of an institution of learning in this country, he is to be welcomed for the courage revealed in this proclamation. To announce a desire to initiate a "measure of justice implicit in the phrase *equal opportunity*" presages a new life for the university whose future will be under his guidance. If he will now dissipate any doubts as to the significance of the terms he uses, he may succeed in a mission to make us "pacemakers in a free world."

I would remind him of the closing words Trench wrote to the preface of his book:

> . . . A meditative man cannot refrain from wonder, when he digs down to the deep thought lying at the root of many a metaphorical term, employed for the designation of spiritual things, even of those with regard to which professing philosophers have blundered grossly; and often it would seem as though rays of truth, which were still below the intellectual horizon, had dawned upon the imagination as it was looking up to heaven. Hence they who feel an inward call to teach and enlighten their countrymen, should deem it an important part of their duty to draw out the stores of thought which are already latent in their native language, to purify it from the corruptions which Time brings upon all things, and from which

language has no exemption, and to endeavour to give distinctness and precision to whatever in it is confused, or obscure, or dimly seen.

How we are to become "pacemakers in a free world" is not clearly explained. No one would say the world is free at the present time. Indeed, it would be hard to convince a laboring man that he is free to take a line that differs fundamentally from the one prescribed by his government or by his union. Our actions in this country are circumscribed, not only by the greatest bureaucracy the world has known, but by the injustices of the system of taxation, which makes equality of opportunity a goal that lies far below the horizon.

Before we can change the systems of States in Europe and Asia, we must alter the conditions that hamper our efforts here to make ourselves free in an economic sense. But how this is to be done by communities that have no knowledge of fundamental economics is a conundrum that cannot be answered. Although in the newsprints day after day we read about economics, we do not gather that the writers have the slightest idea of first principles.

Economics—housekeeping—is an elastic term, but it has been stretched so much since the days of Marx that the men who founded this Republic would not recognize it. An advertisement in the business section of a newspaper recently offered schooling in the "economics of bookkeeping and auditing."

This is an instance of how far we have departed from the root meaning of the words we use. Therefore, if we are to understand one another, it is necessary to clear away the accretions that have gathered about terms, so that the confusions of thought will be dissipated and men will know what is meant by the appeals made to inspire them in an effort to reach a goal of economic security.

New York

Cottage Industries in Bombay

THE GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY in India plans to set up a finance corporation later this year to assist in the establishment of small-scale and other cottage industries. Its primary purpose would be to grant loans to handicraft and cottage industries, but it would not be precluded from giving assistance to larger industries like the sugar and cement industries. Why the sugar and cement industries cannot get credit from the established private institutions is not explained. The Indians had better watch out or the cheap government credit will go, as in the United States, to politicians in an unholy alliance with businessmen.

W.L.

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Management, Labor, and Government

By FRANK T. CARLTON

THE AMERICAN EMPHASIS on the businessman and his point of view arose while a new continent was being exploited and developed. Today, the nation is more mature; its population has grown remarkably. Specialization and interdependence are typical of today. The businessman's idea of rugged individualism and unrestricted business operation is being projected from a pioneer to a mass-production civilization. To the calm observer it appears out of date in the new industrial and social world which engineering and science have developed. As the nation passes out of the pioneer stage of expansion into one in which scientific management and co-ordinated activities are normal, new goals appear, and new types of leaders also come above the horizon. Today, the attractiveness of high adventure in business is fading in the steady light of scientific management, cost accounting, and mass production.

The American consuming public today is vitally interested in the manner in which industry is conducted. Business is no longer purely a private concern; all business is becoming affected with public interest. It has been suggested that the next generation may find its field of adventurous endeavor in the service of government and education. The picturesque period of haphazard, unscientific development directed by the immediate demands of profit-seeking individuals and groups appears to be ending and in its place may come more of systematic planning in the interest of the community. It may be anticipated that rates of profit will become less as risk recedes into the background; also the field of private enterprise may grow smaller relative to that of public enterprise.

A prominent financial newspaper has scoffed at the idea that businessmen have social responsibilities. It was urged that the responsibility of the businessman was so to conduct his business as to make profits. But the number of persons directly connected with large scale business enterprises who depend primarily upon the profit motive is small. To many workers, profits mean profits for some other individuals, not for themselves. It may be suggested that the use of profit sharing and bonus and wage incentive plans would tend to spread the effect of the profit motive to workers and to subordinate members of the management who are now only indirectly and remotely affected by it. In many corporations the

members of the upper strata of management are attaining a professional point of view. They are beginning to emphasize quality of product, fair treatment of workers, and consideration for the general public as well as profits for stockholders. However, owing to the close interdependence between different units of big business, through trade and industrial associations and other business and financial groupings, the management of separate corporations is often obliged to follow a pattern in labor relations and business ethics set for them by a comparatively small group in the higher ranks of financial leaders.

After the Civil War, an aggressive and short-sighted attitude on the part of business leaders led to the enactment of a variety of legislative restrictions ranging from the Interstate Commerce Commission Act of 1887 to the Wagner Labor Act of 1935. Again in 1946–48, the great mass of business executives did not try to lower prices and to keep profits at a level comparable with pre-war rates. The election results of 1948 were not unrelated to the policies of business leaders who continued to look back to the decades before 1930.

Business has not developed a plan to combat depressions—unless it be preparation for war. Labor has developed such plans and the government is also making plans. Business is not well organized for the consideration of social well-being. Consequently, the initiative in the attempt to stabilize the economic order is definitely in the hands of organized labor and the government. The influence of business is negative rather than positive. A decade and a half ago that keen thinker, John R. Commons, indicated that American men cling to rights and privileges coming from pioneer days, from the days of small-scale industry, even though fundamental economic conditions have changed greatly. Two World Wars and a major economic bust within a generation certainly tend to destroy the prestige of traditions coming to the rank and file of the population from very different conditions found in the expanding and buoyant America of 1865–1910.

A reviewer of books on economic and business conditions laments that business seems determined "on climbing higher and higher into its ivory tower." Does the recurrent task of meeting payrolls prevent a businessman from seeing the business scene of today clearly? Or, is the rugged individualistic businessman blinded by looking toward the setting sun? Nevertheless, the big businessman usually thinks of himself as one who should be accepted as a guide and counselor for the men and women of the nation. He is inclined to look condescendingly upon legislators, adminis-

trative officials, teachers, and social workers; and he is also prone to be arrogant when dealing with the representatives of labor organizations. In recent years, business and businessmen have maneuvered themselves into a position in which they appear to be against the farmers, the unions, the veterans looking for better housing, and the underprivileged of various types. This means that they are raising up a host of voters against the continuation of a modified form of the capitalistic system. The Eightieth Congress was unfortunate in its program. As a result, a political overturn occurred in 1948 which may require statesmanship and salesmanship on the part of business leaders to prevent serious upsets to business programs.

The Republican party has been called the party of business; but its attitude in recent years indicates that business has failed to convince the mass of the people—industrial workers, farmers, Negroes, and other groups not directly connected with business—that the typical businessman has vision and is socially minded. Marcus A. Hanna was a business leader at the turn of the century who had social vision as well as business ability in the narrower sense. He believed at that early date in the conservation of natural resources. His relations with workers and with unions made for harmony at a time when few businessmen were so farsighted. He was influential in getting employers and coal mine workers together in the first joint conference in that industry. Mr. Hanna was one of the first big businessmen who saw clearly that the common man must not be neglected in the industrial economy which was rapidly emerging out of the pioneer and frontier economy characteristic of America until about 1890. There are business leaders in 1950 who see beyond the assembly lines and the accountant's reports; but no one of them has a dominant position comparable with that occupied by Hanna. Too many are content to damn labor and labor unions without attempting to see the labor side of the picture.

There are, in 1950, indications that the older type of business leaders and their heirs are being pushed to one side: (a) by the insistence of organized labor that work rules and other traditional ownership prerogatives be shared with unions; (b) by increasing governmental control of business and financial activities, and (c) by the size of a new group of active managers who are not also owners of the enterprise. The individual members of the older and still powerful group are strong for "free enterprise" and "rugged individualism." They are especially bitter in attacks upon the administrative groups in the Federal government. The members of this group are offended by the tightening curbs thrown around business, par-

ticularly since 1933, as were the humanitarians of a century ago shocked by the hustle and aggressiveness of the rising group of manufacturers. The sons and grandsons of the self-reliant industrialists of the post-Civil War period are losing power in the business world of today. They are reacting as might be expected. They demand a rollback to free enterprise, a reduction of the functions of government, and a return to the days before the New Deal. These men call for individual initiative and freedom forgetting that mass production, the giant corporation, and world markets have, for good or for evil, forced the individual into membership in a group—labor union, trade association, professional society, or business organization. American labor organizations now have a total membership of fifteen to sixteen millions, and a potential vote of, say, thirty millions. A new political power has appeared above the political horizon. If the farmers and the white collar workers swing away from big business and align themselves with organized labor, our scheme of things will doubtless undergo marked changes. The potentialities are great; such a combination might well reorganize our economic and political life. Up to date, however, the means of education and of propaganda continue in a large measure under the control and direction of business and financial groups. In any event, the owners of property, and particularly the absentee owners, may no longer expect to dominate the political or the economic field. As the humanitarians of a century ago, they may play with "intellectual fireworks," or they may resort to the futile and picturesque use of invective; but they are, for better or worse, on the road out as a dominant group in the United States.

The character of the middle class as well as the nature of the business leadership is being modified. The middle class is losing its "property status." The small farmer, the small businessman, and the craftsman are being crowded out. They are becoming employees of large businesses or of the government. The typical large business is now a corporation with multitudes of absentee owners directed by salaried officials, the management. When Americans talk about the businessman in 1950, we usually mean the salaried official of our industrial, trade, and financial corporations rather than the small businessman who owns and operates a business enterprise.

In the United States of tradition, property spelled power; but today labor leaders without the support of property exert power; and government is also a potent force not entirely directed by the owners and managers of property. Labor and labor leaders try to reduce the sphere in

which property rights dominate. They are asking and obtaining a voice in the determination of work rules and working conditions. Government has been dominated by the most powerful groups in the nation. Our traditional legal principles deal with the individual and his welfare. Our economic principles deal with competition between individuals. These traditional principles are being outmoded by the thrust of group action—the union, the corporation, and the trade association. If conflict between the individual and the group arises, loyalty to the group and group well-being are emphasized at the expense of the individual. Today the control of government is passing from the owners of property to the workers and management. The triangle of power is now the businessman, the labor leader, and the politician. An association of businessmen "translates economic into political power." Labor leaders try to use the pressure of numbers and the threat of strikes to obtain political power. It is dollars *vs.* numbers of persons possessing votes and the power to paralyze industry through the strike and the boycott.

As was manifested in the 1948 election in the United States, the rise to power of labor parties in Britain and elsewhere in Western Europe, and the movements in India, Burma, Indonesia, and elsewhere in the Far East, the masses of the people are stirring. Any type of political and economic organization which succeeds in the Western world in these unusual times must give to the rank and file of the population a feeling that each is more than a cog in an enormous, impersonal machine. Each must feel that he or she is significant in a worthwhile world. This, the era of the supremacy of the businessman, did not accomplish. If capitalism is to persist and succeed it must cater to this fundamental instinct or impulse of the ordinary man. It must do better in this regard than communism or any other competing economic system. It is the thesis of this writer that a mixed economy may succeed better than communism or orthodox socialism; but it is clear that old-fashioned capitalism, the traditional capitalism of the pioneer community, cannot.

When capitalism evolves so that large establishments employing multitudes of workers and owned by huge numbers of absentee and practically functionless stockholders are typical, ownership and management become divorced, and the motivating forces in industry undergo modification. Into the organized labor group go many who under the conditions of the nineteenth century would have been small businessmen. The trend in population in the United States is toward the cities; and a population with a large percentage of urban people will tend to become more and more

socially and politically minded. In short, the "impact of events," the development of science and engineering, are forcing new points of view upon our people and their leaders.

Although traditionally business interests have not been "liberal," today they are generally in favor of keeping the government out of business affairs. The Republican party traces back through the Whig party and the Federalist party to Alexander Hamilton. Thus, in the past, it and its forerunners were in favor of a protective tariff, of the chartering of corporations, of land grants, and of other subsidies to certain businesses. The growing strength of labor organizations following the passage of the National Labor Relations Act in 1935, undoubtedly was instrumental in causing corporations and trade associations to favor the Taft-Hartley Act which was aimed at weakening the power of aggressive unionism. Today, the normal hands-off attitude of large business seems to be influenced by the fact that governmental interference is in the interest largely of small businessmen, farmers, and workers.

John L. Lewis of the United Mine Workers Union is in favor of "the rights of free men and free enterprise." Mr. Lewis stands at the head of a powerful and firmly united and inclusive organization of coal miners. He and his union are stronger than the coal operators. They can, and have, repeatedly closed down a vital industry functioning in many states. They wish no governmental interference. Like many large corporations and trade associations, the powerful miner's organization believes in free enterprise and a "hands-off" government. They can win victories over employers under such conditions. Without being inconsistent Mr. Lewis' organization might join hands with employers' associations in favor of free enterprise.

In recent months at least two union programs in the field of labor relations were of much significance. The United Mine Workers Union seemed to be definitely developing a program of stabilization in the "sick" coal industry. "Over-production" and price reductions were feared. Presumably, the union proposed to limit production throughout the industry by shortening the work week—with no reductions in pay—and with the aid of periodic strikes of which the "memorial" strike of March, 1949, was a sample. The program aimed at the control of coal production with higher prices to the public. The union was trying to protect wage levels and its welfare program. After nearly a year of memorial and stabilization strikes, ordinary strikes, three work days a week and mutual recriminations, with the government unable or unwilling to interfere effectively, an agreement was reached without solving the problem of stabilization.

Both the miner's union and the coal operators feared governmental interference. The International Ladies' Garment Workers Union in another highly competitive industry, proposes to induce employers in good times to lay aside a reserve fund to be used in bad times in order to regularize employment and production over the complete swing of the business cycle. Again, governmental agencies are to be bypassed.

One of the pressing problems in industrial relations is that of delimiting the rights of management and of labor in the control over industrial methods. Labor organizations are asserting new rights or privileges through the instrumentality of collective bargaining. Management looks upon such demands as an infringement upon its rights or privileges. Unions do not appear to have clearly outlined long-range objectives. They are still opportunistic. There are today no definite limits to the encroachment of organized labor upon the time-honored rights of management and ownership. Carried to the extreme, these encroachments upon the prerogatives of management would lead to the control of business by the workers.

The delimitation of the spheres of union and men and of management and men should be attempted. Unions protect wages, jobs, hours of work, and other conditions including fair treatment by bosses. Management is responsible for the general direction of the industry; but it should not attempt to protect the worker from his union. Management is largely responsible for the social and psychological atmosphere surrounding the workers in the plant. If industrial peace is to be obtained and retained, management must be ready to meet unions more than half way. Ways may be found of co-operating in minor matters such as safety committees. Such experiences will make for mutual confidence and a willingness to seek for other and more important means of co-operating.

We in the United States are evidently in the painful process of change from the autocratic control of business by management and ownership to the joint participation of management and labor in industrial decisions, with the probability of added interference on the part of government. With the growth of administered prices, spreads between the prices of raw materials and the retail prices of finished products are fixed by other means than the ceaseless pressure of competitive forces. Some guiding pressure is needed to prevent wide spreads and unusual profits; and, in certain industries, to prevent management and unions from teaming together at the expense of the public or of the general welfare. Unless such pressure, presumably governmental, is applied, the economy cannot be stabilized and it continues to face the danger of booms and busts. It may be suggested that in the broad social sense, the problem is to ascertain the point

at which this tendency to modify the control of business will give maximum productive efficiency. Any powerful group either of businessmen, of industrial workers, or of farmers will fight to maintain its power and prestige. Such a group will invoke the aid of government if and when it is threatened by loss of rights or privileges.

Management claims the fundamental or natural right or privilege to run the business over which it has control as it sees fit; this certainly has been an old and generally accepted notion in Britain and in the United States. Labor organizations are trying with some success to reduce the area of this right, and society, through government, has for years been in the process of limiting the rights of management. Authority in industry should finally rest upon expertness, upon the ability to obtain efficient production with interested and willing workers. Coercion and exhortation are ineffective agents in the complex industrial order of today. Unions have been to date very largely negative in their impact upon industry. This is in no small measure because they have been forced by the attitude of employers and the public to fight for the right or privilege of existence. Fighting groups do not make efficient production units.

In this day of huge corporations, big labor, and the accompanying powerful government, new goals and activities are perforce coming into the foreground. The profit motive and negative incentives such as fear of loss of job are weakening. Social purposes and responsibilities rather than the wishes of individuals are being pushed forward. The right of the masses of consumers to insist upon efficient and regular operation of all industries "affected with public interest" takes its place along side or in front of the traditional rights in the Bill of Rights. Our educational program should be so organized as to aid in hastening this trend. Our schools and colleges have stressed power *over* others rather than "power *with* others," or leadership "with fellowship." Instead of emphasizing individual power and prestige, the emphasis should be placed upon justice and reasonableness. In such a development lies the hope of industrial harmony and world peace.

Fortunately, the three groups—management, labor, and government—have certain common goals and in this lies the hope of future industrial peace and progress. Businessmen, including farmers, labor and labor leaders, yearn for economic stability. All may praise competition, but each one wishes to protect himself under the umbrella of monopoly and opportunity. Finally, governmental officials are seeking a way to stabilize our economy. They, too, dislike "cut-throat" competition and are favorably inclined toward reasonable economic co-operation. There are three

varieties of bureaucrats—big businessmen, labor leaders, governmental officials—looking for the attractive goal of economic stability, for cessation within the realm of capitalism of the famous boom-to-bust cycle in economic affairs. Stabilization requires the co-ordinated efforts of business, labor leaders and government.

These groups are also interested in the world development program foreshadowed in President Truman's inaugural address. In an interdependent world implemented by mass production, airplanes, and radios, prosperity, to be real and lasting, must be spread; it cannot, for long, be the monopoly of one group or nation. The know-how and a portion of the invested capital of various industrial nations should be used to aid in development of resources, increase in productivity, and raising living standards in the now undeveloped portions of the globe. One of the functions of government, including that of the United Nations, in this paternalistic project should be to see that the old imperialistic type of exploitation is avoided.

Along this path, toward a shining goal of world betterment, businessmen with vision, farmers, labor leaders, and administrative experts and legislators connected with government may be able to go forward with a reasonable degree of harmony. If another World War can be avoided, the trend of events—the pressure of economic and social forces—in a complex world tied together by rapid means of communication and transportation points toward the possibility of a new and happier era of world affairs. If human beings behave, science can do much to improve life and living for all.

Is it possible for these three groups—big business, powerful labor, and strong government—to take a long-run point of view? Is it also possible for them to look at the national, and eventually the world, economy as a huge plantation to be operated so as to produce food, clothing, comforts, and so as to allow a modicum of leisure for the two billion plus members of the human race? We possess in the year 1950 a knowledge of the fundamentals involved in this crucial problem; but the use of such knowledge requires a shift in the center of gravity from the individualistic and opportunistic point of view to one involving planning from the grass roots up. This new point of view demands a sense of social responsibility coupled with stress upon mutual aid and co-operation on the part of the leaders in business, labor, and government, and also on the part of the rank and file of the population. The major problems are psychological and educational rather than technical.

Case Institute of Technology

Land Reform in Austria

AUSTRIA, LIKE the United States, is one of the nations that needs land reform badly but has been laggard about introducing it. One of the reasons for the lag in Austria is that the dominant Austrian People's party does not understand what land reform involves. The Socialist party, under the leadership of Bauer and Adler, before the Dolfuss putsch, did understand; its program, drawing its inspiration from Henry George and the German Bodenreformers, was a practical, far-reaching one developed on sound scientific lines. It would have put to shame the Stalinist spurious land reform schemes.

Why land reform in Austria is meeting the obstacles put in its way can be seen from the statement made by Herr Figl, Chancellor of the Austrian Republic and leader of the Austrian People's party, on Nov. 11, 1948:

"Turning to the question of land reform, the Chancellor stated that it was not a question of the individual or of political slogans, but that it was an economic problem. The Austrian People's party supported the idea of a land reform, but not by way of expropriations or for the sake of party-political catch-phrases. For the Austrian People's party land reform means a change in ownership.

" 'We do not want to produce dwarf holdings; on the contrary, we want to enlarge and replenish individual holdings to make them viable and to enable theme to produce better and more rationally for the benefit of the entire people. We need a land reform which will strengthen deliveries to the markets. Therefore we are making the strengthening of healthy peasant ownership the supreme guiding principle of the land reform.

" 'Agricultural laborers, too, ought to get land, but not merely 5 *Joch* (7 acres) which are not enough for independent husbandry and which would necessitate other work in addition. Parliament will have to concern itself with this question in the near future. It will promulgate the necessary laws, but will leave their execution to the various provincial governments, because we are of the opinion that all questions connected with land reform can best be solved by men with an intimate knowledge of conditions in their provinces.' "

This is the sort of approach that has given the landless Austrians everything but a piece of land to work.

W.L.

Evils of the American Two-Party System

By HUGH P. WILLIAMSON

FOR THE SECOND TIME within a quarter century we have had a tragic demonstration of the fact that the existing social institutions of the world are incapable of directing and governing, in an orderly manner, the world's people. This fact is made manifest not only by the social cataclysms of international strife denominated World Wars One and Two, but to an equal degree by the unceasing conflict which has gone on within countries between and during wars. In consequence, the world picture today is one which shows a furious struggle between nations, and a struggle only a little less intense between various classes, interests, and groups within the warring nations themselves.

For this semi-chaotic condition there obviously are causes, which, if not found and removed, will render the future of civilization dark and brief. To find these causes we must examine and re-examine, analyze and re-analyze, impartially and dispassionately, each piece of the social machine which, once reasonably satisfactory, has served us so ill in recent years. It may be necessary that drastic changes be made in long established and cherished institutions. It may be necessary for certain of our traditional concepts of government to be thoroughly revised, but one thing is certain, that in this self-analysis, and in this reconstruction period, we, and all other people must, disregarding all other considerations, have a single objective: the establishment of that kind of social structure which will most fully meet the national and international needs of our time.

Mass Attitudes Toward War

IT WOULD BE A MATTER of unanimous agreement that a majority—a very large majority—of the people throughout the world are by nature peaceful; that they actively do not want to engage in war; that they have no desire to subjugate other nations; that they are, unless worked upon by clever propagandists, completely uninterested in world dominion and in establishing themselves as a master race. The masses of people want only to have enough to eat and wear, a comfortable place to live, work that is not unreasonably hard, a chance to propagate, to have some recreation, some social intercourse with their kind, and to satisfy—by education and study—whatever degree of intellectual curiosity they may possess. Because of the general steady advance of education, and because of an equal increase

in intellectual and moral development, this attitude of the masses is doubtless greater today than ever before in the history of mankind, but it is a fact, capable of unlimited demonstration, that this has been the position of far more than a simple majority since the earliest beginnings of civilization.

In view of this fact—so well established as not to need supporting data—the greatest social phenomenon of all time is the fact of the innumerable destructive, tragic, and continuous wars which have racked humanity from its beginning, wars instigated by a minute fraction of the people within a country, without the knowledge and desire of the majority, but in which all of the people speedily became involved, and to which they permitted themselves to be committed. In view of the agreed fact that the masses of people very strongly do not desire war or internal conflict, and of the further fact that despite this desire wars and internal conflicts continually exist, we are brought to the obvious conclusion that the desires of the majority are not registered and transmitted with sufficient fullness and effectiveness to determine the international and the domestic policy of their nation. This failure to transmit public desire in sufficient strength and clarity to determine public policy must be, in large part at least, the fault of the official vehicles of transmission of public opinion and desire, which are the political parties in any nation. Since the official attitudes and actions of our own country are our primary responsibility and interest, let us consider here, from the standpoint of their effectiveness in transmitting the will of all the voters, the two major political parties in the United States, and our long established Two-Party System.

Limitations of the Two-Party System

IN CONSIDERING the political system of the United States we are, for many reasons and in many ways, soon impressed by the fact that no two-party system of government anywhere can ever be an adequate and effective vehicle for the transmission of public opinion. This is true because such a system does not afford sufficient scope for the expression of opinion. We have in this country a Republican party which professes to espouse a certain social philosophy, and a Democratic party which professes to espouse another, and a different, social philosophy. We proceed upon the obviously fallacious assumption that together these two parties express all of the political principles which any substantial group of citizens would have or would care to express. We make no allowance and no provision for those of our people who do not believe in the principles and the practices of either of our two major parties.

There is no way to know how many of these people there are because our two-party system forces them into one or the other of the two major parties except in the rare case of an individual who prefers to register a protest vote by voting with one of the minor parties—Socialist, Prohibition, Labor, or Communist—and who knows when he does so that his vote will not have any effect except as a protest. In addition there are the masses of people eligible to vote who do not do so because they feel that no party exists with which they care to identify themselves. The practical effect of this situation is that many American citizens are partially, and many more are wholly, disfranchised as effectively as though they were forcibly denied the right to vote at the polls on election day. These large, unknown, muted legions of people qualified to vote but not voting at all, or voting with a party which only partially expresses their political principles, are composed, in the main, of our bolder, politically-pioneering men and women who are independent thinkers, not afraid to depart from the conventional American political pattern. This country—or any country—badly needs to have the thought of such citizens registered and impressed upon its national political life, but in the United States this element is largely lost, and is almost wholly unfelt, in the shaping of national policies.

We see, therefore, that the American two-party system largely disfranchises an unknown but undoubtedly a very large number of citizens qualified to vote; that in the main this disfranchised group is made up of our better minds whose political will should be effectively registered as of right, and whose political thought, if registered, would afford a valuable contribution to American political life. This is—and will always be—the first signal failure of any two-party system.

Theoretical Purpose of Parties

THEORETICALLY, political parties exist in order that like-minded voters within a particular political unit—such as the United States—may have an adequate vehicle for the expression and registration of their political principles and desires.

Theoretically—and certainly practically—people should belong to a political party because that party represents their interests and those of their class. They should belong to a party because through it they can obtain a government in accord with their political principles. Party affiliation which is determined to any degree by the many factors other than these mentioned, does, to that degree, fail to serve the individual as a vehicle of political expression.

Influences Which Determine Party Affiliation

WHEN MEASURED by the above-mentioned test do we find that the two major parties of the United States are effective transmitters of the opinions and desires of even a majority of their members, and that they truly strive to bring about in government those conditions which would be most beneficial for even a large majority of their members? We find numerous reasons for believing that the answer is "No" to both questions. The first, and perhaps greatest, reason is the fact that the Democratic and Republican parties were originally, and have remained, to a surprisingly great extent, identified with the geographical sections of the country which divided at the time of the Civil War in 1861. After its National Convention at Charleston, South Carolina, in 1860, the Democratic party was very largely confined to the southern states which seceded a year later. The Republican party was even more severely confined to the states which remained in the Union. The bitterness and white-hot hatreds of the Civil War opened a wide gulf between the northern and southern sections of this country, causing each section to fear and distrust the people and institutions of the other. And this feeling was most active in respect to political parties. Unfortunately the dominant political parties in each section came—in the minds of the people both North and South—to represent their section in all of its phases—social, political, moral, traditional. Political contests, particularly in the thought of the Southerner, came to represent a new phase and a continuation of the war which had been lost upon the field of battle. To people in the postwar South the Democratic party came—in the minds of the overwhelming majority—to stand for the Lost Cause, for Robert E. Lee, for every southern lad who had died or who had been mutilated in the war. The Democratic party, and through its success the imposition upon the hated Northerner of the desires and principles of the South, alone remained as a means of getting revenge for burned homes, ravished towns and countrysides, heartaches and tears. In the South, too, the Republican party meant Carpetbag Government; the insolent, unruly, freed Negro; Sherman's March to the Sea; and all of the numberless and unforgettable horrors which an invaded and conquered people experienced. Since this was what the Republican party meant to the Southerner in 1865, we could no more expect him to be a Republican than we could expect him to spit in the face of his idol, General Lee, and with insignificant exceptions he was a "straight-voting Democrat," whether he was a member of the planter aristocracy or whether he was "poor white," leading a hand-to-mouth existence. And so powerfully did he impress his attitude upon his

children that they, and their children as well, also voted "straight Democratic from President to Constable," as is attested by the "Solid South" today, in spite of its recent temporary deviation from its hitherto invariable custom.

In the North much the same condition prevailed. The Republican party meant Abraham Lincoln, the Emancipation Proclamation, The Gettysburg Address, Ulysses S. Grant, The Grand Army of the Republic, a race of people freed from the bondage of tyrants. The Democratic party meant Uncle Tom and the bloodhounds, human slavery, the public auction of human beings. It also evoked in the minds of countless Northerners memories of their sons, brothers, husbands, and friends who marched singing into the South and who now filled graves in that distant, hostile land. Would a northern Republican ever vote the Democratic ticket? While memory endured he would not! And neither would his children!

This unfortunate association of the warring sections with political parties made possible many sins both North and South. From 1865 on, the Republican party was primarily the party of high finance and big business. It made the strong stronger, the poor poorer, the weak weaker; the mass of little people was ignored, forgotten, and if remembered at all, was expected to exist on the crumbs which fell from the golden platters in the palaces of the economic aristocrats in New York and Philadelphia. And the Republican plutocrats were kept in power and were able to exploit and aggrandize only because the mass of despised "little people" kept them in power by voting the straight Republican ticket decade after decade. Joe Brown might have been driven from pillar to post economically; his family might be in rags and starving; he might even have been wounded by the United States Army or by the hired strike-breakers of Andrew Carnegie in the Homestead Massacre in Pittsburgh—all under Republican administration—but he would continue to vote Republican because his daddy had fought under Sherman, and had once seen General Grant ride by —"an' the Gineral no furder away than frum me to thet there stump yander!" And if, as the hard years went by, there did creep into the consciousness of Brown the thought that the revered Republican party cared not whether he lived or died, he instantly rejected the thought of voting Democratic—because his Uncle George had suffered agonies at Libby Prison in Richmond, Virginia, and Uncle Pete had been killed in the Battle of The Wilderness. If he did not vote for the Democratic party he could then either throw his vote away on the Populists, Socialists, Prohibitionists,

or some other temporary minor party, or vote Republican again—and again —and again. He usually ended up by voting Republican!

The political situation in the South was even more incongruous. The old pre-war order of a numerically small aristocracy at the top, based now not only upon land but also upon cotton gins, banks, stores, and factories, and far, far below a numerically large number of poor whites—and now free Negroes—was again, slowly but definitely, established. And the poorest white cotton picker voted the Democratic ticket, straight, after servilely bowing and stepping out of the voting line so that the owner of cotton plantations, cotton gins and cotton-seed cake mills would not be for a moment delayed in his lordly, graceful, excessively courteous progress through the day, after he, too, had voted the Democratic ticket—"Straight, suh! Yes, suh! Straight ez a string! You see, suh, my fatha was with Gineral Lee!" The cotton picker voted the Democratic ticket "straight" for only a slightly different reason—his father had fought with Stonewall Jackson!

When the economic aristocrats of New York and Philadelphia, and the people who did not know where their next meal was to come from—or whether it would come at all—voted for the same public officials and for the same social systems—then either the economic aristocrats or the legions of the poor were doing some foggy thinking, because nothing could have been more clear than that the same government had not—and would not—serve both groups equally well. The little that they had got from the Republican party should have been sufficient indication to the underprivileged masses in the North of what they could expect in the future—and it was—but still these people voted Republican, not so much because of stupidity but rather because in their minds the Republican party was inextricably entangled with Lincoln, Grant, and Emancipation. The situation in the South was, and is, equally bad or worse and for identical reasons. When the multitude of share croppers, cotton pickers, and other possessionless people who lived—and who still live—in a condition which in practical reality amounts to virtual slavery, vote for the same officials and the same kind of government that are voted for by the numerically small lords of the land, the cotton gins, the banks, the stores and mills—when these powerful, elevated groups, and these weak and depressed groups vote for the same institution and social system, then one of these groups is doing foggy thinking. Why do the enslaved Southerners vote for a party which allows their slavery to continue? Because for them the Democratic party is still inextricably confused with General Lee, Stone-

wall Jackson, and the glorious feats of Southern arms. It symbolizes the eternal fight against "Damned Yankyism" and the ravishers of their ancestral homes.

It is certainly clear that the socially and economically underprivileged Southern Democrats and Northern Republicans are not being served by the political parties with which they are affiliated. It is also clear that they are in their respective parties because of tradition, custom, and sentimental associations formed eighty years ago; not because these parties serve their interests and those of their class today.

To this understandable but highly unintelligent condition only one group in this country has made a rational approach. American Labor organizations have for many years urged their members not to be shackled by party membership, and particularly by party membership based upon geographical locations, but to become "floater voters," and to vote for those candidates whose public utterances and whose public and private records give reason to believe that they would be more favorable to Labor than any other candidate. Thus a typical Labor voter might vote for a Republican candidate for mayor of his city; for a Democratic candidate for Congress from his district; for a Republican candidate for the United States Senate from his state; and for a Democratic candidate for President of the United States. Under this new—and highly sensible concept of voting—a member of Steelworkers' Union No. 999, in Birmingham, Alabama, might vote for the Republican candidate for Congress from his district if this candidate was more favorable toward Labor than his Tory-minded rival, in spite of the fact that the steelworker's grandfather had been shot to pieces while fighting with General Lee at Gettysburg. And likewise a member of Truckdrivers' Local No. 828, Augusta, Maine, might vote for the Democratic candidate for President if his Republican rival was unfriendly to Labor, in spite of the momentous fact that the truckdriver's grandfather had been splashed by the mud kicked up by the horse of General Grant as that modern Napoleon rode between the lines of his adoring soldiers on his return from the conference with Lee at Appomattox. Many members of Labor organizations do so vote; many people not members of organized Labor groups vote on the same principle; and in the 1948 election more people voted upon this basis than ever before in the history of this country. Since 1932 many of the Northern, usually Republican states, have gone Democratic, largely due to the Labor vote, which has emancipated itself from the accident of geography, but the fact remains that in the election of 1932, and in all elections held since then, the way in which millions of

votes were cast was determined by events far removed in time from the present. To the extent that people vote upon this latter basis, they are failing to be served by their political parties as a vehicle of political expression.

Neither must we forget the helpless condition of those intelligent people who find that the candidates of both major parties for an office are in about equal degree antagonistic to their interest. Nor those other people, such as the steelworker in Birmingham, who, because of their being in the Solid Democratic South, probably do not have the chance to vote for a Republican candidate, and who, if they do have the chance, know that they are throwing their vote away because there is no possibility that a Republican can be elected in Alabama. The truckdriver in Maine also knows that while he may vote for the Democratic candidate for President, his vote too will be thrown away, because beyond all doubt the entire electoral vote of Maine would be cast for the Republican.

Mention was made above of the sectional character of the Democratic and Republican parties, and we observed that millions of votes were determined by events which transpired many years ago. This situation applies largely to the northern and southern states in the eastern half of the United States. In the western half of the country, and in the middle states in the eastern half, the vote-determining influence of the Civil War is far less potent, and in many places in the farther West is nonexistent. In these places, however, another factor exists almost as influential in determining votes, and equally irrational. This factor may be called inherited political affiliation. It may be illustrated as follows: If, on November 2, 1948, in any of the geographical areas mentioned, we could have gone to any voting place and could have picked up, as they came from the booth, the first hundred voters who had voted the straight Democratic or Republican ticket, and could have interviewed them one by one regarding their reason for voting as they did, we would have learned some surprising and discouraging things. When asked why they voted Democratic or Republican many of them would, by their answers and attitude, have plainly shown that they had never considered the reason at all. Others would have become obviously embarrassed, and would have stammered a few meaningless sentences in which the word "tariff" recurred numerous times, since there is a vague but general belief that different tariff policies mark the chief division in policy between the two major parties. The remainder would have given reasons of varying degrees of validity for their party affiliation.

The fact, of course, is that millions of voters in the areas we are considering cannot give any intelligent reason for their party affiliation because they do not have any reason. Their fathers and grandfathers were Democrats or Republicans as the case may be; they grew up hearing the one party praised and the other anathematized, and without ever rationalizing about the matter they followed faithfully in the political footsteps of their forebears. They inherited their father's material possessions; his religious creed; and his political party affiliation. The financial, social, and economic condition of father and son may be wholly different; the one may have been a rural, the other an urban dweller; the political party to which they belong may have undergone great changes in policy by the time the son becomes an active member—but all of this does not break the pattern of party membership. This is perfectly understandable—indeed is the normal consequent of a permanent two-party system, but it is not at all rational, and it does not lead to the registration and transmission into government policy of the will of the people.

There is in the United States yet another factor, unnatural in origin and bad in effect, which is determinative of party membership in many cases. In this country, largely as a result of the permanent two-party system, as I will show later on, there is a large group of people whose main business throughout life is politics. When their party is in power they have political jobs, varying degrees of authority, and in many cases certain income-producing "rackets." They seek in every possible way to strengthen their party's position so that it will remain in power and control as long as possible. When it is out of power they use every artifice to get it back in again. During the "out" period they live on their accumulated reserve and do such temporary work as necessity compels.

The extent to which these people determine elections and party policies is very great, because politics is their main interest and to it they give a majority of their time. They constitute a dangerous element because in their political activities they are, understandably, wholly motivated by the desire for self-gain. Their personal fortunes are good or bad almost exactly in the degree that the fortunes of their parties are good or bad. This situation produces in them three attitudes which are damaging. The first is that in determining the political policy which their party will publicly advocate—and they are largely determinative of party policy—they are guided almost solely by the desire to find and champion popular policies regardless of the intrinsic merit of the policy itself. To get the public to support their party is their sole aim, and they will advocate any

policy, however bad, if it is popular, and they will shun any policy, however good, if it is not popular. Second, they will undeviatingly support their party regardless of its policies, professed and actual; and they will support the entire candidate personnel of their party regardless of its lack of merit. And third, they are instantly and automatically opposed to anything which the opposition party advocates regardless of how meritorious it may be. They unhesitatingly do all in their power to embarrass and thwart and discredit the opposition in the public mind, regardless of how much the public may suffer in consequence. They do this, not because they are any worse people than their neighbors, but because it is a question of their personal welfare, or the welfare of the public generally, and when faced with such a choice most of us would decide in favor of ourselves, as do the politicians.

If anyone doubts that this is their attitude a brief perusal of any volume of the Congressional Record will speedily convince him. Senators and Representatives in the National Congress, and in State Legislatures, with few exceptions, vote upon party lines and not upon the merits of a proposal. It is impossible to say how much beneficial legislation has been defeated, and how much national progress has been retarded, because persons who made politics a business career opposed legislation which they knew to be good in order to discredit the opposition party, and supported other legislation which they knew to be bad in order to strengthen their party.

Defenders of the two-party system usually base their defense upon the argument that under it each party is able to act as a check upon the other, and that by this the public benefits. As we have seen above, the actual working of this system is that the party in power invariably goes as far as it can in effecting its program, and that the opposition party does its utmost to defeat that program regardless of whether it be good or bad. If in this process some bad is prevented, so at least is an equal amount of good.

Summation of Charges Against the Two-Party System

IT WILL BE REMEMBERED that our first charge against the two-party system was that it did not give sufficient scope for the expression of political opinion, inasmuch as there are in this country many intelligent voters who feel that their political philosophy is not adequately expressed by either of the two major parties, and who, as a result of this situation, either do not vote at all, or vote with one of the minor parties simply as a protest; or vote with one of the two major parties because they feel it does embody in some degree their political principles, and because there is no other vehicle for them to use. We have seen that this situation means that an indeter-

minate but undoubtedly large number of qualified voters in this country are, some wholly and others in part, denied the franchise because no medium exists by which their political philosophy can effectively be expressed and registered.

Our second charge was that the political affiliations of millions of voters in this country are determined by events which transpired eighty or more years ago, and not by the fact—as should be the case—that the party with which they are affiliated serves their interest and the interests of their class. We illustrated this by the example of the underprivileged Southerner who invariably voted "straight Democratic," and of the underprivileged Northerner who invariably voted "straight Republican." We pointed out that in these cases the geographical accident of the place of a man's birth determined his party affiliation, and not present self-interest.

Our third charge was that because our two major parties had existed for a long period of time, the party affiliation of many people was determined by the fact that their parents and grandparents had belonged to a particular party, and that they had inherited the party affiliation along with religious belief, ethical standards, and mental and physical characteristics. We stated that even if we assumed that the party affiliation of the parent and grandparent was so lodged as to be the best medium for political expression for them, yet a greatly different situation in life might make the parental party not the best available vehicle for the expression of the political philosophy of the son and grandson.

Our fourth charge was that those people who make a business career out of party membership do great harm by their automatic and invariable advocacy of all measures and all men sponsored by their party, and by their automatic and invariable opposition to all measures and all men sponsored by the opposition party.

Our fifth charge was that in those cases where party affiliation is determined by the geographical accident of place of birth, and the other accident of parental party affiliation, the individuals affected were very strongly inclined not to think about or study politics, but to vote as a matter of habit.

Solutions of the Problem

IF THE ABOVE CONTENTIONS be true—and their truth seems obvious—the question that arises is: What can be done to change a situation in which the two major political parties of the United States are not an adequate vehicle for the expression of the political opinion of the great majority of the American people?

There would appear to be but one method by which this could be done, and but one course of action to effectuate the method. The method is: A long-range, overall program with the single objective of effecting the ultimate disintegration of the two major political parties, inclusive of the party labels "Democratic" and "Republican." If the party labels are not abolished along with the parties then, half a century from now, millions of voters will still be voting for a party name, and for an imagined sentiment which is gathered about that name, so strong and so lingering is a powerful, established, tradition. Our only possibility of emancipation from the continued tyranny of this illusion is to eradicate its nucleus—the party labels.

On the surface this would appear to be an undertaking immense and of almost infinite duration. I do not believe that this is necessarily so. As we indicated above, American Labor, in all of its many ramifications, is, and is increasingly, a counterpoise to the two major parties. It is furthermore the durable nucleus which, through attraction and even more by example, has taken away from the old parties innumerable numbers of former adherents. It has amply demonstrated a fact of tremendous significance, namely, that an aggregate of voters united in a political party can have a political striking force which is malleable, mobile, adaptive, and free from the heavy hand of tradition.

In addition to this is the fact that nothing may be more deceptive than an appearance of burgeoning life in political parties. As illustrative of this we need but to recall the many instances in the not distant past when the near demise of one or the other major parties appeared to be—and was—imminent. Their structure, at its strongest, is but frail, and is ever subject to rapid deterioration. Their time may well be far shorter than we—and they—believe. But, be it short or long, their total abolition is a prerequisite to political emancipation in America.

What immediate plan of action can we enter upon to thus bring about the demise of the major parties? It would seem that the first step would be, in every campaign from local to national, to place all possible emphasis upon candidates as individuals, not as representatives of a party; upon current political issues, and the respective candidates' proffered solution for them.

In this way public attention would be directed away from political parties, and in proportion as this was done so would the importance of parties, in the public mind, lessen until perhaps a vanishing point had been reached and passed.

Assuming that by these and other methods which doubtless would suggest themselves, and by their inherent weakness and instability, the two present major parties ceased to be, what new political alignments and structures could we expect to see arise? Doubtless other political parties, perhaps two in number, or more than two—but radically different from the old. With party affiliation no longer determined or influenced by sentiment, inheritance, or geographical location, we could expect to see people form parties which would represent their interests and needs.

And if a party did this we could expect to see more political work done, and more influence exercised, by the nonprofessional politician. Furthermore if new parties were formed the persons who now are largely disenfranchised because no extant party represents their political philosophy, would have an opportunity to help shape the new parties, and to make them broad enough, or numerous enough, to represent them.

And if the new political parties did develop along these general lines, we then certainly would have parties which, to a far greater degree than do our present major parties, provide a medium for the expression of public opinion, and its transmission into governmental policies.

If our original premise—that the vast majority of people do not desire foreign war or domestic strife—is correct, then we could, under the new parties, look with some confidence for an amelioration of a situation which today threatens the security, and the very existence, of mankind.

Assistant Attorney General,
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The Modern Atom

IF AN ATOM of ordinary uranium were magnified a billion times it would weigh a ton and be about the size of a basketball. On very close inspection you would find in it 92 tiny particles each smaller than the point of a very fine needle, all moving at enormous speed; the combined weight of these electrons would be about half a pound. In the center you could, with care, discover a wisp of dust a thousandth of an inch in diameter, the atomic nucleus; it would weigh a ton less half a pound and contain 99.9 percent or more of the atomic energy. It consists of 92 positively charged protons and 146 neutrons with no charge at all. How does the atom stay together? That is something scientists have yet to find out. Maybe mesons—the latest atomic particles—supply the glue.

T. SWANN HARDING

USDA,
Washington

The Squatter Problem in Malaya

IN THE VIEW of the Singapore authorities, the squatter problem in Malaya arises not only because many squatters have been illegally occupying both State and alienated lands, but because some of the areas, owing to their isolation, may be used as supply sources for the Communist bands whom the police are trying to put down. It is desirable from the security point of view, the authorities believe, that such squatters should be removed to areas where they can be brought under administrative control and where law and order can be enforced effectively.

To accomplish this, new emergency regulations were adopted in the Federation of Malaya providing for the compulsory eviction and resettlement of squatters. The time in which squatters can be detained in the area to which they have been removed was extended in the regulations to two years. The regulations come into force when the ruler in council of any Malaya State, considering that it is in the public interest to act, directs that any person unlawfully occupying land shall leave the area.

An eviction order must be issued specifying the date by which the evicted person must leave. The date shall not be less than one month from the day of notification. The order must set out the place to which the evicted person must proceed. The person affected may apply to an authorized officer in the area for permission to change the place of resettlement to a place of his choice. Before granting this permission, the officer must be satisfied that the other place or area is suitable and that the person intends to go and remain there.

On the other hand, an evicted person and his dependents may elect to return to his country of origin, leaving the Federation. He may be released on bond, detained in custody or peremptorily expelled if he does not leave the Federation after electing to do so.

All this follows the recommendations of the Squatter Committee, and is worked out, in its controls and appeals and exemptions, in as neat a fashion as any administrative regulation. But it is purely an emergency solution of what is, at its base, not a local problem but a universal one.

Communities inevitably encounter problems of this sort when their land tenure systems serve to enrich without labor one class and to shut out from man's natural heritage another class. The land tenure system determines whether the land resources shall be distributed to those who are able to make effective use of them, and whether their unearned benefits will be distributed to the whole community or plundered by a few owners.

W.L.

The Game of Party Politics

By S. Vere Pearson

Ideas about democracy have not grown commensurately with the increase of population and the growth of knowledge founded on experience, often on disillusion. People feel that greater political freedom has not given them greater economic freedom, and are beginning to wonder why this is. Despite reversions to dictatorship in recent decades, some of which have been upset, it is not generally realised that the 'will to power' is ever present in the human breast and must be watched and combatted even when there is a semblance of popular government. A President or a Prime Minister can be an autocrat though the form of dictatorship is veiled.

A definition of democracy has always been elusive. For one thing, the world has seldom known a true democracy. The complications of life and the intracacies of industry and trade lead away from democracy. Primitive communities, because they were smaller and simpler, were nearer to its spirit. In ancient times it was easier to bestow equal rights and equality of opportunity on all than it is to-day. It is hardly possible now to arrange a form of government in which supreme power is vested in the people collectively, and is administered by them or by officers appointed by them. It is well to recognize this since it partly explains the sense of unreality that has undermined the hold of democratic principles upon public opinion and has paved the way to increased authority by bureaucracy.

Even if all the reforms advocated by liberal opinion at the time of the Reform Bill (1832) had been enacted by now (and few of them have been), it is unlikely that we should have escaped from the present socialistic regime everywhere. Incidentally, it is amusing to note that William Cobbett thanked Americans in that year for subduing the oligarchs whose arrogance and stupidity led to the defeat of the English government because thereby the boroughmonger Parliament was prevented from subduing Englishmen. In spite of this help over 150 years ago it is probably correct to say that Englishmen enjoy less personal and economic freedom than the average American, but that neither enjoys that political liberty on which both pride themselves. That this is due to modern developments in society is well emphasised by Cecil Chesterton in his excellent short "History of the United States." From his early pages I quote these few sentences:

The American colonists, during the eighteenth century, enjoyed what a simple society left to itself almost always enjoys, under whatever forms —the substance of democracy. That fact must be emphasized, because without a recognition of it the flaming response which met the first proclamation of theoretic democracy would be unintelligible. It is explicable only when we remember that to the unspoiled conscience of man as man democracy will ever be the most self-evident of truths. It is the complexity of our civilization that blinds us to its self-evidence, teaching us to acquiesce in irrational privilege as inevitable, and at last to see nothing strange in being ruled by a class, whether of nobles or of mere parliamentarians.

That attempts to establish equal rights and privileges for all have so largely failed needs examining anew.

I

Political Obstacles to Economic Democracy

IT IS AN OLD HABIT of those in positions of power to draw attention from economic issues to political ones, whether these be constitutions purporting to extend the principle of home rule or issues dealing with foreign politics. When a people learn to drop party strife and sectarian bigotry and concentrate on economic reforms, as did the Irish in the Home Rule struggle in the days of Michael Davitt, purely political and constitutional issues are paraded by those interested in opposing the reforms. It is an old story and a common experience. As Burke has said: "The people never give up their liberties but under some delusion."

The forms of government, the gaining of the vote, the selection of the candidates to a representative assembly, the distribution of seats, the position to concede to minorities can all be made to appear very important; and in certain circumstances they are important. But what is the teaching of history? It is that the common man wants to be left alone to get on with his own affairs so long as he can attain some security in life. Even voting in an election is coming at length to be looked upon as an acquired right of but minor importance. Generally a citizen can only be worked up into an interest in political affairs when placed in special or chronic insecurity. Then the rhetoric of the statesmen can shake him out of his simple-hearted acceptance of life—or it could once; but not so easily today, for the working people are less attracted and have less faith in the speeches of politicians and radio announcers, and the writings of the press.

The history of Ireland for the last 160 years and right up to the present day offers an excellent illustration of the way political and constitutional issues have been exploited by the politicians to thwart economic reforms and the chances of establishing a better democratic system. As long ago

as 1847 the great Irishman, James F. Lalor, had written: "Had the people of Ireland been the landlords of Ireland, not a human creature would have died of hunger," (in the famine of those times) and he asserted that "the people ought to decide on grounds of policy and economy that rents for land should be paid to themselves for public purposes." In 1881 the Land League had become the *de facto* government of Ireland. Religious differences ceased to divide the people when the land question was raised, *i.e.* when economic reforms were under discussion. When Davitt came North his meeting was presided over by the Master of an Orange Lodge.

But the next year saw the slowing down of the work of the League, and concentration on parliamentary action for political Home Rule. A few years passed; in 1886 there was a general election. At this a small majority of voters were in favour of Mr. Gladstone and of Home Rule for Ireland. Although Gladstone gained a majority of voters to support his Home Rule policy, this majority failed to secure sufficient seats in Parliament to carry out his policy. There followed a succession of obstacles to sound reforms for Ireland, so that to this day, despite many changes, a continuance of political unrest, economic distress and unsatisfactory religious emancipation have persisted.

Present-day political influences are just the same. Once upon a time I thought what a pity it was that more attention was not given to "foreign affairs," particularly to the ways to encourage commercial freedom and true friendliness between the peoples of the world. To-day I think what a pity it is that so much time is spent in studying matters far away from home instead of concentrating on, say, the housing shortage. Truly it has been said: "The eyes of the fool are in the ends of the earth." But I fear it is not just stupidity, on the part at all events of those who gain positions of authority, that so much space and time on platform, on the air, or in the press are so constantly being devoted to these issues. And, after all the efforts made, how futile are the so-called "peace meetings" of the representatives of "The Powers"! It were better these persons did not meet: they each know the past of the other too well!

II

The Blinders of Party Political Bias

CERTAIN FEATURES of party political contests are harmful to clear thinking and to the adoption of sound policies; and these are resorted to in most countries, whether labelled democratic or not. There is a perpetual stirring up of Party political bias. Party prejudices, often passed on from parents to children, sometimes fixed to certain classes, form one of the greatest obstacles to sane thinking on political matters.

I was talking not long ago with the middle-aged wife of a keen Labour supporter who had married over thirty years ago. All her relatives had always been staunch Conservatives; not only would they not discuss any sociological subject with her and her husband, but throughout the whole period they would not deign, because of their strong prejudices, to visit the couple, and only one, living thousands of miles away, communicated with her. The very same day I met a man who had recently left the Labour for the Communist Party. He had not only no good word to say for any Conservative but neither had he one for any Labour person or policy, nor would he allow any criticism of the Soviets. How can reasonable progress in political thought be made in such circumstances?

I judge from afar that things are not very different in America. I base this view partly because, as an English physician, I cannot help feeling that, in the last months of F. D. Roosevelt's life, party political bias was allowed to override loyalty to the professional instincts and duties of one or two of the late President's doctors. Otherwise it is difficult to understand how the President, so obviously a spent and sick man, was permitted to continue in public life (especially in those very difficult times) and why such precautions were taken to keep his serious condition hidden.

Are not the aims for bettering the lot of man generally the same whatever label attaches to a man or woman? Are not quite a number of the keenest minds those who take an interest in party politics? Perhaps it is nearer the truth nowadays to say "Was it not so once?" Yet true progress is best fostered through free play of human minds in friendly discussion and in co-operation. As Johnathan Swift said three hundred years ago: "Reason cannot be cultivated when mingled, obscured or discoloured by passion and interest." Reason, he continues, should not lead to argument for it should strike you with immediate conviction. The Yahoo slave (the human) described in Swift's voyage to the Houyhnhnms who are the Yahoo's masters told their slave they found it was with extreme difficulty that they could understand the meaning of the word *opinion,* or how a point could be disputable; because *reason* taught them to affirm or deny only where they were certain; and beyond their knowledge they could do neither. Reason and knowledge have advanced since Swift's time—but not in politics.

To what a pass political wrangles have brought us. They have brought us to a new despotism which is certainly not democracy. The parties, while in reality having similar aims and no essential differences in their policies, pretend to be poles asunder. They now all follow like methods of taxing, of war-making, of providing social services, etc., or methods very

closely akin. But their stock in trade, at election time particularly, is abuse of their opponents whom they try to outbid in promises. At all events this is true by and large in England.

Perhaps the people of the U.S.A. may yet save themselves from a further descent into a planned economy, such as most countries have now with a huge bureaucracy based on heavy taxation and public borrowing. But I am fearful. The history of Roosevelt's regime seems to indicate that Americans are still much biased by Party Political loyalties; or would it be more correct to say, by the chances of getting paid employment directly or indirectly out of public funds? When these are nearer than ever to a bankrupt condition can either party be relied upon to have the courage to resist dependence upon a false and purely temporary prosperity through war, and to reverse completely all the slipshod policies of the last eighteen to twenty years which have gradually brought people to the present chaos?

III

Party Politics and Popular Government

THE INSTITUTION of party politics has had important influences, deleterious for the most part, upon popular representation and government. It had different origins in the United States and in England, and it will be to the point to survey them briefly.

In America the beginning of parties is said to date from about 1828 at the time sectional struggles where centering around three economic issues—tariffs, public lands, and internal improvements. In the North West of most importance were low-priced public lands, a low tariff, no internal improvements; on the sea-board South, a low tariff, no internal improvements at federal expense, high-priced public lands; and in the North Atlantic States, a high tariff, high-priced public lands, internal improvements. Out of sectional conflicts was born the Jacksonian Democratic party, in the main based on the South and West, on the smaller farmers and the town workers. D. W. Brogan says in his "Politics and Law in the United States" (Cambridge, 1941) that "This combination governed American politics, until the clash between the Southern Slave States, whose economic policy was now dominated by the Planter interests, and the Western Farmers and Northern workers became too bitter to be compromised."

The political fight in 1860 did not at the time make the sectional issue plain because of the veils which, as so often happens, were thrown over the realities by the politicians. Political parties must invent means whereby they can show a united front to their opponents though their members are frequently disunited in reality on important issues. American

parties are cleverer in managing conflicting interests and emotions in their ranks by showing more toleration of diversity, and by their manipulations, than English parties. But the party system in the United States has often hindered the progress of democracy by preventing free discussion of really vital issues. It was not provided for in the American constitution: it was, in fact, provided against—in vain. George Washington in his farewell address pointed out that some influences of party government tended to produce dictatorships—and he was not thinking of Presidents of the United States! He said:

> The alternate domination of one faction over another . . . is itself a frightful despotism. The disorders and miseries which result, gradually incline the minds of men to seek security and repose in the absolute power of an individual.

In England, too, the stifling of free discussion of really vital issues on which it is known that opposite views are held within the party for the sake of the party is common practice; for example, the question of 'protection' amongst Conservatives in the days of Balfour, and that of land nationalization by purchase in the days of Snowden.

The Party System in England was invented at the end of the seventeenth century to enable William III to secure steady parliamentary support for his war upon Louis XIV. Up to that time, government posts were filled by the fittest men regardless of party. Whatever merits there are in the party system in vogue ever since then, except during some formidable war, it is generally admitted that party tyranny is base.

A representative assembly where the representatives are mere voting dummies, unable to speak or vote on the merits of a resolution, lest damage to the party results, is not a truly democratic body. The real safeguards are publicity and the free expression of opinion. But the party meetings which prescribe how a member of the party shall vote are secret. As Josiah Wedgwood (later Lord Wedgwood) so cogently pointed out, the party he served so ably—but with truly independent spirit—for so many years, the Labour Party, would have had him "undertake to accept and act in harmony with the standing orders of the Parliamentary Labour party." He would not do it. The same discipline at the crack of the "Three-lined Whip" is still exercised; but few are those who act independently since the day of the late Lord Wedgwood, partly because of the financial dependence on their salaries and emoluments.

The British system, so different from the American (possessing, however, its own faults), creates an autocratic Cabinet chosen by the Prime Minister appointed by the King, very often on the advice of the Prime Minister's

predecessor, from leaders in the party which has secured a majority of seats at an election. The Ministers are able to impose a strict party discipline by suggesting disagreeable consequences of voting against them. As Bernard Shaw has said: "The true party man sacrifices everything, even his country—in fact especially his country—to keep his party in office."

IV

Party Politics and Democratic Control

IN THE CASE of any system of popular government based on the English model, it is essential that the Executive be controlled by Parliament and Parliament itself by the people. Yet, from one cause or another, this double control has broken down and the defects of the party system have contributed to this. As Sir Frederick Pollock, a great authority on constitutional law, wrote just before the end of the first world war: "Our whole system of Ministerial and Parliamentary control has been allowed to drift into an unmanageable condition." Things have got worse since he wrote that, or at all events there has been no material change. Lord Wedgwood in his "Testament to Democracy" (1942) says (p. 50)

> that the power of the Prime Minister gives him immense dictatorial power over Members of Parliament, checks the formation of small Parties and the independence of Members, that it replaces reason by force, that it is undemocratic. *Pro tanto,* the Prime Minister is not responsible to Parliament, but Parliament is responsible to him. He gets in this way for his Government a security of tenure, limited only by the legal date of dissolution.

A further point of great importance about the way in which democracies carry on is this: Decisions of enormous importance are not always referred, before being made and acted upon, either to the electorate or to the legislative assembly. Lord Hugh Cecil in a foreword to the little book on "The Case for Electoral Reform" (1938) wrote:

> Great executive decisions which sometimes outweigh everything else in importance must be taken by an oligarchy. For example, the decision to go to war in 1914, and the decision to go off the gold standard in 1931 were taken by a small number of individuals, even the House of Commons having only a nominal control over the decision.

There is some truth regarding his "must be taken," but the party political game has led increasingly to far too much secrecy and a good deal of deception, (perhaps never carried to such excess as it was by F. D. Roosevelt).

In these circumstances, and considering the heated prejudices so often called up when political policies and actions are under discussion, how can

people be brought to the frame of mind for imbibing the teachings of those who maintain that much in social intercourse is under inescapable natural laws? This doctrine was put forward by the Physiocrats at the end of the eighteenth century in France and has been developed a good deal further since then. Yet to this day most people believe human efforts are paramount. Because they are ignorant of any natural sociological laws, they consider that the obtuseness of their political "enemies" is the cause of the hardships which beset us. They ascribe these to the influence of the depraved heart, as our forefathers ascribed pestilence to the influence of the evil eye of witches, and they cannot be persuaded to open their minds to receive thoughts about politics and sociology which are quite revolutionary.

A useful illustration of the evil effects, in world affairs and over a long period, of some of our present political practices is derived from a study in a few sentences of Lloyd George's coalition government in 1918 at the end of the first World War. He won the so-called "coupon" election on the vindictive cries "Hang the Kaiser"; "Make Germany squeal"; "Squeese them like an orange till the pips pop out." He secured 472 seats for his coalition government against only 130 by his opponents, though their supporters cast 4,675,000 votes against 5,101,000 for Lloyd George's party. As a consequence at the conference at Versailles he was incapable, because he needed to retain his parliamentary support, of frustrating Clemenceau and subscribing to the moderating influences of Woodrow Wilson. That was a tragedy the effects of which contributed to make the war not a "war to end war" but the breeder of future wars.

Norfolk, England

The New Lab on the Campus

TO MANY PEOPLE the title Statistical Laboratory (such as the one on the campus of Iowa State College, or those at the great universities) is a puzzler, for it lacks the usual paraphernalia of research in the natural sciences. It is concerned with methods of collecting data, testing the efficiency of alternative plans, and assessing the validity of the results. Many people call on it for advice about statistical problems arising in quality control, the best way to design laboratory and field experiments, or the kind of samples of human population best suited for use in solving specific problems. Its work has great practical value.

T. SWANN HARDING

USDA, Washington

The Dilemma of Democracy

By WILLIAM L. WINTER

IN THE PRESENT WORLD two tendencies exist in opposition to democracy —one designed against the organized mechanics of democratic political procedure, the other operating within the ranks, but each striving for the same end—seizure of power by legislating minority purpose and intimidation of personal liberty by the abuse of delegated power.

The first of these tendencies is a well-known and completely organized movement using the term communism to describe its aims and activities. Universalism is its purported creed, and while it pretends to a universal character, the inspiration and guidance of various national Communist parties are received in mandate from a supposedly international committee which excludes from its leadership all save the intensely nationalistic citizens of one Soviet State.

It is not so much the purpose of this group that is a challenge to the democratic ideals of the nation as the methods employed to promote alliance, the assumption that the mass is hopelessly inadequate in perception and therefore must be incorporated into the movement by force. In so far as this organization fosters violence, pursues illegal and anti-democratic methods to suppress existing political and civil liberty, and with victory imposes dictatorial governments upon the liberated masses, it must be recognized for what it is—not communism, not internationalism, but established and entrenched fascism.

The obvious and organized nature of communistic fascism is in itself protective in a democratic State; consequently there is relatively little danger from this first type of opposition to democracy. The second threat, not so obviously organized, is the more vicious. In its high mobility and concentration of power, social and economic fascism is able to realign itself according to opportunity to terminate individual personal freedom and nullify self-government.

The social fascist is often unconscious of the motives of his own non-democracy; he perceives only his good intentions. The professional reformer is a typical fascist, characteristically associated with other reformers for in-group purposes. He is determined to dictate to others what they should or should not read, think, do, eat and drink. The resemblance of both to the Communists with respect to ultimate aims is evident—

could the various in-groups agree on a definition of objectives and formulate a common program of action, the world would be confronted with the danger of universal fascism.

Thus a certain protection against the fascists lies in their diversity of organization and purposes. This heterogeneity of group interest, however, can have the most appalling consequences when group aims are in conflict—as in the titanic struggle between the German and Russian fascistic systems for the control of central and eastern Europe. Within our own country, crises have arisen from similar causes. The tension between the extreme antislavery faction and the Southern pro-slavery and secessionist extremists forced into war a nation for the most part inclined toward pacifism. Similar examples of misguidance can frequently be cited in the conduct of the municipal, state, and federal governments, with attendant misrule that is as objectionable as oligarchic control.

Again, a fascistic organization possessing an economic or political monopoly which it ruthlessly exploits without thought of fair play will inevitably be faced with an uprising of those who have not and wish to have. Eventually a dictatorship appears, to the discomfiture of those who do not wish to be involved, are disinterested and impartial, as well as of those who have interests at stake. The peasant revolts of feudal western Europe were forerunners of the Protestant, French, and Russian revolutions, cataclysmic occurrences which achieved extensive redistributions of power and property at great cost. Whether the dominating group is a majority or a minority does not particularly matter, nor is it important whether the revolt comes immediately or is delayed. The last decade has seen the long deferred consequences of European imperialism in southeastern Asia; the uprisings in Indo-China and Indonesia have origins that are not recent, but which occurred in the preceding centuries of conquest and exploitation.

American Democracy Is Deep-Rooted

THE SOURCES OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY are pure and deep, and the stream that has flowed forth has a moving strength. Innately the American has roots that reach far into a soil unfavorable to fascism. While the power complexes of the national monarchical States were expanding into trans-Atlantic imperialism, they unintentionally stimulated movements of flight transmitting in the same direction resistance to the instigating forces. The Separatists, Presbyterians, Huguenots left Europe under pressure but in the exercise of what they regarded as fundamental rights that could not be abridged by any political organization. Unfortunately

the toleration demanded and desired by these refugees as a spiritual necessity was too often not extended by them to other sects, and this inconsistency persists today. It is still the fundamental weakness of a people supposedly Christian and democratic that the attitude of the majority is afflicted by bigotry, distrust, suspicion, and a parochial narrowness of vision.

In spite of these limitations there is an unconscious tendency to seek fair play and justice, a tendency that from time to time breaks through to the surface with surprising illumination. The most notable development in this spirit was the long revolutionary movement which began with the protest against the arbitrary exercise of power in 1775 and did not end until it had subverted, temporarily at least, the politico-socio-economic oligarchy that controlled the United States for the few with property. The continuing American Revolution, having achieved fairly well its purpose of agrarian independence (at the expense of the aborigine), was then sidetracked by a coalition of ambitious industrialists and politicians. Hardly three quarters of a century after the continental colonies had seceded from British imperial federation, the Republic had come under the dictatorship of first the Presidency and then a psychopathic minority in Congress, from which emerged the twin principles, one of political science and the other of political practice, centralization of power and government by clique.

To apply the term "fascism" to the developments of the last eighty-five years may seem anachronistic, but there is no better way to describe the absolute and introverted will-to-power. The noun has been somewhat discredited by the abuse of Communists and pro-Communists, to whom any opponent is a "fascist." Likewise, "democracy" has been appropriated and tossed about by all political factions, yet democracy can only mean properly the self-government of a people free of any authority except their own and that of morality. Franklin Roosevelt, popularly regarded as a protagonist and hero of democracy, received support from both communistic and other organizations whose spirit was undeniably fascistic. Both democratic and anti-democratic elements are well embedded in the warp and woof of our history and tradition.

Insurance against the encroachment of anti-democratic forces can never be obtained by political mechanics alone; the only guaranty of democracy is constant political, moral, and spiritual vigilance.

In the colonial period the opposition to arbitrary government under the guise of royal authority culminated in open and co-ordinated revolution.

Doubtless those who would have preferred to keep rebellion in hand and under their personal control were disconcerted. The bitterness of strife in the constitutional controversy and the relentless political warfare between Federalists and anti-Federalists were significant of the cleavage within the newly formed union. Finally the struggle against oligarchy found expression in the elimination of property restrictions on suffrage, and in the aggressive agrarianism of the Jacksonian movement. Yet the entrenchment of the political machine in the same era had the effect of crystallization of our later political development, creating a pattern that tends to dominate and to restrain the popular will as often as to facilitate its function.

The Record of the Last Century

THE GREATEST HANDICAP which the Republic has had to suffer has been the forced reconstruction of the South after the war brought about by the insoluble triangle of slavery, tariff, and the possession of the federal power. This is not the only occasion on which two movements, both of which were fascistic in character, have clashed to leave fateful scars in the history of a nation, but seldom has the result been so disastrous and permanent. The subjugation of the South by force and prolonged military rule were met by white supremacists with fraud, violence, and intimidation. The most virulent effect derived from the economic destruction which left the South in a permanently debilitated condition, creating both an anti-national regional psychosis and an attitude of mistrust toward the social, political, or economic acceptance of the Negro which had been imposed by the Republican party and federal troops. It thus has become impossible to enforce in the South the provision of the federal Constitution enfranchising all citizens regardless of race.

In addition to imposing this peculiarly undemocratic type of political exclusiveness upon the country, the Civil War period, through the reintroduction of a high tariff, ensured the peculiar development of the Industrial Revolution in the United States. A more grandiose, more subtle and influential type of fascism was directed toward the exploitation of industrial labor, the farmer, and the consuming public. The emergence of economic fascism in the latter half of the nineteenth century was signalled by the expansion and consolidation of corporations, railroads, and banking institutions, and was paralleled by the deification of an abstract concept of success which was erroneously supposed to be available to all who were sufficiently interested in opportunity. Simultaneously the control and manufacture of public opinion was being centralized through the

amalgamation of the press and the elimination of the true individuality of journalism—a process completed in the twentieth century.

In the Eighteen-Nineties imperial expansion first reached its continental limits with the seizure and division of the productive portions of the land; while the mineral resources were yet to be fully exploited, more imaginative men began to be conscious of fields abroad. The interest generated in the Caribbean, the Pacific, and eastern Asia inevitably was directed by men whose sense of power was less predatory and more intellectual. Only a very small minority in the United States had a real interest, economic or otherwise, in overseas expansion, but the influence, in the press and in the government, of this minority was persuasive.

International fascism directed by political adventurers, commercial and financial interests, missionaries, manifest-destiny prophets and naval expansionists resulted in the establishment of a heterogeneous colonial empire including the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Hawaii, not to mention the protectorate over Cuba and the assumption of special rights in Latin America. The consciousness of the literate public had to be projected into a world sphere. Among the educated, Mahan's repeated references to imperial destiny predicated upon sea power of the British model served the same purpose as the yellow press for other sections of the public.

The program for expansion began to find a popular acceptance under the auspices of McKinley and the Republican Party as a front for interested parties and a segment of the State Department. Unfortunately the full diplomatic implications and the moral responsibilities of empire were far from being realized. Since 1900 the American foreign policies have been motivated by a complex of interests, paramount among which is the desire to enlarge the field of trade and capital investment abroad. A policy of entering into competition among the empires and "spheres of influence" of the great European powers proved irreversible, particularly since British diplomatic pressure increased as the war against Germany was prepared. The borders of American financial entanglement extended far beyond the political frontiers, and the policy of extension of credit and moral support to the Allies in World War I led inevitably to our participation when the possibility of their defeat appeared.

Concentration on Political Democracy

THE SECOND WORLD WAR brought home the full implication of the failure and breakdown on a world-wide scale of the democratic principles. For nearly two centuries west European civilization, including in this sense

the Americas and the British Dominions, had focused its attention and directed its effort as if obsessed toward a single goal—the realization of the practice of democracy through parliamentary, representative governments, and mature safeguards for liberty of expression and reasonable freedom of action. The outcome of this magnificent, heroic striving was the brood of dictatorships hatched between 1917 and 1935. One after another European countries turned their backs on political democracy and set up fascistic regimes. But the most ominous portents were not those which appeared in the distressed areas—Russia, Germany, Austria, Italy and Spain—but in the coalition "national" governments of the country with the most venerable parliamentary tradition, and the advent in the United States of a political ego that was very much at home in the age of Stalin, Mussolini, and Hitler. As the Romans, weary of their problems, had reposed extraordinary powers in Caesar, so in the twentieth century the electors of the American Republic in the face of its greatest economic crisis sacrificed precedents in exchange for the guarantee of a permanent dole.

The advent of the Rooseveltian third term inaugurated a new era in the history of the United States as surely as the decision to reenforce Fort Sumter. What developments may be in store for this generation and the two following can not be foreseen with any degree of precision. But there is every indication that the people will continue to surrender their interest in the government in return for flattery and fine radio oratory, that rulers of whatever background or derivation will offer bread and amusements and other "socialistic" panaceas while continuing to pander to a small, well-knit group of economic fascists.

The anomaly of American politics has long been a people sovereign in law and absolute in theory, yet indifferent to and careless of their sovereignty, indulging an attitude toward their responsibilities that Louis XV would have considered unworthy. The actual business of governing has thus fallen into the hands of factions and cliques which control these factions, party organizations which are ends in themselves, run by officeholders or candidates whose chief concern is to obtain and hold position and its incidental compensations. Instead of the formulation and pursuit of a policy of national social welfare, the occupation of the professional politician is absorbed in the endless struggle for power by private interests whose lobbies bring every kind of pressure to bear upon legislators and administrators. Trade and manufacturing associations, banking groups, farmers associations, railroads, veterans' organizations, labor unions, reform societies,

churches, mining and shipping interests, professional associations, chambers of commerce and regional interests have their weapons, the nature and use of which the professional politician must understand, since they may be used against him at any time. Bloc voting by the electorate, social influence, the manufacture and control of opinion, rumors, economic favors or retaliation, private censorship or control of press and radio, and, speaking generally, collectivistic intimidation are among these weapons. To expect statesmen of great stature to emerge from the organized feudal anarchy of the lobby system of legislation would be naivèté itself.

The dislocating effect of the anti-social struggle for special consideration, exemptions, and privileges is belied by the appearance of respectability, order, and equilibrium which the existence of only two major parties imparts. Indeed, the uniformity of aim of the two parties is sometimes disconcertingly obvious in a country in which the opposition as a public service would be expected to offer a genuine counter-program. The difference between the promise of the candidate and the performance of the elected official subjected to the homogenizing, domesticating influence of the state or national capital is a common topic of humor. Not quite so well known is the practice of legal or financial firms which have a stake in government policy—the maintenance of at least one member of each major party in the partnership, to ensure a friendly hearing at court under any circumstances.

Vested Interests Generate Reaction

THE FACT that the federal, state, county, and local governments pass, except in the South, from one party to another at elections, is offset by the national nature of patronage. The distribution of offices and favors at the disposition of the federal executive aids in imparting a semblance of cohesion to political procedures that are diverse in motivation and execution. Thus the Democratic administration of the past sixteen years has been able to keep in line anti-federal attitudes of the South, through combining a program of federal aid with occasional concessions to local prejudice. Regional anti-federalism may present an easier problem of control than the growing tendency to the assertion of states' rights by the states individually, taking the form of taxation of inter-state enterprise and the exclusion of competitive commodities. Vested interests through their lobbies are returning us to the period of inter-state tariff wars under the Articles of Confederation.

Under examination, the putative character of American political economy in adherence to laissez-faire principles proves to be nothing more than

a carefully cultivated illusion. Government subsidies and calculated interference in economic activities for the benefit of powerful lobbies have been the tradition and practice in the United States since the beginning, and can be traced back to the colonial era, but have become specially pernicious since the Eighteen-Sixties. The Republican administrations of the Civil War and post-war periods materially assisted in the creation of economic monopolies by subsidizing private enterprises through gifts of federal land to railroads and enactment of "protective" tariffs in restraint of trade. The interests thus fortified have become virtually impregnable, but the reaction of the public to their ruthless use of economic power multiplied legislation in a chain of developments that now seems to have no end. The interstate commerce, anti-trust, agricultural tariff acts, the laws first for the protection and then regulation of labor unions, the subsidies of agricultural industries and licensing of co-operative organizations, price-fixing and wage-fixing decrees, federal banking and credit corporations, the support of millions of unemployed, represent the confused and unrationalized efforts of our legislators to appease the public either by tying strings to the Frankenstein's monster of financial monopoly, or by the creation of smaller counter-monopolies. From a political point of view this mass of legislation resembles a casually constructed pyramid resting perilously upon its apex; from the economist's standpoint, the smothering influences of private monopolistic control on the one hand and incompetent government regulation on the other make the very suggestion of the possibility of "free enterprise" ludicrous.

Thus the last hundred years of our history have seen the undercutting of both our political and economic democracy; the critical and dangerous period has set in with the exhaustion of desirable free economic land in the Nineties. Until then capital in the form of land had been available to anyone possessing initiative; since the passing of the frontier the trend has been toward the elimination of economic independence. The farmer has held out as an occupational group, but his position was considerably shaken by the expansion of World War I farm prosperity and the subsequent foreclosures of the Twenties and Thirties. With another depression the enterprise of the farmer (already subject to commodity market and political controls to the point that it can hardly be called free) may be subordinated to the rank of employment. The effect of the economic trend of the last half century is to make proletarians of the vast majority of the population —their reduction to being working men and women, "labor," whether they realize it or not. Such small businesses as survived the depression received

a new lease on life in the second world war, but that may be only temporary. Unless unforeseen circumstances reverse the trend to centralization, the pretense of economic democracy will have to be abandoned, and its decline will parallel that of our political institutions.

The Responsibility of the Constituent

AS FOR THE LATTER, their fate seems to be atrophy, through lack of use in the spirit for which they were intended. The present political machinery does not need to be drastically changed (though the desirability of some minor repairs is obvious enough), but it does need to be intelligently and earnestly used by all Americans. The revolution that will save democracy is the creation of a healthy sense of responsibility in the individual toward his government, the realization that political failure or evil is the fault not of governors, but of their constituents who installed them in positions of power. It is a common but foolish delusion to expect from leadership a higher standard of morality than from society as a whole.

Modern democracy is not an ideal system, ideally achieved—its foundations are historical, traditional, and economic; its development has been both philosophic and organic. No contemporary parliamentary State has come into existence without reference to the republics of Greece and Rome. Neither, in a study of the origins of our political culture, can Christianity with its emphasis on the equal value of all souls before God be ignored. The self-conscious, literate, newspaper-reading modern public has been the expansion of the middle class who saw in the popular referendum an offset to power too highly concentrated in monarchical and aristocratic institutions; legislatures are more susceptible to plutocratic influence than royal courts.

If there is to be any logic behind democracy, if it is to be more than an expedient justified by and derived from certain related factors in our social evolution, it is essential to do more than maintain democratic forms, to expect the magic of a name to effect self-government. Government of, by, and for the people is now on trial and the watchful care needed for the conservation of civil liberties is nothing in comparison with the mental and spiritual effort necessary to free ourselves from moral lethargy, partisanship and selfishness. Among a people that prizes its sentimental and naive attachment to the abstraction of a patriotic history, and continues fatuously to glorify political and economic individualism in the face of factual evidence of their disappearance, almost every kind of group organization exists, and alignment of loyalties prevails, except a genuine national organ-

ization and national consciousness. Fundamentally our peril lies not in the movements of any minority, but in the inertia of the majority; not in aggression, but in passive disgust and disinterest. The protection of the institutions to which we have a deep emotional liaison calls for more than theatrical investigations, reports of committees and commissions, the effusions of the press and the babblings of the radio—it demands the realization that the American system rather than being subverted or overthrown is slowly becoming meaningless and useless in the hands of its possessors.

Institutional change in one direction or another, for greater or less popular participation in government, is not of much significance if the will to exercise the existing rights is absent. The suffrage can be extended, as it was by Napoleon III, while losing its effectiveness. Our constitutional apparatus might be preserved without the slightest alteration *ad infinitum*, yet through popular diffidence be transformed into a mechanical display of meaningless forms. More and more power is now being transferred or delegated to the executive by the legislature in the interests of "efficiency." The importance of the Presidency is increasing, since it is regarded as the friend of the masses *vis-a-vis* the supposed impotence of Congress. It is significant that Augustus, the first hereditary emperor of Rome, received the title "Restorer of the Republic." The character and status of the Roman electorate in the imperial period are too well known to require comment.

Palpably a semi-conscious tendency has already set in to accept as the most suitable form of government that which produces "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," and to condone the use of any means which does not flagrantly defeat the end. American political evolution has often followed this course of little resistance, but in the lack of principle it is *per se* fascistic. Governed in many phases of his policy by a facile opportunism, Franklin Roosevelt attempted to convert the federal Supreme Court into an annex of executive approval. Defeated in this effort by the Congress, he doubtless looked upon the incident as the hindrance of a noble humanitarian purpose.

Neither opportunism nor the convenience of compromise should ever be substituted for the principle of democracy. In adherence to this principle a medium of ending the tension, the estrangement, between the individual citizen and the State is to be sought in the instrument of representative government. Man and political society have become dissociated, but despite the present cleavage the building of this continental empire has been more

than a myth or a dream—it is a labor of social co-operation. Our problem is not to permit the continued projection of the illusion of isolate and helpless separateness, but to clarify the relationship of each personality to himself and to his fellows. Admittedly the solution must be more than political, and in its deepest implications is universal, moral, and economic. But the State is the visible and best organized expression of the society which the totality of individuals compose, and the immediate goal must be the re-establishment of rapport between the citizens and their representational collectivity—the Republic.

The Role of Referenda

TO ACCOMPLISH THIS END certain measures can be taken to enforce symbolically the effect of individual responsibility that is no longer borne by the citizen and to shake the grip of the professional politician upon government. For example, a referendum should be required upon the enactment of all legislation of national importance, including laws regulating labor organizations and trusts, the declaration of war and the conclusion of peace, the conscription of manpower and capital for military purposes, the ratification of trade treaties and alliances, the imposition of tariff and excise duties. To enable the intelligent participation of the public in the referenda, the text of every bill to be voted upon should be translated into non-legal language, and circulated, together with arguments for and against the bill by leading statesmen and political and social scientists, throughout every community.

Such a referendum would tend to counteract that political schizophrenia which has developed among Americans of the last four generations—a feeling of being alien to the government with whose existence they are under democratic and representative processes a part.

Less than three centuries ago the prevailing type of government in west European society was absolute monarchy. The prince was the trustee of supreme authority reposed in him by God, controlled only by the law which he himself could alter through edict. He personified the national State and on the practical level his power was regarded as a bulwark against encroachments of specially privileged classes. He assumed the responsibility of government, thus validating the popular feeling that the State was one thing, centering on the king, while the people were quite another.

Absolutism has now been thoroughly discredited, yet unfortunately the attitude prevalent under the monarchy, in which the government was abstract from the people and its functions none of their concern, has

persisted and resulted in a deadly indifference compounded of cynicism, complacency, and a conviction of impotence. This is the dilemma of American democracy, the critical period for its solution has been reached, and in essence its solution must be the resumption of responsibility by the majority *and* by individuals, of whom the majority is composed. There is no other way out; otherwise the infinity of laws regulating our political and economic life must have the effect of strangulation with restrictive bonds of red tape. The re-establishment of democracy can only be achieved if the individual is made to feel that he as an individual has a personal responsibility for his own actions, that he is not bound or controlled by the government, and that on the contrary as a citizen he has the additional and heavy responsibility for whatever the government may do. In this way a genuine nationalism, a national democracy, may be created, and the moral equilibrium of the people restored.

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Rent Control in Peiping

THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS, true to their theory, have been attempting to solve the rent control problem in Peiping by decree, just as they have attempted to solve the agrarian land problem. This provides admirable opportunities for "squeeze," to which the Communists are not adverse. The Peiping Military Control Committee issued a proclamation announcing a series of measures to help solve the housing problem and encourage people to repair and build houses. These are the measurers: Houses can be sold and bought freely. A house "stolen from public property or owned by criminals" can be confiscated, but only by order of the People's Court. Rents are to be fixed "by fair and reasonable agreement" between owner and tenant and must be paid in people's money" or in kind, not gold or silver. Repairs must be borne by the owner unless the agreement stipulates otherwise. Disputes will be settled by the Land Bureau or the People's Court. Tenants may be evicted only if the owner wants to live in the house himself or to rebuild or to sell it, and then only with a minimum notice of three months. House owners should be "enabled to earn a profit" but rents should not be fixed "too high." Considering these measures, the odds are ten to one that the housing problem will be a perpetual one in Peiping, just as it is in Moscow.

W. L.

The Prospects of 'Pan-Slavism'

By GEORGE C. GUINS

SOVIET INTENTIONS with regard to the Slav countries are sufficiently clear. The Kremlin wants to control them for two reasons: in order to strengthen its position in case of war with the Western world; or in the event of a spontaneous disintegration of Western Europe during war and subsequent revolutions, to use them as a springboard and a base for further communist expansion.

There are more than 200,000,000 Slavs in Europe: the western Slavs—Czechoslovakia and Poland, with a population of 38,000,000; the southern Slavs—Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, with a population of 21,000,000; and the eastern Slavs—Russia in Europe, the Ukraine, and White Russia, with a Slavic population of about 146,000,000.

It is no wonder that the Soviet Union is interested in supporting the communist regime in the Slav countries and in isolating them economically and politically from contact with the democracies. Neither can the western democracies be indifferent in regard to the Slav problem. It has world significance.

I

THE POLITICAL AIM of the Soviets had been disguised originally as an antifascist movement in the interests of security.[1] Certain of the postwar constitutions of the Slav countries reflect this policy.[2]

However, the Soviet Union was pursuing goals of a much larger scope. It wanted to eliminate any resistance and opposition to its plans. Into the text of all constitutions of the Slav as well as other east-European countries were inserted prescriptive provisions against the abuse of freedoms and against counter-revolutionary activity, which created for the

[1] The corresponding directives had been expressed clearly in the Soviet press as early as 1945. "The peoples of Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, having been liberated with the aid of the Red Army from the fascist yoke want to establish in their countries a political structure under which any resurrection of fascism would be impossible. The peoples of these countries do not wish to connect their destiny with the elements which during the pre-war period cleared the way to fascism." "There is born the unity of an international labor movement, a basis of a newly-united labor class is founded ready for the struggle against fascism, against reactionary forces." (*Bolshevik*, April, 1945, no. 7–8, p. 6.)

[2] The constitution of Bulgaria of 1947, Article 1, mentions the struggle against "monarcho-fascist dictatorship," and the constitution of Czechoslovakia of 1946, Article 2—the struggle against "fascism, reaction, and imperialism."

secret police a legal basis on which to suppress and liquidate all anti-Communist parties and people considered generally undesirable.[3]

During the period of 1945 to 1950 the Soviet government succeeded in transforming all Slav countries except Yugoslavia into Soviet vassals, in isolating them almost entirely from the Western world, and with the aid of high pressure, in forcing the more moderate groups to concede to the Communists. Consequently, all non-Communist parties, in conformity with the recipe of Lenin,[4] were dissolved.

Conditions arose under which one could expect that the idea of 'Pan-Slavism' might at last be realized, if it is realizable at all.

Yet one could hardly conclude other than that a Pan-Slavic Union as a political scheme has been, and still is, an unrealizable goal and that Russia is no more able to achieve it, at least at present, than were Czechoslovakia or Poland in the past.[5] The idea itself was merely a historical sentimentality. It was easily disseminated and found many adherents among the Slav peoples while they were subjugated and striving for freedom. Until they tasted of the sweet fruits of independence and had established their own government, they had welcomed the idea of unification with Russia. Naturally enough, they preferred unification with Russia to the yoke of an alien people.[6]

In the Soviet press, the idea of 'Pan-Slavism' has been renounced several times. The Soviets cannot accept this plan primarily because of their negative attitude toward any kind of messianism based on nationalist dreams and racial discrimination. This point is undoubtedly consistent for representatives of the international.[7] There is, besides this, another important point to remember. The Soviet government has always emphasized its recognition of the sovereignty of all nations and the inadmissi-

[3] In connection with the February events of 1948 in Czechoslovakia the Soviet commentator wrote as follows: "The leading rôle in the State's organs is secured to the progressive democratic forces organized in the National Front under leadership of the Communist party of Czechoslovakia." (V. F. Kotok, "The New Constitution of Czechoslovakia," Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo, no. 12, 1948, p. 32.)

[4] "The unity of the proletariat in the epoch of social revolution," Lenin says, "can be achieved only by the extreme revolutionary party of Marxism, and only by a relentless struggle against all other parties." Lenin, "Collected Works," Russian edition, vol. XXVI, p. 50.

[5] Cf. for details, W. Lednicki, "Pan-Slavism" in "European Ideologies," Felix Gross, ed., Philosophical Library (New York, 1948), pp. 807–912; also, G. C. Guins, "The Degeneration of 'Pan-Slavism,' Am. Jour. Econ. Socio., vol. 8, no. 1 (October, 1948), pp. 57–59.

[6] It is significant, therefore, that during the nineteenth century the Czech leaders expressed much more sympathy and confidence toward Russia than did the Poles.

[7] *Slaviane*, no 8 (1947), p. 37.

bility of interference into the domestic affairs of other nations.[8] In accordance with this initial standpoint, it is proclaimed that the "new people's democracies are united in one friendly family closely rallied around their liberator, the first socialist state in the world," as "equal and independent nations."[9]

Consequently, " 'Pan-Slavism' has degenerated as a philosophy of Slav ethnic culture in contradistinction to the west-European one; it has also degenerated as a conception of an eventual Slav Federation or even a Slav Empire."[10]

Neither are the Slav countries treated as "equal and independent." The Soviet leadership excludes, practically, the sovereignty of any partner of the socialist bloc due to the unavoidable centralistic tendency inherent in the Soviet political and economic structure.[11] Theoretically the Soviet government protects the sovereignty of all nations; practically it submits them to its supremacy because "the assertion that every country travels toward socialism along its own and entirely original path, and that there are as many paths as there are countries, is incorrect. . . . The great historic experience of the Bolshevik party is a guide for the action of Communists and toilers of all countries."[11a]

II

To UNITE all Slav nations is not an easy task. There are many obstacles hindering its realization which are rooted in the differences among the Slav nations themselves.[12]

Poland esteems her national independence above all, and she will always strive for freedom. An intensively industrialized Czechoslovakia may be ambitious to replace Germany in some foreign markets. Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, though quarreling among themselves, were always united in their attitude toward the political domination of foreigners and would

[8] *Mezhdunarodnoe Pravo,* Jurid. Izdatelstvo Min. Just., M. 1947, pp. 139, 140, 146.

[9] *Slaviane,* editorial, no. 1, 1948.

[10] G. C. Guins, "The Politics of 'Pan-Slavism,' " AM. JOUR. ECON. SOCIO., vol. 8, no. 2 (January, 1949), p. 132.

[11] G. C. Guins, "Soviet Centralism," *ibid.*, vol. 9, no. 3 (April, 1950).

[11a] *Bolshevik,* Sept. 15, 1948, p. 51.

[12] Problems of national minorities complicated the existence of Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia. Slovaks and Ruthenians wanted independence; Ukrainians and Byelorussians protested against Polonization; Croatians and Slovenians did not get along with Serbians. The quarrel between the Croats and Serbs is ancient; they follow different religions and use different alphabets. Croats are Roman Catholics and use the Latin alphabet, while the Serbs practice the Greek Orthodox religion and use the Cyrillic alphabet. There are, in addition, the Moslem Serbs who are unfriendly to the Catholic Serbs. Slovenia was a civilized land while the other Balkan regions lived under the Turkish yoke. Like the Czechs, Slovenes adapted the German culture to a great extent and became estranged from some of their Slav neighbors.

prefer to organize a Balkan-Danube Federation in which they would not be forced to play an insignificant rôle.[13]

In order to eliminate complications, the Soviet Union has blocked any attempt of the Slavs to determine their own aims independently. The Soviet Union is obviously attempting to transform the Slav countries, as well as its other satellites, into future republics of the U.S.S.R. The method by which the Soviet government plans to attain this end is essentially the same as that used in the case of Ukraina, Georgia, Bukhara and Tannu-Tuva, whose independence was recognized by the Kremlin, but proved to be ephemeral. Moscow started with a military alliance in order to protect the revolution and ensure its freedom from the capitalist and imperialist world; a united diplomatic struggle under the leadership of Moscow followed, and finally the Soviet Union absorbed its constituents completely after submitting them to the State national economic plan on the basis of the so-called Stalin Constitution of 1936.

Since the end of World War II, the dependence of the Slav countries upon the Soviet Union has been growing steadily greater every year.[14] The Slav satellites have already lost their military and diplomatic independence and are gradually losing their economic sovereignty. Moscow undoubtedly plans to submit *all* the satellites, not only the Slav countries, to a common economic program, and to establish together with them an east-European regional Union. This seems, at least, to be the most probable aim of Soviet diplomacy unless, or until, a maximum program of World Revolution can be accomplished.

III

THE FUTURE of the Slav nations will not necessarily depend, however, upon the policy and aims of the Soviet Union. Inside all the countries which have become its vassals, its policies have created more enemies than friends. There are other bases, therefore, upon which the prospects of the Slav nations must be studied.

We are living at the time of an important and significant evolution of International Law. War is acknowledged to be a crime against man-

[13] On January 17, 1947, the late Bulgarian communist, Premier Dimitrov, disavowed ideas for a Balkan-Danubian Federation, and it later became known that Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were working towards unification of their two countries as the basis for a Balkan Federation but this plan was abruptly vetoed by Moscow.

[14] "Faced by the Greek horrors, the peoples of Eastern Europe, Slavs and non-Slavs, are rallying closer together, striving to form stronger and ever more friendly ties with the only great power whose existence is in itself a guarantee to them against the evil fate of the Greeks, or Spaniards, or the Indonesians." Acad. E. Tarle, *Moscow News*, November 5, 1947.

kind. The United Nations has agreed to secure the peace by joint action and to develop international co-operation in a larger scope. In the light of these tendencies the principle of national self-determination is losing its former significance. From the point of view of world-economy organization and of close international collaboration, it is more expedient to create large state formations than to break up states according to indications of nationality. Large nations with highly developed cultures have as much right to become leaders of small nations as do great and outstanding men to become leaders of people.

The great powers are the natural protectors of small nations. They possess greater potentialities, but are burdened by greater responsibilities. A country which aspires to the leadership of other nations must possess a high culture, one which can win general recognition and respect; a social culture which protects the free expression of personal and spiritual needs; a material culture to ensure a high standard of living, freedom from want, and a spiritual culture which would find its expression in religion, literature and art.

But just as a leader should be prevented from becoming a dictator, a great nation with dictatorial potentialities must be restrained from oppressing small nations.

One must strive, therefore, to prevent the merger of small states with large ones and the division of the world into "spheres of influence," according to the time-worn formula; not to submit, but to create unions and voluntary alliances, founded on similarity of economic interests and a common cultural background.

In the light of these principles the future of the Slav world can be determined differently than history indicated twenty-five years ago.

In its historical boundaries, during the time preceding World War I, Russia already encompassed a tremendous world of so-called Eurasia. Further expansion would only complicate her political and social problems. Under present international conditions, her security can be sufficiently guaranteed without the submission of her neighbors and annexation of their territories. The Soviet policy of expansion does not correspond to the vital needs of Russia's people, and is not necessary for her national security; rather, it is a policy of communist political aggression.

Approaching the Slav problem realistically, Russian national interest demands merely that the Slav countries be independent, strong, and amicably disposed toward Russia. The greater their cultural rapprochement

and mutual trust grew, the more stable would be their political alliance, stronger than it would be when united under a single authority.[15]

As for the political unification of the Slav nations, it is the concern primarily of the Balkan Slavs, among whom attempts in this direction have already been made. Establishment of a Federation of Southern Slavs (if such a thing ever comes to pass) would certainly put an end to the everlasting Balkan strife. But still more expedient would be a Balkan-Danube Union embracing Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and possibly Austria.[16] If Poland and Czechoslovakia joined it, this union would be a very vital and economically strong formation. Existing in close economic and cultural harmony with both the Eurasian and Western-European worlds, yet independent of them, it could better preserve its own interests and secure peace in Europe.

Thus, instead of a Pan-Slav Union, the world may witness in future an Eastern-European regional union with or without Russia. This is one of the primary problems of world policy of our age.

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[15] A close rapprochement of all Slav countries through the medium of schools, science, literature, Slavic academies, the study of Slavic history and economy, literature and art, the opening of museums dedicated to the genius of Slav artists, the publication of magazines devoted to Slavic problems—all of these might gradually make Russia the center of an all-Slav culture. The Soviet government has already laid the foundation of this cultural rapprochment. A special Slav Committee was established in 1945 at the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., under the presidency of the academician N. S. Derjavin, with a directive to unite all Russian specialists in Slav science and to stimulate different kinds of research, and the study of Slav history, law and languages. That is, certainly, a long range, but only basically realistic way to the rapprochement of the Slav nations.

[16] Being in the midst of the Slav states and closely connected with them by economic interests, the Austrians cannot live unto themselves.

Taxing Privilege in South Viet Nam

IN SOME RESPECTS, the citizens of South Viet Nam in French Indochina are very practical people. The government has found it impossible to stamp out gambling under present social conditions, so it has decided to license gaming houses. As a matter of social policy the licenses had to be limited. Who was to get the privilege? Persons favored by the politicians? No, an auction was held on Nov. 27, 1948 at which the privilege of opening gaming houses in the Saigon-Cholon region went to the highest bidders. This is the manner in which the privilege of operating fish wiers in the Hudson River is distributed. With one important difference. In New York the auctions are held annually. Thus the unearned income that accrues to the wier operator is siphoned off for the benefit of the people. Have the Viet Namese been as foresighted? If they have not, they can hardly be blamed. Radio and television channel licensees in the United States enjoy as their private income the unearned income produced by their privilege. The same holds true for State liquor stores and similar ventures.

W.L.

The Abolition of Climbing Boys

By GEORGE L. PHILLIPS

Some wooden tubes, a brush, and rope,
  Are all you need employ;
Pray order, maids, the Scandiscope,
  And not the climbing boy.[1]

I

"CHIMNEY-SWEEPERS," wrote Henry Mayhew in 1851, "are a consequence of two things—chimneys and the use of coal as fuel; and these are both commodities of comparatively recent introduction."[2] Before Elizabeth's reign began, very few homes in England had chimneys. For heating purposes, fires burned on hearthstones, situated in the center of halls or against one wall, and the smoke drifted out through the windows, doors, or apertures in the roof. As fortresses in the country were transformed into manor houses and noblemen's residences in London were altered to provide greater comfort, the Italian fashion of constructing chimneys with flues to conduct smoke from log fires to the roof was introduced so generally that by 1577 Chronicler Harrison was grumbling "now we have manie chimnies, and yet our tenderlings complaine of rheumes, catarhs, and poses; then had we none but *reredosses*, and our heads did never ake."[3] But despite Harrison's glowing tribute to the hardiness of earlier generations, his contemporaries and their descendants, insisting on heated apartments, demanded more and more fireplaces in their residences, indeed a fireplace for every room. As the number of flues for each chimney increased, the size of their diameters decreased, thereby economizing on space, shutting out drafts, and preventing the heat from coal fires—coal began to supplant wood as fuel in the seventeenth century—from escaping up the chimney. So widespread did the practice of narrowing the flues become that, by the Regency Period, Henry Grey Bennet declared many flues were often "not

[1] William Hone, "The Every-Day Book; or, Everlasting Calendar of Popular Amusements, Sports, Pastimes, Ceremonies, Manners, Customs, and Events Incident to Each of the Three Hundred and Sixty-Five Days, in Past and Present Times." 2 vols. (London, 1827), II, p. 618. An illustration of the "Scandiscope" appears on page 623.

[2] Henry Mayhew, "London Labour and the London Poor, A Cyclopaedia of the Condition and Earnings of Those That Will Work, Those That Cannot Work, and Those That Will Not Work," 3 vols. in one (London, 1851), II, p. 338.

[3] James O. Halliwell, "A Dictionary of Archaic and Provincial Words," 2 vols. (London, 1901), II, p. 678. Halliwell defines "reredosse" as an open fire hearth.

more than 7 or 8 inches square. Children of 4 or 5 years of age were used for the purpose of sweeping."[4]

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the trade or mystery of chimney-sweeping was carried on in England, as in other European countries, by men who stood in the cavernous chimneys and swept the light soot deposit from the sides with birch brooms affixed to long poles, or who climbed ladders in especially lofty chimneys and used short-handled brushes. John Cottington, *alias* "Mull'd Sack," better known for his exploits as a highwayman than for his five-year apprenticeship to a chimney-sweeper, is depicted in a print attributed to Elstrack and prior to 1630, as a grown chimney-sweeper with a broom and long pole surmounted with a horn over one shoulder, and an empty soot-bag over the other.[5] Fixed snug as a jack-in-the-box in a nearby chimney-top, evidently resting on the top rung of a ladder, is a bewhiskered sweeper waving his cap to Cottington in friendly fashion. Another print, drawn by Marcellus Lauron[6] and published by Pearce Tempest in 1688, shows Master Chimney-Sweeper Seyley in smock and leggings, carrying a besom tied to a bundle of poles, and a soot-bag. Behind him is his apprentice, a clean, neat-appearing boy with a brush and bag.[7]

Another method for cleaning chimneys with horizontal or narrow flues was usually practiced in Scotland and on the Continent but was seldom used in England.[8] A chimney-sweeper on the roof would lower a rope, weighted with an iron ball, down a flue to his companion waiting on the hearth. The latter would pull on the rope until a bunch of furze or broom, tied to the center, appeared; then, turning the bunch with the

[4] *The Times*, February 19, 1818.

[5] Cottington's dates are given as 1604–1659, or 1611–1656. Mention of the horn, used to scrape soot from the insides of flues, is laughingly commented upon in a poem written during the reign of James I, see, "A History of the Cries of London, Ancient and Modern," Charles Hindley, ed., 2nd ed. (London, 1884), p. 97.

[6] Sometimes spelled Mauron.

[7] This may be the first picture of a chimney-sweeper's apprentice, but it would seem from the boy's unsoiled appearance that he was not accustomed to climbing flues for the purpose of cleaning them. Perhaps the first print showing the sooty-faced, ragged urchin, carrying his brush and scraper, the typical young sweep that Blake, Lamb, and Kingsley described, was Boitard's *The Cov: Garden Morning Frolick*, 1747, wherein the boy is laughing merrily at Captain Montagu perched drunkenly on Betty Thoughtless's sedan chair. In 1750 Hogarth pictured another sable-colored lad watching the soldiers march to Finchley Common.

[8] Jonas Hanway mentions Scotland and Russia. See his "A Sentimental History of Chimney Sweepers, in London & Westminster, Showing the Necessity of putting them under Regulations to prevent the grossest Inhumanity to the Climbing Boys" (London, 1785), pp. xvii, 83. David Porter gives also France and Germany in "Considerations of the Present State of Chimney Sweepers with Some Observations on the Act of Parliament Intended for their Regulation and Relief" (London, 1792), p. 11.

twigs uppermost, he would signal to his fellow to haul it up. The twigs, scraping the sides of the flue as they were pulled up and down several times, would dislodge the soot. Instead, however, of employing two grown men to clean their tortuous flues, householders in England began early in the eighteenth century to transform small children into human brooms for sweeping out their flues, which were easily clogged by soot from coal fires. They believed that by sending boys of five and six years of age along the twisting funnels and around the sharp angles to scrape off accumulations of soot, the flues would be better cleaned than if they engaged men with ropes and bunches of twigs. Hence, it was not uncommon to find on the trade-cards of master chimney-sweepers "Little boys for small flues."[9] So strongly had the practice of using children—girls sometimes swept as well as boys—become entrenched by 1775, that Jonas Hanway, realizing the impossibility of stopping the barbarous custom, pleaded that the youngsters should be treated with kindness for "the occupation is *necessary;* and no mode of sweeping is in all respects so convenient to us as that in use; a great part of the work must be done by children."[10] In 1792 Master Chimney-Sweeper David Porter was, like Jonas Hanway, convinced that children were necessary for cleaning flues; so convinced, in fact, that despite his ostentatious show of sympathy for the miseries they endured, he made no attempt to discover the possible merits of a machine which had been patented but neglected. "There has been," he noted, "lately an invention to sweep chimnies without climbing; I admit there has, and a patent granted to the inventor; but whether from the want of merit, or trial, it seems to have died in infancy, and I believe there remains now no pretensions to sweep chimnies by any other method, than by boys climbing them; it is then for us to inquire, how far misery is inseparable from chimney sweeping, on the one hand, and how far the chimney-sweeper can be relieved on the other?"[11] Porter sought only to palliate the evils of sweepdom, not to abolish them by superseding climbing-boys with chimney-sweeping devices.

II

As early as 1796 the Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures, and Commerce began to take an active interest in improving the condition of chimney-sweepers' apprentices by offering a premium of a

[9] Cited by the Rev. Sydney Smith. See "Works of the Rev. Sydney Smith," 3 vols. in one (Philadelphia, 1845), II, p. 82.

[10] Jonas Hanway, "The Defects of Police, the Cause of Immorality" (London, 1775), p. 98.

[11] Porter, *op cit.*, p. 14. To just what type of machine Porter referred is uncertain.

gold medal or forty guineas to the first person to invent a machine to clean soot out of chimneys and in this manner render unnecessary the use of climbing-boys.[12] The premium was offered annually until 1802, when, no claimant having appeared, it was dropped only to be revived in 1803, in consequence of the founding that year of the Society for Superseding the Necessity of Climbing Boys, by Encouraging a New Method of Sweeping Chimnies and for Improving the Condition of Children and Others Employed by Chimney Sweepers. Furthermore, two new premiums were offered: a gold medal to the person who cleaned, or caused to be cleaned by mechanical means, the greatest number of chimneys at least two stores high and a silver medal to the person who cleaned the next greatest number.[13]

In 1805 George Smart, carpenter, builder, and surveyor, won the gold medal for a machine that he had invented in 1803. It consisted of a number of hollow cane rods which could be joined together with metal sockets. A cord, running from the brush at the top to the last rod attached, was confined by screws fastened to a number of the rods and made taut by a small pulley, discarded in later models. The brush, which presented some difficulties at first, consisted finally of four fan-shaped portions, connected with hinges. When it reached the top edge of the chimney, it opened out like an umbrella and was then pulled down the flue, removing the soot as it scraped the sides. Through a slit in the center of the green baize curtain spread across the fireplace to prevent the soot from falling into the room, the operator was able to maneuver the machine. Besides its use in sweeping flues, the apparatus could be employed for extinguishing chimney fires by merely wrapping the brush in a damp cloth and rubbing out the flames.[14]

Another contender for the gold medal[15] was J. T. B. Beaumont, who, like Smart, was a member of the Society of Arts, Manufactures, and Commerce. Testifying before a committee of the House of Lords in 1818, Beaumont declared that he had been on the point of receiving a gold medal

[12] An expression coined by Jonas Hanway in his "Sentimental History" to signify small boys, apprenticed to or hired by master chimney-sweepers for the purpose of ascending flues to sweep out soot, extinguish fires, and remove rough plaster.

[13] "Report from the Committee of the Honourable the House of Commons on the Employment of Boys in Sweeping of Chimneys; together with the Minutes of the Evidence Taken before the Committee, and an Appendix, Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed, June 23, 1817. Published under the Direction of the Society for Superseding the Necessity of Climbing Boys; with Notes and Observations; A Complete List of Persons Using the Machine, and a Descriptive Engraving of It" (London, Baldwin, Cradock and Joy, 1816), p. 127.

[14] *Transactions of the Society of Arts, Manufactures, and Commerce*, XXIII (1805), pp. 255–66.

[15] The alternative premium of 40 guineas was not revived in 1803.

for the invention of his machine; but experiments made before the Society convinced him that it was not so convenient as Smart's, and he lacked time to improve it. Anyway, he was convinced that no machine could be successful in general use unless legislative action were taken to abolish the employment of climbing-boys.

That the first machines submitted to the Society were not very efficient is apparent from Beaumont's description of how, after several models had been tested out in a chimney of the building used by the Society, a large brush-and-ball was lowered from the top of the flue to the chamber where the members of the committee were seated, confident that after so many machines had been tried no soot remained; but, "to their great Surprise and Annoyance, the Brush that was let down from the Top expelled more Soot than all the others put together, and covered the Committee completely; they were obliged to rush out of the Room as fast as they could."[16]

In 1809 the Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures, and Commerce relinquished its patronage of the climbing-boys to the Society for Superseding the Necessity of Climbing Boys. While it had been actively engaged in helping the young sweeps, it had examined various types of mechanical chimney-sweeping devices submitted for the premiums it had offered; it had awarded George Smart one gold medal for his invention[17] and a second medal for his supervision of the greatest number of chimneys cleaned by machines; it had bestowed a silver medal on Joseph Davis for a machine of some merit, but inferior to Smart's, and given C. Wilson ten pounds for an apparatus he had submitted.[18]

The committee of the Society for Superseding the Necessity of Climbing Boys announced in its "Second Report," 1804, that in response to its publicized premiums of the year before, it had received three types of chimney-sweeping devices: (1) Ball-and-brush—simple to operate and inexpensive, yet disliked by many householders who thought the man on the roof might injure the tiles. (2) Jack-and-pulley—unpopular because it was permanently attached to the top of the chimney. (3) Jointed rod-and-brush—manipulated from the hearth and so more popular than the other two

[16] "Minutes of Evidence taken before the Lords Committees, to Whom was Referred the Bill Intituled 'An Act for the Better Regulation of Chimney Sweepers and Their Apprentices; and for Preventing the Employment of Boys in Climbing Chimneys,' 18 March 1818," p. 202.

[17] Named the "Scandiscope."

[18] Evidently members of the Society remained suspicious of any mechanical apparatus for cleaning flues since the Society maintained Chimney-Sweeper James Watson to clean its flues by using climbing-boys from 1798 to 1818 and perhaps later; machines were merely tried out in the flues. See "Minutes of Evidence taken before the Lords Committees, 18 March 1818," p. 237.

types.[19] From the committee, in 1805, George Smart received £50 for his machine, which he had improved by running the cord through the hollow tubes, rather than on the outside, and an additional £25 for his industrious promotion of the machine—he had, in fact, promised to keep his six men cleaning London flues with machinery until the master chimney-sweepers adopted it in place of using boys. Chimney-Sweepers Richard Page and James Laver were rewarded with £30 and £10 for cleaning by machinery 1,000 and 300 chimneys respectively.[20]

III

ALTHOUGH A MECHANICAL DEVICE for sweeping flues had been invented, had proved satisfactory in ordinary flues and could be used in all, even the most crooked, if soot-doors or registers were inserted at the right angles of flues, and had been publicized by two societies for a number of years, the public continued to approve of the use of climbing-boys to ascend its flues with scraper and brush to remove the soot. Yet the public could not have escaped knowing the tragic lives led by these small children if it read the accounts in newspapers, pamphlets, and books of how they were maimed and murdered, diseased and deformed, beaten and burned, in carrying out like slaves the onerous tasks imposed upon them by callous, often sadistic, master chimney-sweepers. Samuel Roberts, the Sheffield manufacturer and liberal, in describing the sufferings of the climbing-boys, asserted that the work often

> . . . subjects them to peculiar diseases of the most shocking and painful kinds, which rarely fail, if not stopped in an early stage, to terminate in a premature death.[21] The initiating of these tender infants in their horrid, difficult, and laborious calling, is *invariably* accompanied with more or less laceration; their backs, their knees, their elbows, their shoulders, and their toes, are always rendered sore; and very often they are, when in this state of suffering, compelled, in the severest weather, to wander at the most unseasonable hours through frost and snow, and climb the rough and rugged flues till their wounds frequently ulcerate and become incurable. Their eyes are generally rendered inflamed, and their heads swoln. They are scantily clothed, poorly fed, ill lodged, and exposed to the unrestrained capricious cruelty of one of the most ignorant, violent, and depraved classes of human beings in this or perhaps any other civilized kingdom. It is useless to exclaim that there are laws to restrain any improper conduct in the

[19] "Society for Superseding the Necessity of Climbing Boys, By Encouraging a New Method of Sweeping Chimnies, and for Improving the Condition of Children and Others, Employed by Chimney-Sweepers" (London, 1804), p. 3*f*.

[20] "Third Report," 1805, p. 4. The Society also sent machines to various towns throughout England to arouse public interest.

[21] Cancer of the scrotum, known as the "Chimney-sweep's Cancer."

masters! What better are the children for laws which do not, *cannot* protect them? . . . They are deprived of that natural rest which is so essential to the health and strength of children. . . . They have their flesh torn by the sharp points of projecting stones or lime; they are frequently wedged, unable to move, and almost suffocated with soot, in narrow and crooked flues; they are often falling down those which are too wide for them.

They have been sent up chimnies while the fire was in the grate, to force their way through the heated soot. They have been scalded by steam arising from water thoughtlessly thrown into the fire below; nay, they have not unfrequently been compelled to ascend and descend chimnies when on fire, sometimes perishing in the attempt. They have been precipitated from the tops of high chimnies in the loosened pots, and dashed upon the pavement below. They have been slowly roasted to death in the flue of an oven. They have been dug dead out of the sides of chimnies, in which they have been stuck fast, suffocating for hours. . . . Is not this the most shocking, the most revolting of all slavery?[22]

In his indignation, Samuel Roberts forgot to mention that, unlike the custom of giving premiums with apprentices in other trades, in chimney-sweeping the master paid oftentimes anywhere from a few shillings to eight guineas for a boy. Naturally the smaller the boy the more he was worth because the greater number of chimneys he might crawl in, completely in the buff. Again, the boys usually slept in their masters' cellars on bags of soot with coverlets of soot-bags. They begged or stole their rags and food; they never attended day school and only a few were able to attend Sunday school to learn how to read or night school to learn how to write.[23] And, having at the age of fifteen or sixteen become too large to be of further use to their masters, they were turned adrift to fend for themselves. The trade or mystery of chimney-sweeping was such that any man might adopt it without having served an apprenticeship, for he needed only a few boys, a few shovels, scrapers, brushes, and ropes or a mechanical chimney-sweeper. Thus the apprenticeship system was a mockery, for it trained the boys for a trade that required no special aptitude; it provided no means whereby they might be fitted to carry on the duties of another trade—for only a small percentage of the apprentices could hope to become master chimney-sweepers; and it corrupted their morals as it malformed their bodies.

The earliest attempts to ameliorate the lot of the climbing-boys came

[22] Samuel Roberts, "On the Employment of Climbing Boys," "The Chimney-Sweeper's Friend, and Climbing-Boy's Album," arranged by James Montgomery (London, 1824), pp. 12–15.

[23] See George L. Phillips, "Sunday Schools for Climbing-Boys," *Notes and Queries*, CXCIV (October 1, 1949), pp. 427–30.

from men like philanthropists Jonas Hanway, Thomas Bernard, and David Porter. They sought, through appealing to the master chimney-sweepers directly, to convince them that they should give decent treatment to their apprentices. When the masters refused to stop their old ways on the grounds that if they did not torture them, the lads would not climb, since only lighted straw under them, pins stuck in their feet, and thrashings with knotted ropes would force them up the dark, foul-smelling flues, a committee was formed in 1788 to solicit public subscriptions so that a petition for improving the lot of the boys might be presented to Parliament. An act was passed that year for regulating the trade of chimney-sweeping; but no teeth were put in it for carrying out the provisions, already considerably weakened in the House of Lords. Its concluding paragraph, warning all masters and mistresses to treat their apprentices in all things "with as much Humanity and Care as the Nature of the Employment of a Chimney Sweeper will admit of,"[24] suggests the lack of force in the measure. Disgusted with this milksop Act, Porter drew up a plan for improving the trade through the co-operation of the masters and saw it put into action in 1800 under the benediction of the Society for Bettering the Condition and Increasing the Comforts of the Poor; but like other voluntary sweep associations, this one died within a year.[25]

We find, with the exception of the efforts of the Society of Arts, Manufactures, and Commerce in 1796 to promote interest in the invention of a machine to do the work of climbing-boys and thus obviate the necessity of using them, the efforts of benevolent individuals and friendly societies had centered on bettering the living and working conditions of young sweeps. In 1803, however, a determined effort was set on foot with the founding of the Society for Superseding the Necessity of Climbing Boys to abolish the evil completely. This Society planned, until such time as a suitable machine might be invented to clean flues, to hire inspectors to enforce the regulations of the Act of 1788 and to promote further measures in Parliament for relieving the sufferings of the lads. Accordingly, it began by publicizing rewards for the invention of sweeping machines and by petitioning Parliament for a measure to license and register all master chimney-sweepers within ten miles of the Royal Exchange and to restrict the employment of their apprentices. As we have seen, it did find a machine, which it promoted widely, but it failed in having its bill for regulating

[24] Act of 28 George III, c. 48.

[25] For further information see George L. Phillips, "England's Climbing-Boys. A History of the Long Struggle to Abolish Child Labor in Chimney-Sweeping." Baker Library, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration (Boston, 1949).

the trade of chimney-sweeping passed in the House of Lords in 1804. Annual reports of the committee of the Society from 1803 through 1811 focused on the attention given Smart's machine by local associations, patterned after the London Society, and sought public subscriptions to enable the work of the committee to be advanced.

In 1811 the committee, disheartened and discouraged, reported that although Smart's machine had been found satisfactory, "such has been the apathy of the public, seconded by the inveterate prejudices of the trade, that few other persons have hitherto received sufficient encouragement to be induced to adopt it as a means of gaining a livelihood."[26] After a five-year lapse, the committee, in 1816, commenced its reports, as public feeling seemed to be favoring the abolition of the use of climbing-boys; and for the next three years it was busy in supporting legislative measures in both Houses for prohibiting their employment. Only when all efforts had failed to pass legislative regulations in 1819, did the committee's work stop until 1825, when it was resumed for fifteen more years.

Opposition to the humanitarian concepts included in bills sponsored by men like William Tooke, Henry Grey Bennet, William Wilberforce, Stephen Lushington, the Earl of Auckland, and Lord King—opposition so strong that the House of Lords defeated twice in 1818 and once in 1819 bills passed by the Commons for relieving the pitiful plight of chimney-sweepers' apprentices—came from great landowners, master chimney-sweepers who had served apprenticeships in the trade, and servants.

Although experiments made with various devices, principally Smart's and the ball-and-brush, revealed that 910 out of 1,000 chimneys could be swept with Smart's machine if a perpendicular stack had a bend sufficient to clear the opening of the flue above; and that another 50 might be swept by the machine provided the fireplace in the wall was not higher than the next floor and turned off with one bend, thus making two angles in elevation; and that 30 more could be cleaned by ball-and-brush when the shaft was some distance from the fireplace and had one angle and two bends in elevation; and the last 10 could also be swept by ball-and-brush if more than one angle and a part of the length was horizontal; and that with the insertion of registers all flues might be swept by machines,[27] many of the Lords still maintained that machines were not so satisfactory as children. Lord Lauderdale, for instance, in 1819 in the House of Lords compared climbing-boys with calomel in that both were thorough in cleaning out all

[26] "Ninth Report" (1811), p. 3.

[27] Copy of the Report of the Surveyor-General of the Board of Works, 1 Feb., 1819, *Accounts and Papers: Churches, Insolvent Debtors,* XVII (1819), pp. 103–08.

harmful matter whereas other purgatives resembled chimney-sweeping machines in that they passed over many parts and only functioned imperfectly.[28] Furthermore, his Lordship believed that the proponents of machinery who sought to enforce its use through legislative measures were only desirous of attention and "the better way . . . . would be to leave reforms of this kind entirely to the moral feeling of perhaps the most moral people on the face of the earth. At all events, he disliked a prophetic legislation, which presupposed that our successors would be neither so enlightened nor benevolent as ourselves."[29] What is more, Lord Lauderdale declared that fire insurance companies favored the bill because they thought that without climbing-boys as human brushes the risk of fire would increase and thereby their profits would be greater. Lord Chancellor Eldon, who had promised to approve the measure for regulating the trade of chimney-sweeping, jeered at its phraseology of "female girl or woman" and opposed it. In the House of Commons, a new member, Mr. Ommaney, who had not bothered to read the report of the committee appointed to investigate the trade of chimney-sweeping in 1817, claimed that the Act of 1788 provided sufficient protection for the boys and presented a petition opposing the bill from several master chimney-sweepers who asserted that machines could not clean many of the flues of the great mansions in the West End. Furthermore, he pointed out that if machinery supplanted boys, the boys would fall back on their parishes for relief, and the poor-rates would soar and render the tax-payers indignant; moreover, the bill would prevent parish officials from giving their indigent charges as apprentices to chimney-sweepers. Another member, Mr. Denham, fearing that social legislation might be carried too far, did not favor adding penal laws to the statute books. Throughout the debates in both Houses ran the arguments of the opposition members that the evils so clearly reported by the various committees did not exist or were greatly magnified; but if they did exist, it was better that the boys, described by Mr. Ommaney as being not only the children of poor parents but also "of rich men, begotten in an improper manner," should continue to suffer rather than to permit perhaps greater evils to befall the metropolis.

Even more closely touching the feelings of these owners of ancestral

[28] Thomas C. Hansard, "Parliamentary Debates from the Year 1803 to the Present Time" (London, 1819), XXXIX, pp. 902–3. In connection with Lord Lauderdale's frequently quoted reference to chimney-boys and calomel, it is interesting to note that an advertisment in the *Tribune de Genève*, December 20, 1946, depicted the silhouette of a chimney-sweep with his ladder, ropes, and brushes. The explanation reads: "Le ramoneur de l'intestin—reméde du constipé, laxatif, regularisant sans douleur les fonctions intestinales avec RU-BI-LAX. Toutes pharmacies et drogueries fr. 2.50, fr. 3.75, fr. 7.-"

[29] *Ibid.*, XXXIX, pp. 901–2.

homes than the safety of London was an antipathy to change of any kind, even in altering their manifold flues with register-doors to permit the use of machinery. As Chimney-Sweeper Benjamin Watson stated so succinctly: "Gentlemen would not have their Rooms spoilt to alter the Flues."[30] Sydney Smith, understanding the desire of so many members of the House of Lords, in placing property ahead of humanity, explained the failure of the measure to pass the House of Lords in 1819:

> After all, we must own that it was quite right to throw out the bill for prohibiting the sweeping of chimneys by boys—because humanity is a modern invention; and there are many chimneys in old houses that cannot possibly be swept in any other manner. . . . We should have been very glad to have seconded the views of the Climbing Society, and to have pleaded for the complete abolition of climbing boys, if we could conscientiously have done so. But such a measure, we are convinced from the evidence, could not be carried into execution without great injury to property.[31]

For many more years the children of the poor would continue at the sacrifice of their own lives to preserve the chimneys of the rich because the rich desired it.

The majority of the master chimney-sweepers were as vehement in their opposition to any measure to abolish the use of climbing-boys as so many of their betters were in the House of Lords. Perhaps they were less at fault because, as they pointed out, they could not sweep many of the flues in the West End mansions with machines unless soot-doors were installed and the owners refused to order the necessary alterations.[32] Flues in the homes of the middle class and poor usually offered no difficulty to machines.

Their hostility to the machines went back to 1804, when fifteen of the two hundred chimney-sweepers in London met at the London Coffee House, upon the invitation of the committee of the Society for Superseding the Necessity of Climbing Boys, to be instructed in the use of Smart's apparatus. Smart, himself, chanced to be in the anteroom and heard one sweep tell his fellows that he would profess sympathy for the climbing-boys and pretend to work the machine in order to win the good graces of the committee, but that as soon as he reached home he planned to burn the machine provided by the Society and report that it had not proved satisfactory.[33] In 1807 the Sheffield chimney-sweeps openly declared that they would not use machines.[34] More subtle were the fifty chimney-sweepers

[30] "Minutes of Evidence taken before the Lords Committees, 18 March, 1818," p. 181.
[31] Smith, *op. cit.*, II, p. 95.
[32] Hone, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 619–21.
[33] "Minutes of Evidence taken before the Lords Committees, 18 March, 1818," p. 80.
[34] *Annual Register*, LI (1809), pp. 829–31.

of London, who declared at a meeting in 1816 that as soon as practical machines were invented for sweeping all kinds of flues they would adopt them, but until such machines were invented, they planned to continue using boys.[35] Obviously, until legislative measures were passed for the construction of flues able to accommodate mechanical apparatus, the chimney-sweepers did not need to worry. Opposition was carried on by the chimney-sweepers until the Act of 1840 although after the Act of 1834, wherein regulations appeared for the construction of flues and for increasing the age of apprentices from eight years to ten, it appeared less virulent.

Master chimney-sweepers disliked machines because they feared that "leeks,"[36] might take some of their business by gaining the sympathy of householders through offering to sweep with machines. A number of associations for superseding climbing-boys either gave machines to the "leeks" or permitted these men to purchase them at half-price. But although the regular sweeps might complain of "leeks," they denounced particularly the machinery itself which they found too heavy and cumbersome to be operated by apprentices. Instead of ordering their boys into the streets before dawn to begin flue-climbing while they slept off their previous night's gin-spree, they were forced to trudge the streets themselves to maneuver the machines up the sooty flues. Furthermore, the cost of repairing damaged parts often was higher than the few shillings necessary to purchase a small boy; for when machinery was used to extinguish fires burning in soot-deposits, the brushes, well-wrapped in wet cloths, sometimes were injured. On the other hand, a boy, if careful, usually suffered only a few minor burns in beating out the flames with his small brush; if he were not careful, he lost his purchased life, but another boy could be easily obtained.[37]

To win the support of the public, the sweeps claimed that the machines were not only ineffectual in many flues but were also dirty and unhealthy. They proved their points by using the machines so clumsily that little soot was swept out of the flues and what was loosened they spread around the

[35] "Report from the Committee on Employment of Boys in Sweeping of Chimnies: Together with the Minutes of the Evidence Taken before the Committee, and an Appendix, Communicated by the Commons to the Lords, Ordered to be printed 25th February, 1818," p. 50.

[36] "The *Leeks* are men who have not been brought up to the trade of chimney sweeping, but have adopted it as a speculation, and are so called from their entering *green*, or inexperienced, into the business." Mayhew, *op. cit.*, II, p. 375.

[37] The practice of sending boys up flues to extinguish fires was prohibited in the Act of 1788. However, since no provision was made for enforcement, the custom continued generally until 1842.

room. They declared that the operator working the machine through the slit in the curtain inhaled the soot that sifted through the aperture whereas climbing-boys, their heads covered with heavy caps, enjoyed the fresh currents of air as they ascended the flues with the soot falling away below them.[38]

Like little Tom in Kingsley's "Water Babies," many of the masters who had grown up in the trade probably wanted a chance to "get even" by treating their boys in the same manner they had been. Little Tom looked to the day when he would have apprentices to "knock them around just as his master did to him; and make them carry home the soot-sacks while he rode before them on his donkey."

Servants opposed the use of machines on the grounds that they produced more dirt than climbing-boys, that the operators caused them to lose their perquisites, and that grown sweeps were more insistent than climbing-boys in demanding prompt admittance. George Smart, testing out his machine one morning at the home of Mr. Burke, faced an indignant housekeeper who demanded:

> . . . how dare we presume to ring and knock at the Door, why could not we call out as other Sweeps did; this was after we had waited an Hour in the Cold; she said she wished the Inventor was at the Devil, and the Machine with him;[39] we then proceeded and swept some of the Chimneys; I asked her whether she had any objection to it now; she said a serious one . . . if there was anything that a Servant had a Perquisite from, there was always some damned Person to rob them of it. I asked her what she meant; she said her Master allowed her so much for the Kitchen Chimney, and so much for the others, that the Master Chimney Sweeper did it for one Half, and she had the other Half for herself.[40]

Chimney-sweeper Johnathan Snow attributed the ill-will of the servants to getting up early to admit the operators:

> Servants in general keep the Boys a long Time at the Door of a Morning; I do not like to stop too long in the Cold, and I make more Noise at the Door than a Boy will do; then, because I knock them up too early of a Morning—"Oh! you have brought the Machine, I wish you and the Machine were both set a fire."[41]

[38] "An Appeal to the Public by the Master Chimney-Sweepers Residing in the City of Bristol, against the Erroneous Application to The Practice and Character, of the Matter Contained in a Pamphlet Entitled 'Facts relative to the State of Children Employed as Climbing Boys, &c.'" (Bristol, 1817).

[39] This was not the first time that Smart had been sent to the Devil for his machine. In 1804 a chimney-sweep told some colleagues in Smart's presence: "Damn the Inventor, I wish he was in Garnerin's Balloon, and I had a good Rifle, and the first Shot at him." "Minutes of Evidence taken before the Lords Committees, 18 March 1818," p. 80.

[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 80–1.

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 57.

IV

UNTIL 1828 the Society for Superseding the Necessity of Climbing Boys had been promoting the use of the machine which George Smart had invented in 1803. In flues with horizontal shafts and sharp bends, the Society advocated the lowering of the ball-and-brush until such time as the householder inserted soot-doors to admit Smart's device. During the quarter of a century that Smart had enjoyed the patronage of the Society, he had had rivals. We have seen how the Society for Arts, Manufactures, and Commerce tested many machines and rewarded Joseph Davis and C. Wilson for inventions which they had submitted; and when the Society for Superseding the Necessity of Climbing Boys took over the activities of the Society of Arts, it received many chimney-sweeping devices. George Rodney Taylor, a watchmaker, designed a pulley which, fastened to the top of a chimney, held a wire double the length of the flue to be swept. On one end was a brush which could be lowered or raised by an operator on the hearth manipulating the other end. Timber-merchant Thomas Mumford sought to improve Smart's idea by placing joints in the rods to form a flexible column able to turn in an eight-inch square. In experiments carried out in the flues of the Bank of England, the machine did not reach the perfection expected, and so was discarded. Mr. Segrove designed an apparatus consisting of a pully-and-roller to be affixed to the chimney-top. A chain with a brush at one end passed over the roller and through the pulley. Jonathan Snow, cabinet-maker, claimed that his machine, closely patterned after Smart's could pass around slants in flues and that with it he had swept 1,840 chimneys within twenty-two months.[42] Perhaps the most unusual of the inventions was that of James Butters, Junior, described in the *York Courant* on July 21, 1817, as being in form similar to a Turk's head brush. A strong spring within, when wound up and released, would send the apparatus soaring up the flue to the pot on top, carrying up the soot with it. Made to dilate or contract for large or narrow flues, the device could ascend crooked ones as easily as straight ones.[43]

A flue-cleaning machine, the Elastic Rods for Sweeping Chimneys, found to be very satisfactory by Robert, William, and Charles Jeerrad, Surveyors, of London, is described in a letter from that firm, dated February 19, 1820, and addressed to the person who had recommended it:

[42] These inventors are mentioned in the "Minutes of Evidence taken before the Lords Committees, 18 March, 1818."

[43] See "The Chimney-Sweeper's Friend, and Climbing-Boy's Album," 2nd ed. (London, 1825), p. 474.

Sir.—We beg leave to offer our acknowledgments for your commendation of Mr. Estwicks' Bath Elastic Rods for Sweeping Chimneys, as, upon repeated trials, we have found their beneficial effects perfectly correspond with the printed description. It is the simplest machine, and the most complete in its operation of any we have seen exhibited. We need not trespass on you by an account of the many house trials we have made, but mention one where much difficulty existed. We have a peculiar Shop Chimney, with an immense high shaft which was frequently on fire, and cost us repeated forfeitures in consequence. It was also constantly smothering, of slow draft, and sometimes a great nuisance to our joiners.

Upon the first trial the rods were with difficulty forced up by two men, but the Machine brought down such corings of burnt and accumulated soot from the angles and upper part of the flue, as was truly astonishing, though it was swept only the Monday before; for this was done every week.

The succeeding Monday one man accomplished it with ease, bringing down still more from the angles, and it is now done by a boy with the greatest facility; and being properly cleaned, the smoke has entirely disappeared. The pargetting on the flues has not been injured, as the produce of the operation showed; and we are now convinced the fines we have incurred, and the danger we have risked from fires, in so extensive a concern, have not arisen from any radical defect in the chimney, but from the imperfect manner of sweeping practised by Climbing Boys; which, combined with motives of humanity, has determined us never to employ another.

N. B. The Machines cost from three to five pounds, according to the length. One Machine is sufficient for 50 to 60 families.[44]

Despite the fine recommendation of its efficiency, this machine made by Estwick, of Bath, was apparently not widely used.

The Times, on February 24, 1827, gave considerable space in describing John Bentley's "Kaminsarostic," a device having a strong iron pulley which was fastened above the opening of a chimney-top, with a chain passing over it. On the end of the chain was the brush which could be worked up and down the flue by an operator on the hearth.

Despite the ephemeral interest which all these inventions attracted, Smart maintained his favored position under the aegis of the London Society for Superseding the Necessity of Climbing Boys. His machine, however, failed to receive that parliamentary approval which would have enabled him to receive the bequest of £200 willed by Elizabeth Dennis Denyer in 1821 to the person who should invent such a machine to supplant climbing-boys as Parliament might sanction.[45] At long last, having

[44] "Eleventh Report" of the Society for Superseding the Necessity of Climbing Boys (1826), p. 18.

[45] See "Eleventh Report" of the Society for Superseding the Necessity of Climbing Boys (1826), p. 15.

enjoyed the reputation, during a quarter of a century, for inventing and manufacturing the best machines—machines that had been even sent over the Atlantic Ocean to Philadelphia and Nova Scotia,[46] George Smart saw his device superseded by that of Joseph Glass.

V

WHILE SWEEPING FLUES with Smart's machine in 1827, Joseph Glass made so many improvements on it that the new model, which was named after him, at once supplanted Smart's. Glass's machine had ferrules of hollow ash or cane, about two feet and a half long, which could be joined together with brass screws to form a fine, flexible, tapering rod easily adaptable for manipulating the brush of alder with radiating spokes of whalebone twenty inches in diameter. A small wheel at the top of the brush helped to move the machine around bends, and thus permitted it to clean more tortuous flues than Smart's could and to take out the core or refuse left by the plasterers in new flues.[47]

As the fair-haired mechanic of the Society for Superseding the Necessity of Climbing Boys and the duly appointed mechanical chimney-sweeper of London University, Glass saw his business so flourishing that within a few months he engaged a helper, Robert Day, to manufacture machines and also the ball-and-brush device for angular flues without soot-doors, while he demonstrated the use of his invention to men sent from various cities where associations for superseding the necessity of climbing boys had been established. On February 28, 1829, *The Times* reported that the "Government, anxious to diminish in a considerable degree the use of climbing boys in sweeping chimnies, intends henceforth to adopt the use of Mr. Glass's machinery in cleansing the flues of all the Royal palaces, public offices, official residences, public institutions, prisons, &c." In 1830 reports submitted by twenty-one public offices and eight metropolitan police stations showed that of 4,422 flues swept within one year, 1,624 had been cleaned by Glass's machine.[48] The London fire insurance companies backed the use of the machine so strongly that by 1839 Lord Ashley, later

[46] *The Times*, August 5, 1818.

[47] The machine was described carefully in *The Times* on January 18, 1828, and in a pamphlet, with illustrations of the various parts, entitled "Practical Information Presented to the Public by the Society for Superseding the Necessity of Climbing Boys; with a Description of Glass's Improved Machinery for cleansing Chimneys," printed for the Society by Bagster and Thomas (London, 1828). According to its advertisement, "Joseph Glass, Manufacturer of the Improved Machines, No. 2 Moor-Lane. . . . Cripplegate, 'Cleanses Chimneys by mechanical means only, at the same prices as are generally charged in the trade, and with superior cleanliness and effect.'"

[48] *Accounts and Papers. Miscellaneous, Session 5 February–23 July, 1830*, XXIX, pp. 327–39.

seventh Earl of Shaftesbury, told the House of Commons that all but one had adopted machines for sweeping flues.[49]

VI

THE REGULATORY MEASURES in the Act of 1834 (Act of 4 and 5 Guillelmi IV, c. 35), for constructing new chimneys and remodeling old ones and for lifting the age of apprenticeships from eight years to ten, gradually encouraged the widespread use of machinery. All new and renovated flues, if not circular and at least a foot in diameter[50] were to be not less than nine by fourteen inches in every section and contain no angles less obtuse than 120 degrees, although chimneys and flues built at angles with one another of 90 degrees or more were to have proper doors or openings not less than six inches square.

In 1842, the year in which the Act of 1840 (Act of 3rd and 4th Victoria, c. 85) became operative and prohibited minors under twenty-one years of age to sweep or extinguish fires in flues and forbade chimney-sweepers to have apprentices under sixteen years of age, *The Times*, on January 14, announced that "the Ramoneur, a machine to supply the place of climbing-boys to sweep chimneys . . . . has been recently invented and perfected by Sir F. Desanges and a Mr. A. H. August Durant, of Shropshire." It went on to explain that the machine, which would soon be patented, consisted of four brushes which formed, when expanded by elastic springs, a square head. The rods attached to the brush had, at intervals, universal spring joints capable of turning at right angles. A double revolving ball, also equipped with a spring joint, topped the brush to permit the apparatus to slip easily around angles. Mayhew noted that

[49] "Hansard," 1839, 3rd Ser. XIII, p. 1093. As early as 1834 Glass reported selling 600 machines. In Great Britain many chimneys are still cleaned by operators using Glass's machine or the ball-and-brush. See pictures of London sweeps with these mechanical devices in *Life Magazine*, March 23, 1942, p. 84, and of Edinburgh sweeps in *Holiday Magazine*, August, 1948. Dorothy L. Sayres in the detective story, "Busman's Holiday" (N. Y., 1936), has Mr. Puffett, chimney-sweep and contractor, using Glass's machine.

[50] In its "Sixth Report," 1808, the committee of the Society for Superseding the Necessity of Climbing Boys recommended "the circular Bricks invented by Miss E. Bell . . . which, if generally employed in the construction of Chimney Flues, would from their even surface seldom require cleansing, and when they did would with the greatest ease admit the operation of the machine." Sir Walter Scott, writing James Montgomery in 1824, explained that at Abbotsford the flues were circular, about fourteen inches in diameter, and lined with a succession of earthen pots, about one and a half inches thick (like the common chimney-tops), built round by the masonry. Hence, with a smooth tunnel, no soot would gather in angles and what did adhere could be removed with a simple machine. See "The Chimney-Sweeper's Friend and Climbing-Boy's Album," 1824 ed., pp. x–xi. Circular flues were also advocated by John W. Hiort in "A Practical Treatise on the Construction of Chimneys, containing an Examination of the Common Mode in Which They are Built; with an Accurate Description of the Newly-Invented Funnel," Winchester and Vernham (London, 1826).

a Patent Ramoneur Company was started about 1846 and several stations with uniformed operators were established in London.[51] By 1854 the company had dissolved, "vanished of a sudden, leaving its new fangled instrument in the hands of the old-fashioned sweeps," as a correspondent of *The Leisure Hour* asserted.[52] But the "old fashioned sweeps" soon returned to Glass's machine in the metropolitan areas although many in the provinces continued to employ boys to do their work until the Act of 1875 (Act of 28 and 29 Victoria, c. 70), by licensing all sweeps, checked the surreptitious use of climbing-boys throughout Great Britain and established Glass's machine as the undisputed monarch of the flues.

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[51] Mayhew, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 373–4.

[52] *The Leisure Hour—A Family Journal of Instruction and Recreation*, No. 111 (February 9, 1854), p. 95.

Tax Reform in Japan

WHEN PROF. CARL S. SHOUP was in Japan on a mission to survey the problem of tax reform, the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry presented its observations on the issue. It held that the present tax load was beyond taxpaying capacity and that the methods of assessment and collection were "unfair and not in keeping with actual conditions." Its proposals were a hodge-podge of confused thinking that shows a complete unawareness that taxation can be used as a prime instrument of social reform and as a prime mover for achieving a progessive type of capitalism that would benefit all producers and expropriate only the parasites, leeches and receivers of windfalls who now plague our society as well as theirs. Consider their proposals: Distinction between national and local taxes; elimination of duplicate taxation; reduction of income tax rates; simplification of the declaration system; abolition of the excess profits tax; approval of reappraisal of fixed assets; adjustment of inheritance tax rates; repeal of sales taxes, lowering of business tax rates, and limiting of residential taxes. Only in the case of one type of tax, the sales tax, does the chamber advocate the proper course to take toward taxes that penalize the worker and the employer: repeal. The Tokyo Chamber needs considerable education in public finance—and some iron injections, to give it a little gumption.

W. L.

The Social Impact of Current Tensions

By WILLIAM J. GRACE

THE OBJECT of this paper is to help define important contemporary tensions in religion and science, to examine their causalities, and suggest their social impact. By tension here I do mean the kind of taut balance that is to be expected in a tennis racket, a piano, a poet, or an opera soprano—an effective and constructive balance of forces. I definitely mean mental anxiety and a strained condition of relations, a sense of dichotomy within contemporary man himself and in his social reactions.

I

THE FIRST TENSION comes from a breakdown in the meaning of language. Before the possibilities of physical atomization had become evident, we had already undergone an accelerated process of intellectual atomization. I place this tension at the head of my list not because of any order of cause and effect, but rather because it is first in order of inconvenience. After all, we could reduce our other tensions if we could express them by a reliable means of communication. But frequently today if we communicate our tensions, the communication itself is simply an additional tension. According to psychological authorities self-expression is a beneficial aid to mental health. But self-expression in this context implies more than communication to oneself. "Talking to oneself" has not traditionally been considered the best sign of mental health. Even self-expression means much more than a "one's self"; it also implies a "you" capable of sympathetic response to the self-expression. But the "you" can only respond to the "I" if a bridge of communicable meaning has been established. But such bridges are increasingly hard to build. Owing to anarchistic individualism and subjectivity in the use of language, it is difficult for contemporaries to meet today on the basis of mutual intellectual meaning.

Alfred Noyes once observed that "we have evolved a race of specialists each working along his own narrowing line, each developing a language of his own, and each diverging further and further from that central point of view which once enabled us . . . to see life steadily and to see it whole." I am inclined to doubt that there has ever been an adequate historical expression of "seeing life steadily and seeing it whole." It has, however, seemed an aim sufficiently plausible to attract some of the best

minds at various stages in the world's history, as in the age of Pericles, the thirteenth century, the eighteenth century. These ages had their obvious shortcomings, but they were noticeable at least in one thing—that educated men could speak a common language. A work of synthesis was at least conceivable. But where is there a common language today?

I do not think we sufficiently realize how far this breakdown has gone. It is much more than the abuse and devitalization of the language by the advertiser, the Dale Carnegie speaker, the daily paper, radio and television, the hucksters of confusion and misinformation. Breakdown of meaning today has its organization and devotees; it is a religion of nihilism actively and seriously pursued by many intellectuals.[1] Meaning is traditionally associated with a sense of purpose. Traditionally if you said that something had no purpose, you also frequently meant that it had no meaning. Dr. Stace, Professor of Philosophy at Princeton, in his article, "Man Against Darkness," in the *Atlantic Monthly*, September, 1948, argues that the conviction of purposelessness is the predominant modern viewpoint as expressed in science and the arts. The scientific viewpoint, as interpreted by Stace, is that the universe is purposeless. In contrast, religion for him is basically the conviction that the universe has a purpose. For him there is no common meeting point for the two views.

Dr. Stace is in an acute dilemma which, if there was any *purpose* in pity, would merit pity. He himself would rejoice in the assurance of purpose, but scientifically he is convinced there is no purpose. But his love of purpose (purpose he knows does not exist) affords him a kind of embryo religion (using his semantics for the meaning of religion), of which the cardinal principle could be stated thus: "cherish your illusions; they're the only things you've got." This kind of dichotomy is fairly new and recent at least in its semantic expression. A man is obliged now to have a faith which he knows is really illusion. For your own mental health you must firmly believe in what you don't believe. As Stace mentions, Jean Paul Sartre presents an analogous idea. Man is an intruder in an alien cosmos; he is doomed to defeat and extinction. Let him make the most of the existential moment; let him hold tight to illusion for a brief and fitful embrace. The Sartre view is as much in the Walter Pater tradition as it is in what Stace regards as the scientific tradition.[2] "Make the

[1] In this connection see Etienne Gilson, "Les Terreurs de l'an deux mille," *Revue de l'Universite d'Ottawa*, Janvier-Mars, 1949.

[2] "For art comes to you proposing frankly to give nothing but the highest quality to your moments as they pass, and simply for those moments' sake." Conclusion to Walter Pater's "The Renaissance" (1873).

most of the moment"—for Pater, the aesthetic reaction; for Sartre, tense experience of any sort—deceive yourself into believing the moment has meaning. It's the best you can do in an essentially meaningless universe.

It is not necessary to emphasize the relationship between the dogma of a purposeless universe and the breakdown in the meaning of the language. If the universe is in itself purposeless, it would hardly be possible that language would have purpose or meaning.

Dr. Stace's article is particularly interesting from the point of view of explaining how this intellectual situation came about historically. The situation is thus described in Dr. Stace's own tragic words:

> Since the world is not ruled by a spiritual being, but rather by blind forces, there cannot be any ideals, moral or otherwise, in the universe outside of us. Our ideals, therefore, must proceed only from our own minds; they are our own inventions. Thus the world which surrounds us is nothing but an immense spiritual emptiness. It is a dead universe.

Dr. Stace traces the emergence of this view to the loss among intellectuals of any concept of final purpose. If St. Thomas Aquinas or Aristotle were asked what the sun was for, they would answer in a way which seemed reasonable to them—that it was for the purpose of giving man light. But from the seventeenth century onwards, scientists lost interest, according to Stace, in final ends. They would tell you of what the sun was composed, the secret of its motion. But when it came to asking what was it for, they could say nothing. Dr. Stace summarizes his findings in these words:

> The picture of a meaningless world, and a meaningless human life, is, I think, the basic theme of much modern art and literature. Certainly it is the basic theme of modern philosophy. According to the most characteristic philosophies of the modern period, from Hume in the eighteenth century to the so-called positivists of today, the world is just what it is, and that is the end of all inquiry. There is no reason for its being what it is. Everything might just as well have been quite different, and there would have been no reason for that either. When you have stated what things are, what things the world contains, there is nothing more which could be said, even by an omniscient being. To ask any question about *why* things are thus, or what purpose their being so serves, is to ask a senseless question, because they serve no purpose at all. For instance, there is for modern philosophy no such thing as the ancient problem of evil. For this once famous question presupposes that pain and misery, though they seem so inexplicable and irrational to us, must ultimately serve some rational purpose, must have their places in the cosmic plan. But this is nonsense. There is no such overruling rationality in the universe. Belief in the ultimate irrationality of everything is the quintessence of what is called the modern mind.

This passage, written by a well-known philosopher, is too socially characteristic of our time to be ignored. Later in the paper I shall comment indirectly on the social significance of the attitude that Dr. Stace describes so well. Quite a few scientists would dispute the issue with Dr. Stace. A man like Lecomte du Noüy in his "Human Destiny" uses the arguments of science and of mathematics to demonstrate how highly improbable it is that we have a purposeless universe. At the same time the scientific positivist has stoutly maintained that no knowledge is valid or acceptable unless it is arrived at by the empiric method. Maritain in "The Dream of Descartes" has explained in large measure the philosophical postulates that led historically to these intransigeant claims. The knowledge of the artist, the knowledge of the mystic, are arbitrarily ruled out of court. A Gerard Manley Hopkins, a Franz Kafka, a Thomas Merton are quite unintelligible according to the scientific positivist. The Bible, Milton, or Dante are documents without human significance. Unless a truth can be demonstrated in the laboratory, it must be denied, or relegated to the unknowable. Since the great abstractions like truth or justice cannot be so demonstrated, since meaning cannot be heard in a retort, or God located in a test tube, universals and transcendentals are junked. Rather than admit that science is only *one* of many instruments in the discovery of truth, the scientific positivist loudly and dogmatically insists on a meaningless universe and scoffs at the findings of all the other disciplines. The creation and use of the atom bomb seems a fitting commentary on the social influence of the scientific positivist in our society. The atom bomb is the reality; this is the object worthy of our study and contemplation; of our hush-hush projects and hugger-mugger reports. This is something that can be understood—it has none of the vague attributes frequently associated with human nature or with God. The indifference to end or purpose was ironically demonstrated in the actual construction of the atom bomb. Many workers and even the leading scientific brains did not actually know what they were constructing, though it must be credited to the human qualities of many contemporary scientists that they were shocked at the result of their own anonymous handiwork.

Our first tension, therefore, is not just the loss of meaning through the abuse of language, not just the emergence of a new barbarism divorced from tradition; our first tension is also due to the intransigeant and unjustified pretensions of science, divorced from its proper relationship in the hierarchy of knowledge. The assault is powerful and ironic, for not only has the abuse of science led to the postulate of a meaningless universe; it has also

given us the gadgets and gimmicks in the atom bomb and other things to see that our purposelessness is adequately consummated.

II

THE SECOND TENSION area is intimately associated with the first. Dr. Stace indicated it in his article:

> The widespread belief in "ethical relativity" among philosophers, psychologists, ethnologists, and sociologists is the theoretical counterpart of the repudiation of principle which we see all around us, especially in international affairs, the field in which morals have always had the weakest foothold. No one any longer effectively believes in moral principles except as the private prejudices either of individual men or of nations or of cultures. This is the inevitable consequence of the doctrine of ethical relativity, which in turn is the inevitable consequence of believing in a purposeless world.

The attack on the absolutes, whether derived from the great classical tradition or from Judaic-Christian tradition, has had the widest social impact. Under the reeling blows of Cartesianism, Rationalistic Religion, Romanticism, and Economic Liberalism we may well echo the words of John Donne in the seventeenth century:

> The sun is lost, and the earth, and no man's wit
> Can well direct him where to look for it.
> And freely men confesse that this world's spent,
> When in the Planets, and the Firmament
> They seeke so many new; then see that this
> Is crumbled out again to his Atomies.
> 'Tis all in peeces, all coherence gone;
> All just supply, and all Relation:
> Prince, Subject, Father, Sonne, are things forgot,
> For every man alone thinks he has got
> To be a Phoenix, and that then can bee
> None of that Kinde, of which he is, but hee.
> (*First Anniversary*)

John Donne torn by spiritual anguish, made melancholy by the dark theological pessimism of the Late Augustinian tradition, saw little to await in the world save decay and dissolution. Yet his age was witnessing the discoveries of Copernicus, Keppler, and Galileo. These men, genuine and sincere scientists, turned their backs, as Stace points out, on final causes. Indirectly and unconsciously they were preparing an intellectual climate in which man was to become a Phoenix—a solitary individual in a world "all in pieces, all coherence gone." The society of the scientific

dispensation is one of surface order, of technically perfect machines and gadgets; it is intensely rationalistic at the same time that it is dehumanized and out of touch with human reality—the reality that the psychiatrist has not yet socially succeeded in re-establishing. No problem is popularly supposed to exist which could not be solved by a committee of experts. All that is necessary is a blueprint for readjustment, the introduction of a trouble-shooting gimmick—like the United Nations for example—and all will be well. The committee-issued report, the advertising expert, the public relations man will iron out any problem however impenetrable. Every problem will dissolve once you have the angle on it —this is the naïve faith of popular rationalism—in spite of the fact that it is easier to pull the switch on the atom bomb than it is on truth or justice. Yet the modern man as described by W. H. Auden in "The Double Man" is as much a Phoenix as in the poetry of Donne:

> Emerged a new Anthropos, an
> Empiric, Economic Man,
> The urban, prudent, and inventive
> Profit his rational incentive
> And work his whole exercitus,
> The individual let loose
> To guard himself, at liberty
> To starve or be forgotten . . .

Auden, I suspect, partly owes this summary to the oft quoted passage in Maritain where he makes a distinction between the *person*, as conceived in the orthodox tradition as the Image of God, and the *individual* as emerging from both rationalistic and romantic concepts:

> In the social order, the modern city sacrifices the *person* to the *individual*; it gives universal suffrage, equal rights, liberty of opinion, to the *individual*, and delivers the *person*, isolated, naked, with no social framework to support and protect it, to all the devouring powers which threaten the soul's life, to the pitiless actions and reactions of conflicting interests and appetites, to the infinite demands of matter to manufacture and use. To all the greeds and all the wounds, which every man has by nature, it adds incessant sensual stimuli, and the countless hordes of all kinds of errors, sparking and sharpened, to which it gives free circulation in the sky of intelligence. And it says to each of the poor children of men set in the midst of this turmoil: "You are a free individual; defend yourself, save yourself, all by yourself." It is a homicidal civilization.[3]

The homicidal civilization functions underneath a surface of smooth organization by which an individual is constantly supplied with immediate

[3] Jacques Maritain, "Three Reformers" (New York, 1937), pp. 21–2.

information (newspaper), constant entertainment and propaganda (radio and television), instant transportation (aeroplane and motor car). Frequently he can know, see, and hear everything, at the same time that he is largely powerless to do anything (the atom bomb, the concentration camp) in a world which the Sartres and the Staces tell him is, in any case, purposeless.

The irony of this situation would be terrific in a work of art, but is appalling in the order of direct experience. For this reason intelligent men of good will, as they converse with one another about the problems of our day, generally sound like tragic actors or a Greek chorus bewailing inevitable dénouement. Unless the contemporary individual is insensitive or insulated from reality completely, he has little alternative but tension and despair—unless, if this be possible, there exists an order in the universe of radically different knowledge from that of science.

To quote John Donne again—he foresaw the limitations of what he called "the new philosophy"—the new science—that "calls all in doubt." There is an area of mystery, pivotal in our whole penetration of reality, which needs a higher revelation than our publicity men or our gadgets can give us:

> Poor soul, in this thy flesh what dost thou know?
> Thou know'st thyself so little, as thou know'st not
> How thou didst die, nor how thou wast begot.
> (*The Second Anniversary*)

E. I. Watkin, in speaking of the seventeenth century, the age in which appeared two men as different as John Donne, torn by spiritual anguish, and Renée Descartes, whose thought helped to furnish the basis of contemporary rationalism and mechanistic optimism, summarized the situation productive of so much dichotomy in these words:

[The seventeenth century] was also the century in which the foundations were laid of the science which has transformed man's knowledge of the world and enabled him for good and ill to transform his earthly environment. The philosophy inaugurated by Descartes saw nothing in the subhuman world save mechanism. It sought to rescue man's spiritual and intellectual life by divorcing the human mind from the world of matter and therefore from the body and severing it from them by an impassable gulf. On either side of the gulf mind and matter, thus forcibly torn asunder, strove for the mastery. Scientists began to entertain the prospect of explaining the entire universe, including man, by mathematico-physical laws. An idealist philosophy attempted in various ways to prove that the material world was wholly or in part a mental construction. In the field of metaphysics idealism prevailed over materialism. Science,

however, pushed metaphysics into the background. The sceptre was passing into the hands of science, and a science, that, in practice at least, admitted no knowledge save the quantities extracted from sense data. At last human reason, advancing from knowledge to knowledge, from power to power, could decipher the secrets of nature and control her forces at man's will. Forgetful of the depths and complexities of the human soul and the sin that warps it, reason in its pride believed it could control men's passions as surely as it could control the forces of inanimate nature.[4]

The process that Watkin describes still proceeds at an unchecked rate. At the conference of savants at the M.I.T. Centenary a serious project for controlling human thought was thus indicated, according to a report in *The New York Times* of April 1, 1949:

> We may be reasonably sure [Dr. Burchard said], that we have not reached the end of the road, that we will not see an early moratorium on science, and that the consequences of future discoveries, wrongly used, will be even more forbidding than the consequences of the one big present threat which will not down.
>
> Without assuming any mantle of prophecy, it is meet to suggest that the early conquest of space is probable, that large-scale biological controls are possible, and that ability to control man's thoughts with precision is by no means out of the question. Any of these is more awesome in its implications than was the mushroom cloud in 1945.

Free-wheeling fantasy divorced from the "inner check"—to use Babbitt's phrase—the sense of moderation of the classical traditions, or the humility of Christian tradition, are to be found in the Associated Press report of December 29, 1948, that "The United States, leading in the world weapon race, is now studying the possibility of creating a military outpost hanging like a tiny 'moon' far up in the skies . . . a satellite that would have the whole earth in its bomb sight."

On reading this, I was reminded of Walter Pater's remark that "we are all under sentence of death with a sort of indefinite reprieve." But, of course, Pater did not mean that we were *all* under sentence at the *same* existential moment.

III

I AM QUITE PREPARED to believe that in the near future it will be possible to have the whole earth in one's bombsight. I am prepared to agree with Dr. Stace that this matter and quite a few other similar developments are quite pointless. In spite of the very foreseeable evil and irony in this situation, such a plan indicates a remarkable naïveté about the nature of

[4] "Catholic Art and Culture" (New York, 1944), pp. 180–81.

reality. It is not only homicidal; it is sophomoric. It is the Faustian dream of infinite extension fulfilled on the plane of action by disregarding all the more essential and pivotal factors of reality.

The spiritual and transcendent dimension is missing here. We may consider, if we like, that both the concepts that the universe is purposeless and that it is purposeful are relative forms of belief. But obviously in this vital matter it is of importance to guess right. Even Dr. Stace sees the psychological advantages of backing the thesis that the universe has a purpose. It would certainly be tragic, however, to assume that the universe is purposeless if *in fact* it is not. It would be at least helpful, as Stace and Sartre would agree, to subscribe to the illusion of purpose. In fact both counsel illusion as the only alternative to despair.

The dilemma that the scientific positivists have created for us consists in presenting problems that scientific processes cannot answer. But they refuse to acknowledge that any other approach to knowledge *can* answer them. They insist on trapping us in this vicious circle. They ask questions that only spiritual insight can answer, but they refuse to accept the credentials of spiritual insight.

Herein lies one of our worst self-defeating intellectual tensions. It is relevant in assessing the social impact of this tension to inquire what has been missing in our society that has allowed the scientific positivists to fill the vacuum in this way.

I would say we are deficient in the capacity for synthesis—we are out of touch with the great intuitions and insights that give us a key to transcendent truths, that give us symbols for realities not immediately of nominalists who deride even the possibility of the abstract idea and transcendent truth—from their viewpoint, all that we can know are facts and phenomena. We have, on the other hand, the Cartesian rationalists and the romantic idealists to whom all that matters is the idea—the concrete individuation for them is irrelevant. The nominalist will explain everything in terms of statistics and news reports; the idealist in terms of the "human spirit," "freedom," "democracy," "the purity of Nordic blood," "evoluting nature," "free enterprise." Both nominalists and idealists lack a sense of total reality; they are aware of the otherness of mystery, of the vast areas of knowledge that lie outside the natural level. A Kafka, a Gerard Manley Hopkins, remind us of the vast stellar spaces of radically different knowledge from that we can accumulate merely from men and facts and ideas.

As I sit on this chair and write, I am aware that I am physically sup-

ported by the floor of this room. Under the floor are some twenty stories of a modern hotel. I suppose under the hotel we have the intricate relationships of supply lines, sewer systems, and subway transportation. Beneath them is the center of our planet; beneath the center—perhaps China. I suppose it would not be a gross inaccuracy to say that I am sitting on China. Beyond China is the stratosphere; beyond the stratosphere—well. . . . In one sense I am supported by all of these. Traditional theology does not view this progression as infinite; it tells me that all this was created from nothing. It is ultimately supported by God. According to this view it is God who sustains me, who is my keeper. According to theological tradition, the physical cosmos as far as you care to extend it cannot even be weighed in terms of value with myself as a spiritual personality. I am the Image of God. Theology has given me an adequate sense of humility, which I would partly define as a true appreciation of one's nature. But it is a sense that leads me to reject the advertiser's world of glorified physical aids, the scientists' world of ingenious gadgets of mass destruction, of Dr. Stace's purposelessness. In my own autonomy, free will, and intelligence I know that I must reach out to others and the Other, in order that I may be. I know what God means in this sense, but I could not express Him semantically or in nominalistic or rationalistic phraseology. I also know that it is not necessary for me to establish "a satellite 200,000 miles above the earth" to contact Him. After all, that distance is, in a certain sense, a trifle to the intelligence.

The admiration for the conquest of space and the mastery of matter is radically different from the sense of wonder to be found in religious tradition. In religious tradition, there is also an unpredictable world—the hidden, the separate Otherness of the Hebrew prophets, of the Kafkian dimension. It is not to disparage the human intellect to say that it is limited or to say that man is in a state of plight, the plight let us say of a "Hamlet" or of Kafka's "The Castle." The plight of man, however, cannot be met—such is the religious view—by the sensible world with which man directly engages. Dr. Stace has given us a social document that shows why this is impossible. The fiction of the self-contained man in a self-contained universe has been exploded by science itself. It is not to disparage science to say that it is limited or to say that the plight in which it finds itself is a reflection of man's own plight.

Man's plight is dramatically in focus today in terms of peculiar irony. At the heart of a society, so Cartesian on the surface and frequently so irrational underneath, so smoothly and scientifically organized and basically

so anarchistic and unpredictable, lies a great fear against which our practice of anaesthetization fails. But it is not the kind of fear that is the beginning of wisdom. The fear of the Hebrew prophets was of Jehovah—the separated one, the distinct one. Fear in this sense was constructive—the reality of the Other was too vivid and insistent to allow the setting up of a purposeless universe founded on despair. Too often contemporary man is determined to follow one road leading to a dead end when tradition and experience are available with much more adequate, though more complex, maps. The modern fear is not the fear of God, but the fear that there is no God.

Gerard Manley Hopkins once said that "all things are upheld by instress and are meaningless without it." Instress for him was the supernatural force that binds the finite. The immanence of God which comes out of the Christian concept of the Incarnation is partly indicated by Hopkins' "inscape." The "inscape" is the creation itself; the "instress" is the hand of God upon His creation. In his "Notebooks," June 19, 1872 he states:

> I thought how sadly beauty of inscape was unknown and buried away . . . and yet how near at hand it way . . . and it could be called out everywhere again.

Hopkins, sensitive as he was to God's incalculable range and altitude, contemplated and enjoyed a universe in terms of the signs of the Other, the Separated, at once immanent and transcendent:

> God's utterance of Himself is God the Word, outside Himself is this World. This world then is word, expression, news of God. Therefore its end, its purpose, its purport, its meaning is God and its life or work to name or praise him.[5]

As Chesterton said:

> No man knows how much he is an optimist, even when he calls himself a pessimist, because he has not really measured the depths of his debt to whatever created him and enabled him to call himself anything. At the back of our brains, so to speak, there was a forgotten blaze or burst of astonishment at our existence. The object of the artistic and spiritual life was to dig for this submerged sunrise of wonder; so that a man sitting on a chair might suddenly understand that he was actually alive, and be happy![6]

The gulf between the religious viewpoint and that of the scientific positivist can be appreciated in spite of our semantic breakdown. Contrast Dr. Stace's statement:

[5] W. H. Gardner, "Gerard Manley Hopkins" (Yale, 1948), p. 20.
[6] "Autobiography" (New York, 1936), pp. 90–1.

. . . the world is just what it is, and that is the end of all inquiry. There is no reason for its being what it is. Everything might have been quite different, and there would have been no reason for that either.

and the emotive words of the seventeenth century poet, Thomas Traherne:

How like an angel came I down!
  How bright are all things here!
When first among His works I did appear,
  O how their glory me did crown!
The world resembled His eternity
  In which my soul did walk;
And everything that I did see
  Did with me talk.

A native health and innocence
  Within my bones did grow;
And while my God did all His glories show,
  I felt a vigor in my sense
That was all spirit: I within did flow
  With seas of life like wine,
I nothing in the world did know
  But 't was divine.

IV

THE AREAS OF TENSION today springing from semantic breakdown, scientific positivism, ethical relativism, the acute threat of physical destruction, ironically comment on the optimistic view of science derived from the Cartesian and Lockian dispensations. Descartes, believing that all knowledge of which we are capable is comprised in the world of innate ideas within us, deprived the otherness of religious truth of intellectual meaning by maintaining that religion could not be penetrated intellectually in any way and should be accepted merely on the basis of authority. He was an antitheological fideist who removed religion from the intellectual life of man and substituted science in its place. He divorced religion from life, so that science might absorb life.[7] Space does not allow a full exposition of the Cartesian impact but the following quotation from Maritain hints at the result:

It remains—and this is what concerns us—that the Cartesian ideas come from God, like angelic ideas, not from objects. Thus the human soul is not only subsistent as the ancients taught, causing the body to exist with its own existence; it has, without the body, received direct from God all

[7] This is the thesis of Jacques Maritain in "The Dream of Descartes" (New York, 1944).

the creative perfection which can befit it. There is the destruction of the very reason of its union with the body, or rather, there is its inversion. For if the body and the senses are not the necessary means for the acquisition of its ideas for that soul, and consequently the instrument by which it rises to its own perfection, which is the life of the intelligence and the contemplation of truth, then, as the body must be for the soul and not the soul for the body, the body and senses can be there for nothing but to provide the soul—which needs only itself and God in order to think—with means for the practical subjugation of the earth and all material nature, and this reduces the soul's good to the domination of the physical universe. The universe, the whole of which has not the value of one spirit, will make it pay dear for this deordination.[8]

Locke's influence has been paralleled to that of Descartes. Locke's key word is *reason*, which in its social impact, has had an analogous history to that of the Cartesian *idea*. As Basil Willey has ably demonstrated in the "Seventeenth Century Background" and in the "Eighteenth Century Background," for Locke everything can be known through reason. Why then was a historical revelation of an Otherness ever necessary? *Nature* in the deistic sense was itself revelation. Just as in Descartes the leap from the world of innate ideas to that of the world outside man demands the intervention of God, so that the external world is in itself revelation; similarly, in Locke reason is so extended in meaning that there is no otherness radically different from the nature before us. This cozy adjustment between man and environment (Descartes, Locke) has finally been dispelled by science itself as Dr. Stace points out. The optimistic view with which the deists and rationalists viewed *nature*, the complacency with which science was exalted and historical revelation expunged, have now reached their dénouement. "The satellite would have the whole earth in its bombsight." It is interesting to see how demonic reason has become, how, if you like, unreasonable. "For modern philosophy there is no such thing as the ancient problem of evil." That view, in face of the facts, would seem to be one of the illusions of which contemporary intellectuals are making the most.

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[8] "Three Reformers," pp. 63–4.

Our Way of Life

By FRANCIS NEILSON

PHILOSOPHY HAS BEEN DEFINED as a way of life, and a very good definition it is, for we know that many men have shaped existence for themselves in a worthy manner. But what is "our" way of life? Recently the head of a university said it was a possession to be defended. From this one may infer that it is something precious and worth keeping. Still, it is necessary to know just exactly what "our" own peculiar way of life amounts to on investigation. Men who can look back sixty years frequently remark that the present cannot be compared with the past for security and well-being.

What with politicians who find new ways of squandering the people's money and trade unions taking their "slice" of wages, "our" way of life for millions of producers is by no means a "primrose path of dalliance." Indeed, "our " way of life is strewn from cradle to grave with fines and penalties. We have to go back more than a hundred years to find a condition similar to the one that afflicts us now. In 1820 the "wit of wits," Sydney Smith, wrote the following to the *Edinburgh Review:*

We can inform Jonathan what are the inevitable consequences of being too fond of glory;—taxes upon every article which enters into the mouth, or covers the back, or is placed under the foot—taxes upon every thing which it is pleasant to see, hear, feel, smell, or taste—taxes upon warmth, light, and locomotion—taxes on every thing on earth, and the waters under the earth—on every thing that comes from abroad, or is grown at home —taxes on the raw material—taxes on every fresh value that is added to it by the industry of man—taxes on the sauce which pampers man's appetite, and the drug that restores him to health—on the ermine which decorates the judge, and the rope which hangs the criminal—on the poor man's salt, and the rich man's spice—on the brass nails of the coffin, and the ribands of the bride—at bed or board, couchant or levant, we must pay.—The schoolboy whips his taxed top—the beardless youth manages his taxed horse, with a taxed bridle, on a taxed road:—and the dying Englishman, pouring his medicine, which has paid 7 per cent. into a spoon that has paid 15 per cent.—flings himself back upon his chintz bed, which has paid 22 per cent.—and expires in the arms of an apothecary who has paid a licence of a hundred pounds for the privilege of putting him to death. His whole property is then immediately taxed from 2 to 10 per cent. Besides the probate, large fees are demanded for burying him in the chancel; his virtues are handed down to posterity on taxed marble; and he is then gathered to his fathers—to be taxed no more.

FRANCIS NEILSON

New York

The Civic Revival in Ohio

Municipal Ownership and Economic Privilege

By ROBERT H. BREMNER

TO THE CIVIC REVIVALIST the private ownership of public utility companies typified privilege in all its meanings: public service corporations were natural monopolies; they were founded upon franchises, the prizes for which businessmen corrupted politics; and they provided the funds with which "the system" undermined democracy. The fight of the Civic Revivalists for municipal ownership of public utilities is the urban side of the national antitrust movement.

In 1903, shortly after election to his second term as mayor of Cleveland, Tom Johnson proposed that the city issue bonds for the erection of an electric power plant authorized to sell electricity to private consumers as well as to provide electric power to the city. Although Detroit and Chicago supplied themselves with electricity for street lighting and other public purposes from municipally-owned power plants, no large American city had as yet undertaken to provide electricity for commercial sale. The conservative classes of Cleveland were amazed and perplexed at the mayor's audacious scheme. Why should the city enter a field already occupied by a private concern which was doing its job efficiently? Why should the city increase its debt burden by issuing bonds to build a new plant when there was already in existence one built by private capital without any charge on the credit of the community? And finally, why should the city's tax load be weighted by a foolhardy adventure into competition with a private company already paying taxes into the city treasury? The only answer to these questions was that Johnson was bent upon committing Ohio's metropolis to the doctrine of "municipal socialism."[1]

"Municipal socialism" was the term of opprobrium used to designate the idea of municipal ownership of public utilities by those who opposed it. Men who believed the city's duty was to transact public business efficiently and honestly and not "to furnish employment and 'pleasurable conditions

[1] H. T. Newcomb, "A Study in Municipal Socialism" (pamphlet). Johnson recounts how his plan to obtain a municipal electric power plant was temporarily defeated in "My Story" (New York, 1911), pp. 191–93. An injunction was issued to prevent the holding of the special election on the bond issue in the summer of 1903. At the regular election later that year the bond issue was defeated. Cleveland obtained a municipal plant through the annexation of South Brooklyn in 1905.

of life' to its citizens" saw nothing but evil in plans to extend municipal activity into areas which would bring the city into competition with private enterprise.[2] They conceded the city's right to construct grade crossings, to build bridges and viaducts, to pave streets, lay sewers, and to extend fire fighting services—all of which were beneficial to the business community. They agreed that the city should develop park systems to keep the children off the streets and the men out of the saloons.[3] But they opposed the city's entry into industries like transportation or electric power production in which private capital was profitably invested. The opponents of municipal ownership said that there was too much danger of graft and bureauracy accompanying the city's participation in these services.[4]

Men who professed a belief in the necessity of governmental regulation of public utilities drew back from municipal ownership simply because they didn't think cities were capable of handling such important problems. "The granting of unregulated power to municipal government to own and operate industries is like placing the operation of a powerful and complicated machine in charge of a novice." The chances are that the machine will be damaged and the operator injured.[5]

His critics were correct in their conjecture that Johnson was determined to commit Cleveland to a program of municipal ownership. Like the other leaders of the Civic Revival he thought the employment of its citizens was a matter of interest to the city and that the providing of "pleasurable conditions of life" was one of its chief concerns. The Civic Revivalists asserted that the city was more competent than private individuals to own and operate the public services necessary for urban life. They felt the possibility of graft in municipally-owned utilities was a less dangerous threat than the systematic prostitution of representative government that went on when public utilities were left in private hands.

The leaders of the Civic Revival were unanimous in proclaiming that the private ownership of public utilities was the fountainhead of municipal

[2] "Municipal Socialism" (pamphlet), p. 21, citing New York *Evening Post*, October 1, 1902.

[3] Newcomb, *op. cit.*, pp. 18–19, lists these as permissible fields for municipal activity.

[4] The pamphlet, "Municipal Socialism," *passim* gives the typical conservative arguments against municipal ownership.

[5] Allen Ripley Foote, "How Should the Franchise Question be Settled?" (pamphlet). In 1905 James Dalrymple, manager of the Glasgow municipal railway, reported to Mayor Edward F. Dunne of Chicago that political conditions in Chicago did not warrant the serious experiment of municpal ownership and operation of the street railways of that city. Ida M. Tarbell, "How Chicago Is Finding Herself," *The American Magazine*, LXVII, p. 126 (December, 1908).

corruption. They thought the political boss was kept in power by the campaign contributions he collected from the privilege seeker. They believed the most valuable privileges the boss had at his disposal were franchise grants. In their opinion, bad government, as manifested by election frauds, protected vice, and petty grafting resulted from the rule of the boss and the men he elevated to political office with money received from franchise-seeking (or franchise-protecting) public utility companies.[6]

The famous liberal clergyman, Washington Gladden, who served a term in the Columbus City Council in the early nineteen hundreds, agreed with Frederic C. Howe that such privileged business interests had a negative interest in reform and a positive one in bad government. Men whose private economic welfare was connected with the profitableness of public service corporations did not want good government. They could not get the kind of concessions they wanted from honest government. "Good government would not permit them to levy tribute on the public for the payment of dividends on vast issues of fictitious capital."[7] Their economic interests made them welcome the entrance of weak and corruptible men into politics, for to privilege, "bad government is profitable, reform a menace."[8]

Just as they were in agreement in holding that the struggle for privilege, and especially for franchise privilege, was the chief source of corruption in cities, so the leaders of the Civic Revival all advocated municipal ownership as the best way of ridding cities of this blight. None of them had any illusions that the regulation of public utilities by the city or the State would solve the problem. They firmly believed that as long as we allowed public utilities to be privately owned, the utility interests, acting through their political henchmen, would control the agency which was intended to regulate them.[9] Municipal ownership, on the other hand, would take down the prize of privilege which tempts businessmen to corrupt politics. "Did you ever hear of anybody trying to get a fire department franchise?"[10] Municipal ownership impressed Howe and

[6] William Allen White, "The Old Order Changeth: Progress in American Cities," *The American Magazine*, LXVII, pp. 603–10 (April, 1909).

[7] Washington Gladden, "Recollections" (Boston, 1909), pp. 346–48. For Steffens' theory of why public utility corporations stay in politics after having won franchises see "The Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens" (New York, 1931), pp. 527–28.

[8] Howe, "The City, the Hope of Democracy" (New York, 1905), p. 114.

[9] "Big Matt" in Whitlock's novel of the same name is the corrupt commissioner of public utilities in a middle western state.

[10] Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

Samuel M. Jones as the only system under which the economic interests of all the people would allow them to work for, rather than against, the city.

Despite their belief in the theory of competition Howe and Johnson were as willing as Jones to admit the necessity of public ownership of any industry that was naturally[11] a monopoly. Some things, of which the services rendered by public utility corporations were the best examples, could be more efficiently done by monopoly than by competition. They insisted that all such industries should be owned and operated by and for the public. Howe, who never completely lost the service ideal with which his university training had indoctrinated him, thought municipal ownership would cure the apathy which most people felt toward municipal government. "Let us give the city things to do that will make it important and beloved. Then the citizens will be proud of their city and be eager to serve it."[12]

The Civic Revivalists did not deny that municipal ownership might result in some extravagance, in some grafting, and in the temporary extension of the spoils system. The temperament of these men was such, however, that they were less disposed to worry about those possibilities than to rejoice in the greater likelihood that municipal ownership would make every citizen a critic and would free the press from the toils of privilege so that it would be able to use its energies on behalf of the people.[13] They had little fear that municipal ownership would result in an overbearing class of officeholders. "Which is more in politics, a private or a publicly-owned water plant?" asked Howe.

As evidence of the greater ease of reforming the spoils system under public as contrasted to private control, Edward W. Bemis, the superintendent of Cleveland's municipal water works in the Johnson administration, pointed out that many of the interests most opposed to Johnson's more fundamental reforms were enthusiastic in their praise of his administration's effort to put the water department on a non-partisan basis.[14] All of the Civic Revivalists thought the "oligarchy of privilege" which controlled the political parties was a greater menace to real democracy than a large officeholding class would be. We must remember, too, that they

[11] The interpretation of this word is what differentiated Jones from Johnson and Howe. With his broader conception of social values Jones would say many industries are "natural" monopolies which Johnson and Howe (at this stage of his career) would insist were monopolistic only because of the private ownership of land and resources.

[12] Howe, *op. cit.*, pp. 123–24.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 123.

[14] "The Franchise Situation in Cleveland," *Municipal Affairs*, VI, p. 261–67 (June, 1902).

meant to complement municipal ownership with political innovations calculated to bring the government under closer popular control.

Perhaps the reasons so far emphasized for the Civic Revivalists' championing of municipal ownership of public utilities were rationalizations of their belief that municipal ownership was a just system. The value of the franchises of public service corporations was made in the same way as the increase in the value of land. They looked upon both land and franchise values as unearned increments created by the growth of the city and enjoyed by private individuals who had obtained a legally-protected monopoly of things everyone needed.

The leaders of the Civic Revival believed that it was fair that the wealth the city had created should go to the city, whether the wealth took the form of land or franchise values. But since all the leaders of the Civic Revival agreed the public utilities were natural monopolies they thought that justice dictated going beyond the taxation of franchise values to municipal ownership of these monopolies. They looked upon charges for services such as street car transportation to and from work or school as burdens incidental to living in the city. Life there was practically impossible without them. Because of the common need for these services, and because of the necessarily monopolistic character of the agencies which provided them, the Civic Revivalists thought it was wrong to permit anyone to make a profit from supplying them.[15]

Jones, whose chief objection to our present economic system was that competition made men seek individual success at the expense of their fellows, was particularly conscious of the immorality of allowing public utilities to remain in private control. "I see no reason why all the people [i.e. the State] should give a few people the right to get rich off the rest of the people."[16] In his Annual Message to the Toledo City Council in 1899 Jones recommended that the city take over the job of lighting the streets. Disclaiming any personal animosity toward the company then holding the street lighting contract, he nevertheless insisted that lighting was a public necessity and hence a function that the city should perform for itself. "The people have a right to furnish their own light at cost without paying private profit to anyone."[17] Jones looked upon municipal

[15] Howe, *op. cit.*, pp. 133–34, gives the single tax justification of municipal ownership.

[16] Quoted in the *Toledo Bee*, December 6, 1897.

[17] Toledo Annual Statement . . . 1899, p. 18. In "The New Right" (New York, 1899), pp. 95–99, Jones tells of his unsuccessful attempt to establish this municipal lighting plant. Whitlock summarizes the progress of municipal ownership in Toledo in a letter to Louis F. Post, November 15, 1910, Allan Nevins, ed., "Letters and Journal of Brand Whitlock" (New York, 1936), p. 141.

ownership as a way of demonstrating the superiority of the co-operative to the competitive way of life. He believed that municipal ownership was a step forward in the process by which government was to evolve from an agency concerned with the coercion of individuals to one concerned with the management of things; from the policeman to "the means by which we do our work together."[18]

Ohio State University

[18] Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 236.

Mechanization of Southern Agriculture

As the South mechanizes, great changes are sure to follow. Larger farms, for one thing. Fewer hands to plant, care for, and harvest crops. Some small farm units will expand. Others will disappear and be absorbed in larger farms.

What is that going to mean to the family sized farm? I think that with proper guidance and assistance, it will be good for the family farm. Certainly, it will mean that some producers who are barely getting by with a hand-to-mouth existence on submarginal land with a minimum of equipment, will leave the farm for jobs in industry or the service occupations. But this is not a bad thing, if thereby they better their living standards. Others will undoubtedly get larger acreages. Farmers Home Administration will help in this as it has in the past. Tenants will be aided to ownership through that same agency. Some farmers will take their land out of uneconomic crops and diversify. If they do not have the acreage to raise livestock or to take up dairying, they may go in for more poultry and truck crops.

But always the family size farm that uses machines is going to come up against the factor of larger operating costs compared with large units. Where a tractor is employed on a 200-acre plot, the cost of operating it may be only one-third as much as if it were operated on a 50-acre plot. Obviously, the smaller farm is at a disadvantage.

There is an answer to this also: Co-operation.

Where it is not feasible for a producer to put out a large sum for farm machinery—or where the acreage is too small to permit full use of machinery—it may be possible to form a co-operative and buy machines on that basis. Or it may be more practicable to engage machinery on a custom basis. (From an address).

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USDA,
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· REVIEWS ·

Contemporary American Economic Thought

By M. BRONFENBRENNER

"All of them are learned; some are almost readable." R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism.*

Introduction

THE POSTWAR PERIOD has been one of intense activity in American economic thinking as scholars and research men have returned to their profession enlivened by interludes of government work, foreign travel, or military service. This activity has not been concentrated in any one field, and so cannot be summarized in a single essay and I propose, therefore, merely to present a few problems close to my own interests, without any profound or comprehensive criticism.[1]

I

Economics as a Logical Structure

AMERICA'S MAIN CONTRIBUTION to the basic architecture of economic thought, viewed as a logical structure, has been Paul A. Samuelson's *Foundations of Economic Analysis.* Largely written before the war, its publication was delayed by hostilities. It represents America's main overall theoretical contribution since John Bates Clark was writing at the beginning of this century. It represents in economics what "logical positivism" represents in philosophy, an attempt to reduce economics as far as possible to a scientific study limited to verifiable propositions regarding observable variables. Not only this, but Samuelson has tried to derive mathematically not only the great bulk of received economic doc-

[1] In addition (or perhaps prior) to attempting most of the reading mentioned in the text, the student would do well to look at the following works, most of them more elementary than the volumes cited.

The American Economic Association has published a *Survey of Contemporary Economics,* stressing American and English works, as well as several volumes of *Readings* in the fields of (a) *Social Control of Industry;* (b) *Business Cycle Theory;* (c) *Theory of Income Distribution;* (d) *Theory of International Trade;* (e) *Agricultural Policy.*

Three leading American university textbooks including recent economic thought are Kenneth Boulding, *Economic Analysis,* Paul A. Samuelson, *Economics,* and George J. Stigler, *Theory of Price.*

Alvin H. Hansen, *Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles* and *Monetary Theory and Fiscal Policy,* Seymour Harris (ed.), *The New Economics,* and Oscar Lange, *Price Flexibility and Employment,* are representative of the dominant Keynesian strain of thought in America.

trine, but numerous original conclusions and corrections as well, from a relatively few propositions regarding such observable variables. The book is an economic counterpart of Whitehead and Russell's *Principia Mathematica;* only modesty may have prevented Samuelson from calling it *"Principia Economica."*

Criticism of this structure, technical slips apart, has been primarily that it omits many policy and welfare issues that are and should remain of interest to the practicing economist. To these critics, particularly Kenneth Boulding,[2] the book represents an apex or summary of the revival of abstract and mathematical economic theory which has featured the period since, roughly, 1929, beyond which further progress is unlikely except by a radically different route. The time is now ripe, says Boulding, for an antithesis to this thesis, a swing in the other direction. He expects the greatest advances of the next generation in American economics to be made in the "fuzzy borderland between sociology and economics" which has been in the past the preserve of American "institutional" economics.

And indeed the time is ripe for an institutional revival, for the second generation of American institutionalism has not lived up to its heritage or progressed materially beyond the works of John R. Commons and Thorstein Veblen. On the critical side, writers like Clarence Ayres[3] continue in the Veblen tradition, belaboring the pure-competition, full-employment economics of 1900 as though nothing had been written since. On the positive side, no real institutional system has developed—Commons' *Institutional Economics* is looked on as a magnificent failure—and institutionalism has lapsed into historical and statistical compilation, into propaganda and bill drafting in the interests of organized labor and agriculture, and into worship at the shrines of Commons, Veblen, John A. Hobson and Wesley C. Mitchell.

We cannot leave the general terrain of scope and method in American economics without reference to John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern's *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.* Like Samuelson's opus, this is primarily a mathematical work of an advanced order, but it is otherwise very different. It proposes nothing less than the replacement of the present framework of theoretical and mathematical economics, based as it is on maximum and minimum conditions for the most part, by an entirely new framework based on strategy, allowing explicitly for uncertainty, and with greater scope for inter-actions between individuals. If this approach can be applied concretely (i.e., statistically), it will be able

[2] *Journal of Political Economy,* August, 1948.
[3] *Theory of Economic Progress, Divine Right of Capital,* etc.

to include within the main body of economic theory a great deal of the material formerly relegated to political scientists, sociologists, and institutional economists. It would seem a priori that the new approach should prove most useful in monopoly theory, where there is most room for strategy due to the relatively small number of participants. The main danger, of course, is of lapse into empty formalism without any real attempt at application.

II

Economics as a Predictive Science

IN THE LAST SECTION, we discussed the formulation of economic theory on the basis of variables which we might conceivably observe, whether or not we had actually observed them; the next step is to collect observations upon these variables and use them as basis for predictions and conclusions in the future. In this section, we shall consider certain attempts which are being made in the present to base predictions and conclusions on existing statistical data.

The development of such data has been extremely rapid in the United States as a result of war and postwar demands, particularly as regards the economic "aggregates," such as national income, consumption, employment, and the like. Not only the quantity but the quality of the data is constantly being improved as concepts are sharpened, estimation techniques improved, and statistical discrepancies reduced.[4] The improvements, however, have not been costless. Many a macro-economic hypothesis, promising almost to the point of acceptance under the "old" series of national income and expenditure statistics lost 5 to 10 precious points in its correlation coefficients when the U. S. Department of Commerce revised its fundamental series in 1947.

As I have just suggested, during the fifteen years which have followed the publication of Lord Keynes' *General Theory of Employment Interest and Money*, much of the work done in predictive economics in the United States (as well as in Great Britain) involved the construction of mathematical and statistical models of the Keynesian System, and the basing of predictions upon the results. This method, however, suffered a somewhat dismal setback after the close of World War II, when America Keynesians predicted a major depression in 1945–46 which is five years overdue as this is being written.[5]

[4] See in particular the *Studies in Income and Wealth*, published under the auspices of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

[5] For a bibliography, studies and explanations of the failure here, see M. Bronfenbrenner, *Southern Economic Journal*, January, 1948; also James Duesenberry, in Lloyd Metzler, et al., *Income Employment and Public Policy*.

The "model-builders" have not lost hope, and improvements along "model-building" lines are constantly being made, particularly at the Cowles Commission for Economic Research at the University of Chicago. The models being constructed presently (by Lawrence Klein and others) are far more detailed than those used in predicting the elusive depression of 1945–46. They include more variables and more observations. They also attempt detailed consideration of the aggregation problem—the extent to which the reactions between aggregates like total income and total consumption depend upon the composition of these aggregates. On the purely statistical side, they have modified the ordinary methods of least squares and now use what is known as the "simultaneous equations approach" developed in America by the Norwegian statistician Trygve Haavelmo and others.[6] This is not the place to explore the statistical intricacies of this approach, except to point out that it operates to avoid inconsistency in the direction of measurement of deviations as between the different equations of a single statistical model, and therefore to avoid statistical bias in the final result. Profiting by the experience of its wartime predecessors, the Cowles Commission has wisely postponed publication of its ambitious model until sufficient time has elapsed to test the model's forecasting as well as back-casting powers. Publication is scheduled for 1950.

Another approach to the prediction problem is being made at several U. S. Government agencies in Washington, and also at the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. Workers at these institutions are hoping to be able to base short-time predictions with great accuracy upon the beliefs and plans of individuals with regard to consumption, investment, etc., as revealed by their answers to detailed personal interviews. The whole "interview" approach, of course, suffered a severe shock in November 1948 by erroneous predictions of the outcome of the presidential election by the various "polls." Its economic predictions have been subjected as yet to no such dramatic refutation, but the atmosphere of skepticism has expanded to include these predictions as well.

III

Economics as a Tool for Policy

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT set up in the Employment Act of 1946 a Council of Economic Advisers which in periodic reports (a minimum of two per year) informs the President and Congress of its views as to the economic health of the nation. Under the Truman Administration, how-

[6] Haavelmo's basic work is entitled *The Probability Approach in Econometrics.*

ever, the Council has come to represent a definite point of view, in this case "Left-wing" New Deal, with a strong belief that inequality in the distribution of income and wealth is the source of most of the world's economic problems.[7] Its pronouncements are not accepted generally as impartial, therefore, and there has been disharmony within the Council itself, leading in 1949 to the resignation of the chairman, Edwin G. Nourse, in protest against the Council's endorsement of deficit spending as a remedy for the recession of that year. Whatever may be the future of the Council itself, it is highly questionable whether American economics has yet progressed far enough to permit any group of economists being set up as an economic Supreme Court, either for the United States or for any country under American occupation.

Thinkers on economic policy and welfare economics in the universities and in less authoritative posts of the American civil service differ widely among themselves in their economic prescriptions. The really basic cleavage, in this writer's opinion, is between the thinkers who do and those who do not base their prescriptions upon the "optimum conditions" (production at minimum cost for maximum satisfaction, with each resource paid according to its contribution measured by marginal productivity) which are supposedly satisfied by the ideal competitive price system.

The so-called Chicago School of economic policy, whose intellectual parent is Frank H. Knight, but whose best-known publicist is Henry C. Simons, author of *Economic Policy for a Free Society,* believes these optimum conditions would, in fact, be realized quickly and painlessly in a free economy, despite the complications raised by economic progress and the possible multiplicity or instability of equilibrium conditions, if three conditions were satisfied. (1) Elimination of all seriously monopolistic restrictions on the supply of goods and labor. (2) Monetary policy devoted to maintaining a stable price level, or, alternatively, a stable level of government expenditures, without any guarantee of full employment for products and resources which priced themselves out of their markets. (3) Mitigation of inequality by taxation (particularly the progressive personal income tax) rather than by interference with the pricing of goods and services. David McCord Wright (*Democracy and Progress*) and Frank D. Graham (*Social Goals and Economic Institutions*) have taken a similar conservative line without direct influence from Chicago. Wright

[7] The semiannual *Reports* of the Council of Economic Advisers, as well as its occasional special reports, are available from the U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. For a criticism, see, M. Bronfenbrenner, *Journal of Political Economy,* October, 1948.

is less inclined than the Chicago group towards equalitarian redistribution of wealth and income, and Graham places great stress on a commodity money based on a composite of durable and storable goods as a cure for both inflation boom and depression unemployment.

The same line of thought has made its influence felt even among American partisans of a planned or controlled economy. Abba P. Lerner, in his *Economics of Control,* is perhaps outstanding among writers who believe on the one hand that economic planning will degenerate into dictatorship unless it uses "economic rationality," i.e., the competitive optimum conditions, as rules governing its decisions, and on the other hand who doubt that these optimum conditions can ever be realized by the free play of a market economy without strong injections of socialist controls. Oscar Lange's *Economic Theory of Socialism* expressed the same position seven years in advance of Lerner's book, but Lange's views have presumably changed or been changed since his return to his native Poland, where he continues alive and unpurged as of last report.

Most American planners, like planners elsewhere, throw "economic rationality" out the window, and prefer to operate on the quasi-military basis of "Father Knows Best" or "Me (and My Gang) for Dictator," unhampered by any rules whatever. Along this line, the most interesting development has been the approach known as Linear Programming. Adherents of this approach abandon economic theory in favor of elaborate imput and output relationships between different types of goods and labor, or other sectors of the economy, such as the imput-output tables developed by Wassily Loentief[8], which enable them to work out in great detail the ramifications or repercussions of alternative policies which they are considering. On the basis of such tables, they try to work out maximum results for a given cost either in money or materials, or minimum costs for a given result, without asking embarrassing questions about prices and price changes. This type of planning resembles that believed to be used in the Soviet-controlled countries. The statistical work involved has been greatly facilitated in recent years by the development of electronic and other automatic calculating machines which can work out the requisite computations with remarkable celerity. Linear programming has been used in America, to the best of my knowledge, only by the military (an ominous development) for determining the best allocations of shipping space during the war, of air cargo space during the Berlin blockade, and

[8] Leontief's major work in this field is entitled *Structure of the American Economy.* Professor Leontief is, of course, not responsible for the uses to which his work has been put.

so on. It is believed to figure significantly in plans for American economic mobilization for any future "national emergency," temporary or otherwise.

IV

Dynamics or Growth

PASSING NOW to a few of the specific questions receiving new or increased attention from American economists, the problem of economic dynamics or growth comes first to mind. Out of the Kenesian discussion of the later nineteen thirties, with the stress laid by most writers on increased investment as a way out of depression unemployment, there has come a revival of interest on the longer-run effects of such investment or capital accumulation.

Is there, in the first place, any mechanism operating to keep the actual rate of growth in line with the rate warranted by the current expectations of businessmen, to say nothing of the normal rate required to maintain full employment? The terms are those of R. F. Harrod in Great Britain (*Towards a Dynamic Economics*), but the problem is at least as old as Marx and many American writers are disposed to be pessimistic, as is Harrod himself. Evsey Domar, who has written widely on growth problems[9], sees a dilemma in that the very investment which provides employment in one period may displace employment subsequently; he sees accumulation at increasing rates as necessary to maintain prosperity under capitalism, and is inclined to look toward government for the solution. David McCord Wright (*Economics of Disturbance*) focuses attention on a different aspect of the problem, the cyclical oscillations resulting from fluctuations in the rates of an economy's growth. He sees these as basic to the observed business cycle and doubts whether the cycle can be eliminated by economic planning except at the cost of damping down the growth rate when it rises most rapidly. Neither of these ideas is original in any strict sense, but their revival after years of relative neglect is indicative of the trend American economics is taking.

As is clear from the discussion of Domar's work above, the "stagnation thesis" or "mature economy" discussion is still an issue in America, despite the persistence of postwar prosperity. Many Keynesians, particularly the Harvard group (Alvin Hansen, Seymour Harris, Domar, himself), see an inceasing volume of public investment, artificial encouragement of high consumption, and perhaps a rising national debt as requisite to any

[9] *American Economic Review*, December, 1944 and March, 1947, *Econometrica*, April, 1946.

really long-term prosperity in the United States. Others, including not only business spokesmen but also the Chicago group already mentioned, think of investment outlets as nearly unlimited at going rates of interest (i.e., they see the demand for new capital as almost infinitely elastic) except for the influence of monopoly, particularly of labor monopoly as exercised through the trade unions. George Terborgh's *Bogey of Economic Maturity,* written under the auspices of a trade association, is an example of this type of literature.

Still another group of writers on economic growth rely on time series and their extrapolation to portray America's economic future, either without specifying the mechanism through which the extrapolation is to take place or advocating continuance of the economic system which allegedly caused the trends which are being extrapolated. The results of such extrapolations are usually highly optimistic in terms of the possible output, productivity and living standard America can expect in another generation or two if past trends are allowed to continue, and the whole method is considered ultraconservative in its implications. Among the writers taking this general line have been Harold G. Moulton, Sumner Slichter, and W. S. Woytinsky. Perhaps the fullest postwar presentation can be found in a Twentieth Century Fund publication entitled *America's Needs and Resources.*

V

Unemployment versus Inflation?

MANY AMERICAN ECONOMISTS, who ten years ago looked on full employment as an end in itself, are now wondering, on the basis of wartime and postwar experience in America and abroad, whether assured full employment is really worth its price in either permanent inflation, burdensome and arbitrary economic controls, or some combination of both. The problem is particularly acute when business, labor, and agriculture are all organized to press for constantly higher remuneration, but few believe it could be eliminated entirely in the most atomistically competitive economy.

We may mention Sumner Slichter (*The American Economy,* as well as a multitude of newspaper and magazine articles) as the most influential leader among those who feel that, particularly with increased labor influence in American politics, Americans must resign themselves to a "stair-step" inflation, with prices and wages rising during every boom and supported during every depression. Melvin Reder has formulated the same proposition theoretically[10], taking the position that a pressure-group

[10] *Canadian Journal of Economics,* February, 1949.

economy is unstable under full employment, in the sense that the total money demands of all organized groups in such an economy can be expected to exceed the total money national income at any price level whatever!

Under these conditions, many American economists are now willing to abandon the full-employment criterion for policy altogether, and use the threat of unemployment quite deliberately as a means for keeping pressure groups in line and moderating their money demands. The Chicago School should be mentioned particularly here, although its members are not in complete agreement among themselves. Henry Simons and L. W. Mints[11], for example, think in terms of a stable price level maintained through monetary and fiscal policy regardless of the degree of employment. Milton Friedman, on the other hand[12], would prefer the volume of government peacetime spending (in real terms), and also the tax rate structure maintained even if both prices and employment should vary. (This type of proposal, called "built-in flexibility" of the fiscal system, has the support of many business groups, including the Committee for Economic Development, who have been impressed by the destabilizing and inhibiting effects of fear regarding possible high future taxes even when present ones seem reasonable).

VI

Monopoly and Social Control

A NUMBER OF NEW PROBLEMS in both economic theory and economic policy have arisen in connection with monopoly and the public regulation of business. I shall mention only a few, which may be of general interest:

(1) There is a strong undercurrent of dissatisfaction with all received-monopoly and imperfect-competition doctrine. Its assumption of short-term profit maximization on marginal principles seem unrealistic, its results are not always identical with those observed in the market place, it leaves a number of important cases "indeterminate" without any solutions whatever, and it fails to provide administrators with any clear criterion for deciding what is a monopoly or monopolistic practice and what is not. There is a great opportunity for someone here, perhaps someone adept in the new techniques of the von Neumann and Morgenstern "Theory of Games."

(2) With the growth in strength and membership of the leading American trade unions, both national and local, has come a demand by some

[11] *Review of Economic Statistics*, February, 1946.
[12] *American Economic Review*, June, 1948.

economists and businessmen for a re-examination of the policy by which trade unions have been exempted from prosecution under antimonopoly legislation in their collective-bargaining activities. The issue was raised by Thurman Arnold in a book entitled *The Bottlenecks of Business*, written during the author's tenure as Assistant Attorney General of the United States, and the Chicago School strongly favors regulation of trade unions under the monopoly statutes. On the other side, in favor of the status quo, are arrayed the great bulk of American labor economists, led by Richard A. Lester and Arthur M. Ross[13], who deny that unions are monopolies or that it is practicable to regulate them as such.

(3) A recent court case involving the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, one of America's leading chain grocery stores, has raised the question whether monopolies (buyer's monopolies) are to be condemned by the public even when they pass on to the consumer the cost reductions they obtain by squeezing their suppliers. The Supreme Court and the U. S. Department of Justice have answered the question in the affirmative, but many professional economists, looking at the matter from the consumers' point of view, have disagreed sharply with the Court's decision.[14]

(4) Other postwar Supreme Court decisions, relating to the steel and cement industries, have forbidden agreements to price products delivered to the purchaser, with freight charges paid by the seller from some "basing point" which may not be the point of actual shipment—it may, for instance, be the plant of a competing seller. These decisions have aroused a storm of protest from business interests, and have revived professional controversy as to whether the elimination of "basing-point pricing" is in fact a step toward competition or toward monopoly. Fritz Machlup in a recent book[15] has established himself as a leading theoretical antagonist of basing-point pricing, with J. M. Clark as the outstanding spokesman for the other side.

(5) Joseph Schumpeter in his *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, created a minor furore by challenging the traditional American anti-monopoly position on dynamic grounds. In the long run, suggested Schumpeter, the restrictive practices of monopoly should be looked on as nothing but reasonable service charges for the more rapid rate of tech-

[13] Lester, *Journal of Political Economy*, December, 1947. and for a general denial of the applicability of marginal analysis to wage and employment problems, *American Economic Review*, March, 1946 and March, 1947; Ross, *Trade Union Wage Policies*.

[14] American Economic Association, *Proceedings*, May, 1949; also, Morris Adelman, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, May, 1949, and *Review of Economics and Statistics*, August, 1949.

[15] *The Basing Point System*.

nological progress, and therefore eventual higher output and lower cost, which business has brought forth when insured against too much or too rapid competitive pressure. This heresy has found favor both in ultra-conservative and left-wing socialist circles, although for different reasons, but it has been opposed by most American economists of professional status, including Wright and Domar among those who have specialized in problems of growth and dynamics.

VII

International Economics

THE WAR has brought about a great revival of interest among American economists in the problems of international economics, which had been relegated previously to a narrow group of specialists. The realities of American foreign aid and foreign investment programs, America's part in international economic agreements on currency and trade, and America's world-wide economic and political rivalry with the Soviet bloc, have changed all this and made international economics one of the most popular specialties among university students and other prospective economists.

In international trade theory, the great postwar storm center is the thesis which has come to be associated with the names of Thomas Balogh in Great Britain and Ragnar Frisch in Norway[17], that stable international economic equilibrium is a snare and a delusion. According to these authorities, normal multilateral trade relations between nations do not necessarily or even probably lead to stable equilibria. Instability is rather the probable result, particularly if the countries concerned wish to maintain full employment, or if they are moving at different rates of technological progress.

If this thesis is correct, the United States is misguided in her attempts to lead the world economy back to freer and more multilateral trade. If this thesis is correct, there are no such things as "equilibrium exchange rates," for example, between currencies; "fundamental disequilibrium" is the order of the day. If there are no stable equilibrium exchange rates, trade must be planned quantitatively. If trade must be planned quantitatively, bilateral agreements, exchange controls, and "discrimination" against countries "exporting unemployment" or exceeding the world level of technological advance—meaning specifically the United States—must remain permanent features of the world economy.

[16] *American Economic Review*, September, 1949.

[17] Balogh, Contributions to Oxford Institute of Statistics, *Economics of Full Employment* and to Seymour Harris (ed.) *Foreign Economic Policies for the United States*, also, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, February, 1949; Frisch, *American Economic Review*, December, 1947.

Most American writers, both in Government service and in the universities, are skeptical of this thesis. Except for a minority of planners and ultra-Keynesians, they think in terms of finding equilibrium exchange rates which will solve the world dollar shortage and permit not only multilateral trade but also free international capital movements, once a reasonable degree of confidence in the international political situation has been restored. Within the United States Government, Clair Wilcox has been a leader along this relatively optimistic line of thought; in academic circles, Gottfried Haberler has been a prominent spokesman.[18]

Another much-discussed problem has been the proper relationship between free and planned economies. Most American writers, led by Jacob Viner[19], doubt the wisdom of allowing a free economy to become too dependent on the decisions of foreign-planning authorities, just as European writers came to question the wisdom of maintaining the international gold standard after the world gold supply had become concentrated in the United States and dependent on the decisions of American monetary authorities. In general, then, American economists think in terms of minimizing the trade relations between market and planned economies, a policy more practicable for a relatively autonomous country like the United States than for a relatively dependent country like Japan.

American economists are also interested professionally in the problems related to the supply of capital to undeveloped areas, or to areas damaged by the war. There is a great deal of discussion as to whether the capital should be supplied as a gift or as a loan, whether by public or private bodies, whether by the United States alone or by international bodies such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, whether interest should be charged, and whether supervision should be exercised over the uses to which the loans are put.

The problem of safeguards, of course, is a bilateral one. What control, if any, should the lender have over the uses to which his funds are put? What assurances, if any, should be given of his right to convert interest, principal, and possible profits into his own currency? What protection, if any, has he a right to expect against nationalization of foreign-controlled enterprises or discriminatory competition against them? On the other hand, what protection, if any, should be given the borrower against "exploitation" of native labor, monopolization of skilled positions by foreigners, and other forms of "economic imperialism"?

[18] *American Economic Review*, September, 1948, and contribution to Seymour Harris (ed.), *op. cit.*

[19] Viner, contributions to American Economic Association, *Readings in the Theory of International Trade.*

These questions are not being answered on any overall basis. But, as a by-product of interest in special problems of foreign economic development there is rapidly expanding in the United States a group of "regional economists," well trained both in general economics and in the problems of a single country or area, such as Latin America or the Soviet Union.

VIII

Marxian Economics in America

THERE IS, in America, little interest in Marxian economics within government or university circles. American Marxism is centered in special party circles, study groups, "worker's schools," and the like. Marxian economics as economics is not greatly stressed, and most of it does not go beyond parroting the most elementary and crude pamphlet versions of Marxism. Only a minority of professed American Marxists have ever read *Das Kapital, Anti Dühring,* or other Marxian classics. This situation is due, in part, to suppression of Marxist thought by "Red-baiters," Fascists, and people they have terrified. It is particularly serious at present because of the "Cold War," and has progressed to the point where no leading Marxist holds a chair in economics at any major American university. On the other hand, the American Communist party is, itself, partially responsible for the relative stagnation of American Marxism since the existence and enforcement of a party line dominated by Russian thought has tended to stifle independent fundamental research on Marxism in the relatively distant outposts of America.

The only outstanding recent American economic works from the Marxian point of view have been written by Paul M. Sweezy whose conversion to Marxism has been relatively recent. His *Theory of Capital Development* is a major contribution to the scanty literature on Marxism in English; his later volume on *Socialism* is more elementary.

The main problems discussed by contemporary American Marxist economists appear to be the imminence of the final collapse of capitalism and the relation between Marxian and Keynesian economic policies. There is relatively little interest in the discussion regarding the validity and relevance of Marxian value theory for a socialist economy.

American Marxist thought has followed that of Russia as regards the possible survival of capitalism. Immediately after the war, the thesis of Eugene Varga, to the effect that the war indicated capitalism's ability to plan, to stabilize itself, and therefore to increase its life expectancy, found considerable acceptance, but it is today heresy in America as well as in the Soviet Union. The official communist position appears to be that Amer-

ican capitalism can neither avoid nor survive the next depression, whose international repercussions will generate the final crisis of capitalism.

American Marxists take two divergent positions as regards Keynesian thought. Most favorable is the position taken by Sweezy and by Klein (*Keynesian Revolution*) that Keynesian policies are generally correct, but politically unworkable in a capitalist society and largely anticipated by Marx and his followers. Less favorable has been the communist "party line" reaction which follows the usual Russian criticism; in this view Keynes and his disciples propose simply to inflate the currency and alter the method of exploiting the proletariat from unemployment and wage cuts to inflation and price increases, whereas, in fact, no fundamental reform can possibly be brought about by purely monetary and financial manipulations so long as the class relationships of capitalism are left undisturbed. This view is accepted generally, not only by the Communists, but by the other Marxian political groups in America, most of which owe allegiance directly or indirectly to Leon Trotsky.

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Sociologia de la Politica Hispanoamericana. By Julio Ycaza Tigerino. Madrid: Seminario de Problemas Hispanoamericanos (Marqués del Riscal, 3), 1950, 344 pp., 25 ptas.

Because of his advocacy of *hispanismo* and nationalism, Señor Ycaza Tigerino, a Nicaraguan journalist, is an emigré in Spain. His book, which is based on his lectures at the Instituto de Cultura Hispánica in Madrid, is ideology rather than sociology. It will be useful for understanding the currents in Mexican, Central American and Chilean politics with which he is identified.

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